I recently finished Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety [0]. I can't recommend the book enough for how eye opening it really is into how blasé we have been with nuclear weapons.
We've been reckless and by all accounts it is a miracle we haven't had a serious accident (there have been a few, just not on our own soil). The number of close calls is just astounding.
Further the book, at one point, talks about America's position on Russia and the attempts to keep them from getting "the bomb". It is exactly what has played out and will continue to play out with North Korea and Iran. History is repeating itself and we sure haven't learned from it.
It worked so 'well' that it lost part of it's territory.
From Budapest Memorandum Wiki:
'The memorandum included security assurances against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.'
Now it will be a lesson for others: nukes are way more reliable than some piece of paper, which no one is gonna follow: http://www.dw.com/en/ukraines-forgotten-security-guarantee-t...
"Now it will be a lesson for others: nukes are way more reliable than some piece of paper, which no one is gonna follow"
Is it really though? Even if Ukraine had nukes, would it have threatened and actually have the will to use it over the lost of the Crimea? The conflict was low intensity warfare, which nukes are not particularly well suited for. I don't think nukes are the be-all-end-all weapons people think they are. There are huge consequences to using them, especially against another nuclear power.
> Even if Ukraine had nukes, would it have threatened and actually have the will to use it over the lost of the Crimea?
Over a conventional invasion by a neighboring nation-state with massive conventional superiority with a paper-thin cover story?
Probably. I mean, that’s why the USSR didn't pull that stunt against any of the NATO countries bordering its satellites, ever, even though they did similar things to other neighbors. And those bordering states were merely allies of the nuclear powers, not nuclear powers themselves.
Crimea is 70% ethnically Russian and the majority wanted to become part of Russia. Russia invaded and held a vote. Ukraine's response to that was that the vote should not have happened not because it was undemocratic, but because it was unconstitutional.
If the invasion involved limited or no violence and ended up with a democratic vote that was otherwise going to be suppressed, I'm not so sure that's such a bad thing.
The inability for countries to peacefully reorganise themselves with clear democratic mandates, both enabling the rights of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority, is a major problem, and one that could well define the 21st century.
So what would Ukraine have done if they had nukes? Nuked the enemy troops in the Crimaea, with their own population in the way? Or bomb some Russian city and start a nuclear war ...against the second larges nuclear power?
Honestly, use of nuclear weapons just sounds like pure madness, no matter what the threat one is under. I mean, unless we're talking about an alien invasion (and I'm not impartial to keeping around a few nukes just in case that ever happens).
Nope. There is no precedent for invading a nuclear armed state. So much can go wrong so fast that diplomacy is always preferred to war. Isn't it wonderful what a little nuclear leverage can do for you ?
Ukraine doesn't consider Crimea inhabitants Ukrainians. They call them traitors and hate them (it's not an official position, just guessing from comments in social media - if you can read Russian, you'll find such comments easily)
Secondly, imo the nature of the conflict is less important than whether a concentrated population of the adversary's citizens are within range of the weapon as far as determining the effectiveness of nuclear deterrent.
> Even if Ukraine had nukes, would it have threatened and actually have the will to use it over the lost of the Crimea?
Would those that made the decision to invade have accepted the risk of even the most minute possibility? No leader has done that so far.
China, India and Pakistan, all three of them nuclear powers, have been fighting a low-level conflict over Kashmir for several decades. So far none of them has nuked the others.
Presumably, they realise the consequences of dropping a nuclear bomb in a region of the world with a couple billion people or three.
Didn't know much about this conflict, thank you for educating me. One other difference between those combatants and a theoretically nuclear armed Ukraine is that that war is more widely seem as an existential threat to an independent Ukraine. Kashmir political disagreement seems to rest on somewhat more limited territorial claims versus the desire of one party to post its military inside the other as well as to exert widespread political influence.
And no one has lost any territory to the other since they developed nuclear weapons. All conventional millitary conflicts date from before they became nuclear powers.
Ukraine couldn't have used the threat of nukes WRT Crimea. It happened too fast (IIRC Russians used old school messengers to avoid Western SIGINT), and at least the majority of the population supported or did not actively oppose them (e.g. Ukrainian generals defecting to the Russians)
It's another story WRT to Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine's military units had poor morale and were repeatedly destroyed by regular Russian soldiers AKA "volunteers". The time frame is not days as in Crimea. Perhaps the threat of nukes would have stopped Russian tanks and soldiers from "volunteering" in Ukraine.
It is now up to the armchair historians and alt-history writers to contemplate the what-ifs.
The utility of nuclear weapons is strategic, not tactical. The only relevant deterrent is their use against against major cities for which speed is not really relevant. What's relevant is maintaining launch capability in your control - hence major powers go for stealthy submarine platforms.
And the lesson has been rammed home multiple times by now unfortunately... Iraq, Libya, Ukraine... so it's not even ambiguous. All politicians of calibre by now understand this.
Nuclear weapons wouldn't have help Gaddafi anyways. He didn't have a working weapon nor a reliable way to delivering it. Also, what was he going to do with one? Threaten the US with one if the internal rebellions don't stop? Threaten to nuke his own people?
There's an illusion of the utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons might be OK if you want to destroy masses of conventional armies or destroy the ability of an enemy fighting a heavily industrialized conventional form of war. Unless the destructive power of nukes fit into your overall strategy, it's better not to have them or waste the resources developing them (along with the risk of sanctions, etc.)
Had Gaddafi developed a working nuclear bomb with the necessary delivery mechanism, would France/UK/US have launched a campaign that ultimately ended with his death? We will never know, only speculate, but North Korea is betting that the answer to this question is "no".
The reason for this is arguably because we could not. North Korea borders both China and what was at the time the Soviet Union. The cliff notes of the Korean War (at least after the point of division and active war) are that North Korea decided to invade South Korea. They had South Korea on the brink of destruction and then the UN/US intervened on behalf of South Korea.
The US/UN enforces then pushed the North Korean forces back north and to the brink of destruction. Then Chinese (and to a much lesser degree Soviet) forces intervened on behalf of North Korea and pushed US/UN forces back beginning a sort of see-saw that ended up with neither coalition able to make meaningful progress. After some time of a back and forth, an armistice was signed.
I think it's somewhat unclear how the balance of powers changed in the time after this.
Quite true. Though western countries didn't attack Gaddafi before he gave up nuke either.
The speculation I've heard (on radio, so I cannot paste a link) is that NK analysis is roughly: NK's regime is safe as long as China sees it as useful (probably using NK as some sort of buffer state against US), but sooner or later that support will end. Then only nuclear weapons will ensure NK's regime survival. It's rational, though again just speculation.
The contradiction, or maybe unintended side effect, is that the developing of nuclear weapons itself is causing China to rethink its support of NK regime...
Not saying the hypothesis you put forward is wrong but I've heard a very convincing complementary one:
Kim's goals are:
1. Survival of the Kim leadership
2. Reunification of Korea
To achieve the latter (and also the prior), he needs to remove the US from intervening in any conflict on the Korean peninsula. If he had a credible threat to any major US city, then the US would have to weight the freedom of S. Korea vs. the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
Kim has a substantial problem in that premise, regarding China.
At this point we have to assume North Korea will soon have dozens of nuclear weapons (basically as many as they can manage to make), and in a few years that they'll have dozens capable of being placed on an ICBM that can hit most US cities. Their progress has accelerated dramatically, that will probably make such numbers very feasible.
Now, following the premise of keeping the US out of it by way of the risk that the US will lose several or more of its major cities. Here's the problem. If the US loses a dozen of its major cities, we'll destroy China in retaliation for making the North Korea situation possible to begin with. There's no scenario where the US just absorbs that kind of vast destruction, trades nukes with North Korea and says: oh well, woe is me. China will lose hundreds of millions of its people - Beijing, Shanghai, etc - if the US sees its biggest cities nuked. The American public will demand all enablers of North Korea be held accountable, it'll lead to the classic global nuclear war scenario, a billion people die.
If the US loses one city, that'll be an extreme tragedy that the US can absorb, while obliterating NK in response.
If the US loses its top dozen (or more) cities in a nuclear exchange with North Korea, there's no scenario under which the American public won't demand retribution against the enabling power/s that made that outcome possible. China would be guaranteed to get nuked as a consequence, given its responsibility for propping up and nurturing the Kim dynasty. If the US loses half of its civilization, it will respond exactly as one might expect.
You can't actually think the American public is going to sit on its collective hands and suffer its outcome quietly? That they'd be ok with trading NY, LA, SF, Seattle, Houston, Washington DC, et al. for Pyongyang and call it a day, while China goes on about its business, its civilization unscathed, like its actions over five decades didn't make the North Korean threat what it was. If it weren't for China, the US would have destroyed the Kim dynasty during the Korean War and unified Korea. They're responsible in every possible way for what North Korea is today, they propped them up and supported each regime with full understanding of what was going on in regards to the North's nuclear program across decades. Even if I don't agree with that premise, of holding China accountable in such a way, you can bet a just-been-nuked-40-times American public will, they'll ask a simple question: who has been North Korea's primary supporting ally?
Xi Jinping does not like Kim at all. I suspect if NK continues the current course and gets close to launching China will invade NK and remove the leadership. They primarily want a stable region not under US control. A NK modernized in the Chinese communi-capitalist manner would benefit everyone.
Ths US population lives down-wind of China. I’m guessing the demand for more nuclear fallout will be at an all-time low after dozens of US cities are nuked.
Also, I’ve seen MASH. The US’s pointless war was as responsible for North Korea as anything else.
Anyway, I really doubt there will ever be significant popular demand for nuclear war.
Indeed. It's the whole reason to never allow a nuclear conflict to erupt in the first place. And particularly to not get into a scenario where a weak third world type power can threaten the existence of a superpower (because it may topple the MAD premise in the after-consequences; MAD has a rarely discussed psychological requirement involving the people of a nation: acceptable parity exchange, aka great powers with a lot to lose choosing to not destroy each other; ie how does a superpower react to being destroyed by a country like NK? what's left of MAD afterward?).
"Internal" rebellions in nations tend to be sponsored and supported by other nations. A leaked diplomatic cable [1] from 2009 described Gaddafi as "an important ally in the war on terrorism, noting that common enemies sometimes make better friends." The "common enemy" Senator Lieberman was referring to are groups we were calling terrorists at the time. They're the same groups that we would decide to arm, support, and ultimately help overthrow Libya 2 years later.
This is hardly a secret and a retaliatory strike from Libya would have been justified. And ultimately that's what nukes provide. North Korea is not deterring a US invasion by threatening to nuke our invading soldiers. They're deterring an invasion by implicitly threatening to nuke South Korea. If the US invaded North Korea and it ended up costing millons of lives and billions/trillions of damage in South Korea, the responsibility for that change would lay with the US as they threw the first punch. On the other hand, if North Korea engaged in any substantial preemptive attack themselves - then any loss of life could be argued as saving even more lives; similar to how we ended WW2 by nuking hundreds of thousands of otherwise innocent civilians.
>Also, what was he going to do with one? Threaten the US with one if the internal rebellions don't stop? Threaten to nuke his own people?
prevent the US from intervening/preventing him from putting down internal rebellions. the risk of nuclear escalation gives you a much greater license to do things that fly in the face of international conventions.
I think the question is "how would he do all this"? Realistically speaking, if you can't hit your enemy because they're too far for your nuclear weapons and the only opportunity you have to hit them is if they invade your territory (in which case you're nuking yourself) then having nuclear weapons is not much more of a deterrent than threatening suicide: you're just hoping your opponent will take pity on you.
there are plenty of creative avenues that the weight of existential risk combined with the ability to vaporize a few square miles gives you. read about the samson option.
If you think Gaddafi was a particularly bad guy, you need to watch Adam Curtis' excellent documentary 'Hypernormalisation', still available on the BBC iplayer, and probably elsewhere too
I worked around nuclear weapon systems and TBH came away with the opposite impression. I grew up terrified of the military and panic mongering about of "THE BOMBS!" from family, media, etc. But after this, I ironically came away feeling much safer seeing how professional and serious people took their jobs.
> I grew up terrified of the military and panic mongering about of "THE BOMBS!"
It's probably not intended that way, but the above is a bit of a strawman. There are many serious reasons to be concerned.
For example, a few years ago it was discovered that the Air Force units operating the missiles had very low morale, there was widespread cheating on qualification exams, significant disregard for safety regulations, and a problem with drug use. Also, the general in charge had a drinking problem so bad that he went on a binge in Moscow.
Before that, it was discovered that the Air Force lost track of several nuclear weapons. The Secretary of Defense at the time, Bob Gates, fired multiple Air Force leaders.
Outside the missile field, maybe 10 years ago peaceful civilian protestors penetrated a complex storing highly enriched uranium or plutonium (weapons-grade materials, IIRC), and spent something like 20 minutes adjacent to the building containing the materials before security discovered them.
IMHO, with something this dangerous, the greatest threat is complacence and trust. We are dealing with human beings who we are requiring to be vigilant over a period of generations - something people are very poor at for even a short time. Trust, but verify said Reagan of the Soviet Union, and that applies to our side too.
Some nuclear plant worker told the same on reddit. We're all very concerned about nuclear plant since Fukushima and we all saw mistakes. But the guy basically said he wouldn't work in any other place considering how well it was done and operated.
Fukushima should be an eye opener because that mistake and accident cost many lives. It made innocents suffer due to health problems.. who might never recover.
"there were no deaths caused by acute radiation syndrome. Given the uncertain health effects of low-dose radiation, cancer deaths cannot be ruled out. However, no discernible increase in the rate of cancer deaths is expected."[0]
I'd be curious what your takeaway is from the book.
At one point one of the regulators in the Safety Commission stopped receiving reports about accidents because the Air Force knew that this would be used as ammunition to fix the Titan II safety issues that had been in place for decades.
The problem is not that we are blasé about nuclear weapons. For the most part we are completely ignorant about them.
No, the problem is that we assume that we wouldn’t put clowns in charge of something this dangerous. So when we put clowns in charge of nuclear weapons and they inevitably fuck up (and not just a bit), we either refuse to believe it is even possible or we assume it is a rare accident.
If you read the literature, there were plenty of people in the industry who were well aware of these problems and worked tirelessly to fix them (making them clown-proof), since around 1960. The military brass actively worked to thwart their efforts.
I was referring to the general public, as (mis)informed by the media. But also the general attitude the public tends to have about whether or not people in important positions are competent.
This is probably what will happen with terrorist attacks. There is no way they will stop now that medias love to talk about them, and there is no way they will decrease. We'll just grow tired of them.
There are not a lot of controls that work really well. And a lot of the controls that do exist were fought for tooth and nail. That is the entire point of the book. :)
For example, the locks in place at each Titan II facility all had exactly the same code (1111). And they were left unlocked.
Keep in mind that the article we're discussing is about a 53 year old event that was _just_ revealed. There are more of them -- we just don't know about it, yet.
The other way to interpret these facts is that it takes a lot of work to actually detonate a nuclear weapon, so they are pretty safe by default and can handle abuse.
To actually detonate a nuke it pretty much has to be armed and intentionally dropped. That said, there's a much lower barrier for scattering nuclear material all over the countryside.
As an example, an implosion type bomb needs to be detonated at several places around the bomb simultaneously. It's designed such that if you don't have detonation of the explosives all at the exact same time then the pit won't make a nuclear blast.
They're very safe in terms of accidental nuclear detonation, but still, if the explosives are detonated it's going to make quite a mess to say the least.
> Further the book, at one point, talks about America's position on Russia and the attempts to keep them from getting "the bomb". It is exactly what has played out and will continue to play out with North Korea and Iran. History is repeating itself and we sure haven't learned from it.
Is it actually similar, though?
The US got the bomb in 1945.
The Russians got theirs in 1949.
Given the size of the Soviet Union, how far it is from the United States, the available spying and reconnaissance technology (no satellites, no stealth aircraft), and that the US was only four years out of World War II, I don't think there is any way the US could have made a creditable threat to use military force to stop the Russians.
Also, China and Russia were still on good terms back then. China might not have stayed out of it if the US attacked their ally and neighbor.
Compare to North Korea and Iran. In both cases the US can make a creditable military threat. From a purely military point of view, the US could easily wipe either (or both) of them out.
Furthermore, neither has any powerful allies who want them to get nukes.
With North Korea, their only powerful ally is China and I don't think China actually cares if North Korea gets destroyed as long as (1) it doesn't send a lot of refugees across the Chinese border, and (2) whatever replaces it continues to function as a buffer zone between them and South Korea because they do not want a US ally right on their border.
That’s not quite an accurate read though, at least as far as NK. The US can’t really make a credible military threat because of the north’s proximity to the south, an important US ally and a country all but guaranteed to be mortally wounded in the event of north/USA hostilities.
Sure we can. We have the capability to totally annihilate as much of North Korea as we need in order to prevent a counter attack. The question is if we are willing to do it, and kill millions of North Korean civilians. Trump is sure trying to convince the North Koreans that he is.
> We have the capability to annihilate as much of NK as we need to prevent a counterattack
...from North Korea
If we start launching nukes in the direction of NK, how does China know it's going to stop in NK and not hit them? Do we call them up first? Then what do they say?
Is it totally out of the question that China would panic (or reason?) and counterattack? NK doesn't exist in a vacuum, and in fact NK wouldn't exist at all today had China not intervened in the last war.
NK is an ongoing humanitarian disaster right now. At the moment, everybody is standing by blaming the NK regime for not acting to resolve it. If you remove the regime, the crisis gets much worse. If you bomb the country, the crisis gets much, much worse.
When you are done bombing the snot out of NK, who will pick up the pieces? Who will be on the hook for millions of starving people? Who will be the neighbor that gets slammed by the masses of humanity in desperation?
You think China hasn't thought about all this? You think they won't automatically recognize the obvious and enormous threat to themselves? Every missile that lands in NK is a direct threat to China.
It's simple orbital mechanics to calculate the trajectory. ICBMs aren't like planes, it's not like they just fly to the target and stop. It's powered during the first minutes of flight and then it just coasts from there. The exception to this is MIRV ICBMs where warheads are deployed one at a time and the final stage changes orbit a bit before releasing the next warhead. MIRVs can't change their trajectory that much though, you can target multiple locations, but they have to be in a couple hundred kilometers of each other.
Basically if there's an ICBM flying over China and it looks like it's going to hit NK, there's no way to kill all of that horizontal velocity and significantly change its trajectory.
I’ve read that ICBMs are very hard to spot after the initial boost phase. That being the case, if I was an ICBM designer, I’d add a cold gas thruster to the payload stage that allowed the target to be adjusted or fine tuned while it was out of the atmosphere in a stealthy way — even a delta-V of just 100 m/s adds up to 280km when the missile takes 45 minutes to arrive.
The US wouldn't launch ICBMs at NK. They would be dropped from bombers or launched from subs/ships.
Most likely bombers though, which is what all of the saber rattling in the news with B52s/B1s has been about.
Also, China has a defense treaty with NK and has very publicly stated that it will honor its treaty unless NK strikes first.
Personally, I don't think nuking North Korea would even be an effective use of resources.
With modern military precision bombing I'd say it's serious overkill unless you want to destroy something like an entire carrier strike group or deliberately cause loss of civilian life.
Precision strikes could probably take out their nuclear and missile program, and much of the top leadership, and probably cause the regime to eventually collapse. The problem is their artillery, spread throughout the south of the country, that poses a major threat to South Korea.
Agreed. And which was the stated reason for the Clinton administration not bombing North Korea and why I find it weird that North Korea has pushed the nuclear weapon issue.
If North Korea can kill tens of thousands of people in Seoul in a few minutes with just artillery and no one wants to be responsible for that... then why do they feel the need for nukes?
One can envision a world where the US accepts South Korean losses as acceptable, if unfortunate. But I don’t think we would ever accept the loss of an American city.
Because they feel the United States might take the risk of damage to South Korea. As long as US citizens aren't involved (other than a few tourists and business people in Seoul), the US has less skin in the game. If NK can directly threaten the US, the US has to be more careful.
You’re assuming that China’s nuclear force posture is like that of the US or RF. It is much more robust against false alarms. Given the massive alert arsenal the US possesses, along with the historical fact that both the USSR and US sat out strong technical alerts of incoming massive strikes, rather than launch — it’s a good prior that they would sit it out.
From missile launch to missile detonation is enough time for NK to shell large chunks of high population areas of SK. They have the guns already pointed and ready for exactly this reason.
You assuming that NK has an early warning system which consists of more than a guy with binoculars and circa 1960s radar which they don’t.
The US is more than capable of launching a preemptive strike against NK without Seoul being hit nearly as hard as one would think.
The main reason they won’t isn’t the shelling of Seoul is that China won’t allow US troops on its border and neither the US, SK nor China wants to deal with the fallout of having to care for millions of uneducated by modern standards starving people that believe in unicorns.
The flood of refugees into SK would do much more damage than any possible shelling from NK which is also why neither player has pushed for critically destabilizing measures or a regime change for the past 50 years.
> You assuming that NK has an early warning system which consists of more than a guy with binoculars and circa 1960s radar which they don’t.
You don't think China has such a system and won't give a friendly call to North Korea? You'd be willing to bet the lives of South Koreans on that?
Also, as much as we like to think of North Korea as a joke nation, I'm sure there are some very smart people in the government. In fact, there may be more smarter people in government than in the United States. There are plenty of opportunities in the private sector here for a smart ambitious person. There's less private sector opportunity in North Korea, and statistically, 25 million people is bound to produce quite a few very smart people. As long as they can identify and capitalize on some of them, you can bet they are likely government resources.
So, I think it's much more likely that North Korea doesn't have early warning system technology because they've decided they don't need it, and they can focus their research elsewhere. If China gives it to you for free (for the reasons you outlined), then why waste those resources? I would be hesitant to assume any perceived shortcoming of North Korea's situation wasn't specifically sought by them. Not because they are geniuses and masters of strategy that have designed every aspect of their situation, but at least some aspect are, and complacency and underestimating your enemy have no place in war, much less a nuclear war.
China doesn’t have sophisticated early warning systems either, nor does it have a central military command nor integrated command and control infrastructure they’ve started one in 2011 but as their military ranks are a political appointment the competency of their military leadership is lacking at best.
You seem to not understand exactly what the situation is even if NK would get an early warning say 10min it would not even get it past the guy who answers the first phone get alone to the military in the field.
The US and Russia have invested 70 years in building infrastructure which is designed for a single contingency which is to launch a retaliatory strike within 15-20 minutes this requires an enormous investment and North Korea barely has phone lines.
This doesn’t even take into account the fact that the soldiers manning the artilary installations can barely hit anything and that they don’t have enough shells to fire their 11,000 cannons zeroed on Seoul.
North Korea’s conventional military is a joke these days and unless China puts its own soldiers into the fray it won’t be even a two sided fight.
> You seem to not understand exactly what the situation is even if NK would get an early warning say 10min it would not even get it past the guy who answers the first phone get alone to the military in the field.
You seriously think high level Chinese diplomats don't have very quick communication access to Kim Jong-un? Why would you think that? I think it's very likely they have phone access to multiple aids of which one is guaranteed to be very close.
> The US and Russia have invested 70 years in building infrastructure which is designed for a single contingency which is to launch a retaliatory strike within 15-20 minutes this requires an enormous investment and North Korea barely has phone lines.
That's because our system has checks and balances and a heirarchy. Kim Jong-un likely has direct phone access to the cammanders in the field, and through secured lines. That's the first thing you do, and that doesn't take a genius to figure out.
> This doesn’t even take into account the fact that the soldiers manning the artilary installations can barely hit anything and that they don’t have enough shells to fire their 11,000 cannons zeroed on Seoul.
They don't have to aim. Everything is likely already dialed in. There's only one target to retaliate towards no matter who attacks (since it's not going to be China). They could literally have a single qualified person go through and dial in the settings for every piece of artillery and every rocket launcher system, and just have trusted personnel to initiate the attack.
> North Korea’s conventional military is a joke these days and unless China puts its own soldiers into the fray it won’t be even a two sided fight.
It's not about being able to put up a fight, it's about making it too costly to start the fight.
In the end, even if the North Korean response comes after first strike (and a first strike likely wouldn't eliminate their offensive capability, according to retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales[1]), a lot of South Korean lives will be lost.
That's because our system has checks and balances and a heirarchy. Kim Jong-un likely has direct phone access to the cammanders in the field, and through secured lines. That's the first thing you do, and that doesn't take a genius to figure out.
IIRC POTUS can order a nuclear strike by himself. No checks and balances.
The "two man rule" is basically two men check the authenticity of the order (IIRC it is encrypted Twitter-length message) and or turn the keys to "vote" launch. Each launch crew in two silos (4 people) need to vote to launch to actually launch.
There's not a lot of information on the order of succession and the two-man rule on the Internet. ;(
I'd think if everyone above is dead or unreachable the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Education can start nuclear war all by themselves too. No checks or balances either.
Again you are missing the point NK has about “11,000” cannons pointed at Seoul these are fixed installations capable of being destroyed in a conventional preemptive strike before anyone gets the order to fire.
By the time it would take China to detect a US attack, figure out what to do, deliver a message to the NK leadership and that message can be relayed to the field there won’t be many canons left.
I think you don’t realize how long does it take for orders to go through, even a close air support request can easily take 30 min or more to push through a single chain of command.
An NK doesn’t even have direct communications with most of their fielded forces.
And as far the the zeroed cannons go it really ain’t that simple, 80% of their shells missed a bloody island that was also zeroed and were not talking about missing a target on the island we’re talking about missing an island several kilometers in size.
What you say is directly contradicted by the quoted words of a retired Major General in the article I previously cited. If you want to convince you me you are more knowledgeable or truthful than what was presented there, you'll need to cite some source. No offense, but when it comes to matters of military action, I'm going to take the word of someone with is or was relatively high in the military over a pseudo-anonymous internet persona unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
Here's the last paragraph: North Korean anti-aircraft weapons “are not all that impressive,” Scales said, “but there’s lots of them.” Could the North Korea guns be taken down? “Sure, over time,” he said. “But by the time we do that, the damage they’d inflict on Seoul would just be staggering.” They go into the reasons for that earlier.
It is pretty rich to repeat over and over again statements like, "I'm sure that" and "I believe" as well as a host of other implications with nothing to back any of your assertions except a Huffington Post article, then try to high road your way out of the corner you built for yourself by demanding citations.
What else do you do when people start calling your beliefs into question? You fall back on facts and expert sources to back up your assertions. And I believe I'm still the only person to have done so in this direct thread, even if only through a Huffington post article. But the point of that article wasnt that it was from the Huffington post, but that they had an expert source, and that's who I referenced.
I was a bit incredulous when I referenced someone that k rw that they were talking about and it was ignored. I'm even more so now when I'm actually being called out for bringing some expert information to this pissing contest.
I'm in class so I can't post as detailed as I wish, but there are at least three links in this comment section from much more credible sources that might inform your opinion more. I recommend the New Yorker article first. You need to segregate your emotions from your reasoning. Having a misinformed opinion is not a crime, but it is correctable. My chief issue with your comments is, as I stated before, your general implications and assertions, particularly in regards to China and Best Korean competency. I too am still learning just how isolated, geographically, ideologically, and intellectually, the Juche government of NK is.
Don't hear what I'm not saying: I think you are ignorant of some of the facts, not incapable of understanding. I see now that my initial comment was overly petulant and could have been more constructively worded. I will post some links I find helpful when I get out. But should you gave the time there are some enlightening docs on documentaryheaven.com (their site is a huge mess) about Best Korea. Be well.
> but there are at least three links in this comment section from much more credible sources that might inform your opinion more.
And none as direct ancestors to this comment. If you follow this directly up thread up you'll find I'm the only one to have sourced any reference beyond the very top level comment, which was an Amazon link to a book. Even if we expand to branches from tzs second level comment, there's almost no references.
> I recommend the New Yorker article first.
I did find what I assume is the New Yorker article you mentioned in a sub-thread that starts out talking about Qaddafi, but it just seems to bolster my point:
Six years into Kim Jong Un’s reign, some analysts in Seoul argue that senior Party officials can overrule or direct him, but U.S. intelligence believes that Kim is in sole command. ... That left Jong Un, who had received a degree in physics from Kim Il Sung University, had trained as an artillery officer, and was active in security and political work.
So an intelligent person that is well versed in the challenges and threats artillery faces? Are we to assume he ignores the obvious weaknesses that he should know of (since he's trained in their aspects) then?
The Obama Administration studied the potential costs and benefits of a preventive war intended to destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Its conclusion, according to Rice, in the Times, was that it would be “lunacy,” resulting in “hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of casualties.” ... If Kim used his stockpiles of sarin gas and biological weapons, the toll would reach the millions. U.S. and South Korean forces could eventually overwhelm the North Korean military, but, by any measure, the conflict would yield one of the worst mass killings in the modern age.
So the same source you called out as worth reading that might inform my opinion mirror what I've been stating all along. Attacking North Korea would result in massive casualties in South Korea. There is no current strategy that would result in us wiping out the offensive capability of North Korea before they can cause massive damage.
> My chief issue with your comments is, as I stated before, your general implications and assertions, particularly in regards to China and Best Korean competency.
So, my implications and assertions that a nation that views its defense a existential priority won't put the bare minimum of 1910's level technology in place to make sure they have secure land lines run to important military locations? This is a country with artillery that is literally "dug in", as in they've placed the entire thing below ground with large hanger doors that can be closed to shield the artillery for defense, and opened for attack.
NK has an estimated 12,000 pieces of tube artillery, and another 2,300 multiple launch rocket systems.[1] That we would be capable of knocking all these out, or that they don't have specific orders on exactly how to proceed should the command structure deteriorate that would result in them commencing attack requires more explanation than "we'll take out the cannons quickly" which is the argument most the responses have put forth, and as I've references previously from educated sources, that is not the case.
I'll just note that I'm still citing references, my own and ones you pointed out, which still support my argument. If you can't cite something yourself, perhaps you should examine your own beliefs, and why there's no evidence to be found for them.
I think it’s fair to assume that such answers assume the US isn’t willing to preemptively nuke an entire southern swath of North Korea. If we are, and Trump is trying very hard to at least pretend that we are, it’s a totally different ballgame.
There's also the dud rate that's a contributing factor here.
---
IIRC from a recent article regarding potential DPRK artillery salvo on Seoul the civilian casualties are in the tens of thousands.
South Korea kind of like Israel have bomb shelters everywhere. So DPRK only has a very limited number of salvos before people realize what's happening and seek cover (also counter-battery fire).
IMHO South Korea should have moved their capital a long time ago. They had 50+ years.
Your first strike plan appears to use nuclear weapons against another country (not seen since 1945), on such a massive scale that it knocks out the ability for North Korea to respond.
Lets say for some miracle you're right, and the plan works. The fallout is going somewhere - China, South Korea, Japan, and the far east of Russia. That's a lot of unhappy people right there, before the rest of the world realises just what tiny hands has done and the US truly becomes the evil empire.
The US doesn't need a nuclear strike, the fixed artillery installations can be hit with cruise missiles and air strikes, Pyongyang can be levelled with conventional bombing.
People also overestimate the amount of fallout from modern nuclear weapons, it won't be a picnic site anytime soon but it's not going to turn into a Fall out game either.
Nuking the DMZ isn't going to happen unless it's to stop a flood of 200 million zombies, but nuking Pyongyang isn't going to have drastic effects on SK due to fallout or radiation worse case people would have to drink bottled water for a few weeks.
> People also overestimate the amount of fallout from modern nuclear weapons
If those people include the South Koreans, you still have a problem. Some estimates I’ve heard say more Americans were killed by heart attacks caused by the increase in blood pressure caused by the fear of terrorism after 9/11 than by actual terrorism. Likewise, if just 10% of Seoul flees in fear of radiation, I’d expect many dead just from the running-away part.
DPRK leadership wouldn't know a strike was underway until most of their military capability could be destroyed by stratcom.
A strike would not originate from North Dakota -- it would come from stealth bombers right on top of their artillery forces and command and control infrastructure, as well as from nearby boomers (ctf134) launching at a pace of a dozen warheads per minute, per boat, throwing mk-4/5's with recently upgraded fuzing systems.
When the LEP is complete, they will be GPS guided and accurate enough to destroy hardened targets from kinetic energy alone.
If the DPRK threat continues to escalate, and the US were concerned enough, F-35's could be upgraded with B61-12 harnesses, adding a nuclear stealth armada with pinpoint-accurate weapons to the arsenal. US fbm's are also not equipped to close to capacity due to arms control agreements. During initial flight testing, maneuvers consistent with deployment of 14 warheads were observed, meaning an fbm could deploy 336 warheads.
You're underestimating the power and depth of American and South Korean counterbattery along the DMZ. DPRK will not be able to sustain a prolonged artillery attack. They'll get a their first punches in, but they won't be able to keep it up. All that shit is completely automated, too. All they have to do is flip a switch and anything in Best Korea firing ordnance across the DMZ will explode fairly quickly and completely automatically.
And South Koreans: Seoul is just 60km (35 miles) from the border, about as far as Palo Alto from SF. Even if the nukes don't affect South Korea, the DPRK has the border lined with arms (conventional, but effective enough).
If you "annihilate as much as North Korea as we need in order to prevent a counter attack" you'd also be annihilating much of South Korea- and China, and every country bordering North Korea to boot.
That's unless your scientists have found a way to control nuclear fallout so that it stays within national borders.
> If you "annihilate as much as North Korea as we need in order to prevent a counter attack" you'd also be annihilating much of South Korea- and China, and every country bordering North Korea to boot.
Trouble with NK is, they don't have second strike capability, so a disarming first strike from the US is possible and NK knows that. That puts NK in a use it or lose it situation with their nuclear weapons and it may be, that the regime calculates that they (the generals) can survive one. Or they don't, they calculate that their only chance is rapid escalation and basically calling the bluff of the US, or they may just prefer to go out with a bang rather than with a wimper. That means that the nuclear threshold for NK may be a lot sooner than it would be if they have second strike capability. And the US knows that, and knows that they may have to use a disarming first strike before NK decides it's only chance is rapid escalation. NK knows that the US knows. Toss twitter into the mix and you have a pretty toxic stew, even though nobody is actually very unhappy about the status quo.
China cares a lot if North Korea became reunified and the US still kept military bases in Korea. China doesn't want US forces on its border any more than the US wants Chinese forces on its border. They support NK because it is a buffer.
> Given the size of the Soviet Union, how far it is from the United States, the available spying and reconnaissance technology (no satellites, no stealth aircraft), and that the US was only four years out of World War II, I don't think there is any way the US could have made a creditable threat to use military force to stop the Russians.
That whole 'massive military presence in western europe and asia minor' thing notwithstanding of couse..
Less so than you might think. We brought our forces home after WWII, which put them on the wrong side of the Atlantic to mount a defense against a Soviet invasion of Europe. That's actually where a lot of the early urgency originated in nuclear weapons development - not just to stay ahead of the Russkies, but to as quickly as possible mount a credible deterrent to precisely that potential Soviet war plan.
We brought some of them home. The US still had a quarter of a million troops in Germany in the late 1980s. In the 1950s, there were still 300,000 to 400,000 across all of Europe (eg 50,000 in the UK in the mid to late 1950s).
That's not but about a sixth of what the tank-heavy Red Army had at the time - a sixth which in a new war would have no hope of timely reinforcement, because of the aforementioned ocean. A nuclear deterrent was still seen as valuable, even necessary, and I think not wrongly so.
The US forces obviously were not the only counter forces in Europe. It wasn't just ~300,000 US troops vs the entire Red Army.
It was: the US, the UK, France, Western Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Turkey. Russia also very likely would have lost several of its western post WW2 Soviet Union territories in the chaos.
The US could bomb Russia from all over Europe. Russia couldn't sustain a meaningful bombing campaign against the US mainland. Russia also had a mediocre navy compared to the US. Rapid attrition would have guaranteed a Russian loss.
Russia was very weak for 30 years after WW2 (really their entire existence except for the brief oil boom of 1974-84). While the US was in the exact opposite position. Timely US reinforcement probably would not have been necessary. That's a war that would have gone on either for years, or for a few weeks. Russia also would have had few allies in a European war. The US had the manpower, financial and manufacturing ability to stay in a long-term fight with Russia, whereas Russia could not have afforded to stay in it. They could have never replaced their war manufacturing after the US destroyed it with aerial bombing, and the war would have ended there (in the non-nuclear scenario). Russia would pull out the nuclear card, an equivalent of suing for peace, and that would have been that.
Some of the NATO plans for a Soviet attack were pretty crazy. They had plans where they would not start any real defensive action until the enemy reached the Rhine, hoping to trade almost all of West Germany for time so that US reinforcements could cross the Atlantic and deploy.
Major bridges and railway lines in Germany were designed with ways to block or destroy them to deny then to the enemy. Even the smaller roads near the border had holes in them for explosive charges (sometimes allegedly even pre-placed to save time). I grew up at the Czech border and have seen these. All of this was done to slow any invasion force that might enter the country from the east. After the fall of the iron curtain all of this was removed.
Also, Germany until 1990 was hardly in a political position to deny its western Allies the stationing of more troops if they had really wanted. Formally, provisions from the WW2 surrender were still in place that would have allowed the disbanding of the West German government and placement under allied control (this finally ended with the 2 plus 4 treaties).
Thankfully, the defense plan never needed to be tested, so there is no telling if it would have worked.
> the US was only four years out of World War II, I don't think there is any way the US could have made a creditable threat to use military force to stop the Russians.
Thanks, you just reminded me about this book. Gonna pick it up this weekend!
Lately I have been feeling very anxious about the North Korea situation, but for some reason reading about nuclear accidents, close-calls, stories, etc. calms me in a morbid way.
I guess it has to do with "facing your fears" or something like that.
This wasn't really that big a deal. By the Minuteman era, warheads were safe against fires and crashes. Nuclear weapons from several B-52 bombers hit the ground hard in crashes without a nuclear explosion. (Sometimes the implosion charges did go off, but not symmetrically, as is needed to get implosion.) The Minuteman missile itself had a solid fuel engine. This was nowhere near as bad as the incident described in "Command and Control". That one was a liquid-fueled missile with hypergolic propellant.
See Wikipedia's list of nuclear accidents.[1] This wasn't one of the big ones.
Yep, a modern nuclear bomb takes a very coordinated sequence to actually have the confinement needed to get good utilization of the fissile fuel (i.e., be a nuclear-driven explosion), otherwise they just fly apart before any significant fission/fusion can occur.
The fuel used for a nuclear weapon is also basically radiologically inert by necessity so if it does explode conventionally there is not a significant release of radiation. It's pretty toxic chemically, but there's not a lot of it so it's not nearly as bad the fallout that would precipitate from a nuclear explosion.
"Radiologically inert" is a bit much. Both uranium and plutonium are alpha emitters. This basically means that if you can keep the stuff outside your body, you're OK. A chunk of metal is safe; breathing dust is lethal.
> Incredible as it may sound to a civilian, Hicks said he spent no time worrying about the thermonuclear warhead. He had been convinced by his training that it was nearly impossible to detonate a warhead accidentally. Among other things, he said, the warhead had to receive codes from the launch-control officers, had to reach a certain altitude, and had to detect a certain amount of acceleration and G-force. There were so many safeguards built in, Hicks later joked, that a warhead might have been lucky to detonate even when it was supposed to.
Supposedly static electricity could trigger the detonator in a nuclear weapon. There was a near accidental ignition during the development of "the Gadget" and my understanding is that the ignition system was virtually unchanged for decades.
Lightning bolt, maybe. Static electricity, no way. The detonators used are exploding-wire devices. They're just hugely overloaded resistors.[1]
Regular detonators have a primary explosive which is triggered by a modest electric pulse. The primary explosive detonates and its energy detonates the secondary explosive. Those can go off by accident, cook off, etc.
The ones used in nuclear weapons are just inert wires. Without a hulking big electrical pulse (about a megawatt for a microsecond, which is one joule) they can't do anything. A big capacitor bank is required to fire such things. It's done this way because all the detonators have to go off within nanoseconds of each other to get the symmetrical implosion squeeze to work. Otherwise the thing just blows itself apart without a nuclear reaction. That's happened a few times in plane crashes.
Newer (post-1950s) nuclear weapons don't even have a full critical mass in them. The core is squeezed down by the implosion to achieve criticality at a density higher than the normal density of the material. Without a symmetrical implosion, not much happens.
This physics makes for a much safer device. It's why nobody has ever had one go off by accident.
(The Hiroshima bomb, though, was very unsafe. It was a gun bomb, basically a 5-inch
gun with conventional detonators and propelling charge. The crew of the Enola Gay was
told that if they had to return to base without having dropped the bomb, drop it in deep water. Don't try to land with it. A crash or fire on landing probably would have detonated the device. That design was only used once.)
There's a LOT of cold war history up there in the central plains. The Strategic Air Command museum just outside of Omaha Nebraska has really incredible displays and a surprisingly large aircraft collection (to me at least). Including an SR-71. Highly recommended for anyone interested in that kind of thing.
>> without hitting the missile and causing an explosion.
>> caused a short circuit that resulted in an explosion.
>> Luckily, the cone did not do enough damage to the missile to cause the missile to explode.
To clarify: There was absolutely no chance at any point of a nuclear explosion. The article suggests that some big explosion was on the edge of possibility which, given the context, one might think would be a nuclear explosion. The warhead, the "physics package", was never really a worry. Getting those to detonate requires some careful triggering.
This was also a SOLID fuel rocket. While you wouldn't want to damage it, it wasn't full of the nasty pressurized liquids of other missiles. Getting its fuel to actually ignite would require more than hitting it with a hammer. You need something akin to a blasting cap. Shuttle used something more like a giant flamethrower. The solid retro rockets were not directly triggered by a the short circuit. I'd bet good money that their ignition system felt the short rather than the fuel being ignited by the short.
That's a big part of Command and Control, the farther back in time you go, the greater the likelihood the design of the warhead was not one point safe and it wasn't at all assured that it'd take careful triggering to get a full or partial nuclear explosion. A decent chunk of later nuclear tests were to help make bombs one point safe. But even then, it there were absolutely rudimentary fail safes that basically worked on the honor system, for well over a decade.
Anyway you still have a mess on your hand if the explosives detonate but there's no chain reaction.
> There was absolutely no chance at any point of a nuclear explosion
Exactly. Even if the conventional primer went off it's not gonna cause a create the conditions necessary for fission because it wasn't set off by the detonator.
Not an aerospace engineer or anything. I think the fear was that the rocket may tip over and collapse under its own weight. I wouldn't be too surprised if that could trigger an ignition of the rocket fuel at the very least, risking nuclear contamination.
While the physics package surely has numerous safeties, I'd be concerned that the safeties would be damaged in a way that no one could really predict after falling 80 feet. They served their purpose well, but you can bet all the engineers were in the lab for the next 72 hours straight looking for various failure modes.
Any damage to the warhead would likely make it impossible to have a nuclear reaction. In order to do that, the warhead would have to explode multiple precisely shaped conventional explosives with precise timing. If any one of them was deformed, nothing (apart from the small conventional explosion) would happen, even if all the safeguards incorrectly decided to explode the warhead.
There are no radioactive materials in the warhead. In other words: there are no materials that undergo radioactive decay. What is in there are fissile materials: ie. materials that emit neutrons upon being irradiated with neutrons.
The only way the warhead might become radioactive is if it partially detonated.
This is why nuclear non-proliferation is important. Its difficult enough for a super power to safely store and control its WMD. Each new nuclear state magnifies the risks, and all the more so because they lack the after action experience that a half century of mishaps delivers.
Of the broken arrow incidents I'm aware of this was one of the least dangerous in terms of detonation threat.
> Its difficult enough for a super power to safely store and control its WMD.
There has never been an accidental detonation of a nuclear device. The problem this article describes was one in rocketry, insulation, and adherence to protocols.
Nuclear non-proliferation is important, but this article is not the reason why. The reason non-proliferation is important is because of the ramifications of using the devices, not challenges in storing them.
But these devices always exist as one part of a wider technical and human system. It seems unwise to separate the two when safety could be comprised by a failure in any part of the system.
Perhaps I am ignorant and don't know it, but the USSR collapsed, its nuclear arsenal was split, and nothing awful happened. Even during one of the most spectacular system-wide failures in modern history, a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons was largely kept safe and in tact.
Maybe we just got lucky? I don't think 60 years of history is enough to draw conclusions about the systematic safety of nuclear weapons. Especially when so many facts are unavoidably restricted.
It is easy to become prone to a sort of survivorship bias. But nuclear proliferation guarantees that we will have more and more opportunities to test that safety. It only needs to fail once to be catastrophic at which point your argument would seem a little flawed.
I don't disagree that nuclear non-proliferation is important. But I think the arguments you're using are kind of a bit of false logic. Essentially your argument boils down to "this thing X is hard to do safely. Therefore only people who have done X should do it [because they've failed a lot of times before]." And I don't think that is a legitimate argument for any topic, really.
Arms reduction is even more important. I'd rather live in a world where 20 countries have 50 warheads each, then one where two countries have 4,000 warheads each.
A weapon detonating by accident is terrible. Thousands of weapons on hair-trigger alert is civilization-ending. It's absolutely insane that we're conditioned to believe that this is not only normal - but the best possible state of affairs.
> I'd rather live in a world where 20 countries have 50 warheads each, then one where two countries have 4,000 warheads each.
I absolutely would not. Those 2 countries know far more about the process then those other countries, and they have the budget to do it right. You would have to duplicate labs, and computers, and other efforts 20 times in your scenario, and each of those labs will not be as good as the 2 higher funded ones.
> A weapon detonating by accident is terrible. Thousands of weapons on hair-trigger alert is civilization-ending.
Look at it from a fear point of view: No one will detonate a thousand weapons unless they are declaring total war. So all one needs to do is read global moods and see if total war is likely (it's not). (i.e. war might happen, but not total war)
An accident on the other hand can happen randomly, you would be permanently and constantly worried about one.
> No one will detonate a thousand weapons unless they are declaring total war.
Or if they believe (rightly or wrongly) that the other nuclear power has declared total war. There's been a number of false alarms that have been successfully ignored, but what if one of those false alarms came during the Cuban missile crisis or immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan?
>I talked with the president at one of those fundraisers some months back, and I asked him, "What keeps you up at night?"
> And he said, "Everything. Everything that gets to my desk is a critical mass. If it gets to my desk, then no one else could have handled it." So I said, "So what's the one that keeps you up at night?"
> He goes, "There are quite a few."
> So I go, "What's the one? Period."
> And he says, "Pakistan."
> I get that: There's the question of whether Zardari's government is actually in control, or whether the military is. And how close the Taliban, or Al Qaeda, or whoever else is to having their hands on real weapons of mass destruction. It's the closest government there is to allowing those weapons to either be used or sold to places that we really wouldn't like to have those weapons. That's a concern for all of us.
After 1971 it has been relatively "minor" conflicts. Granted, none of this is a long time on the world scale, but thus far it has brought a lot more restraint.
China has had several major border skirmishes with India, some with Russia and with Taiwan and I’m sure there are others too. Israel has had lots. Russia has had some ugly episodes too.
I'd argue that the other side having nukes is what kept them to being skirmishes. Plenty of ugly episodes for sure but there is a cap on how much conflict can happen before the doomsday machines come out.
> I absolutely would not. Those 2 countries know far more about the process then those other countries, and they have the budget to do it right. You would have to duplicate labs, and computers, and other efforts 20 times in your scenario, and each of those labs will not be as good as the 2 higher funded ones.
If your goal is maintaining an arsenal of world-ending weapons cheaply, sure. I am not trying to optimize for that use case.
> No one will detonate a thousand weapons unless they are declaring total war.
Or they think that the other side declared total war. Or they are engaged in a small-scale conventional war, and are afraid the other side will escalate. Or they are escalating, by using tactical weapons, and the other side retaliates with strategical weapons. (Spoilers: Russia has made it very clear that it will use tactical nuclear weapons, against military targets, in an otherwise conventional conflict.) Or there's an intelligence failure, and they believe that they are the target of a sneak attack.
All of these are incredibly plausible ways for a nuclear war to start.
What's the realistic approach to this though? I don't know anything about this area, but to me it seems like hoping for 20 countries having 50 each would be effectively the same as hoping for 20 countries having 0 each.
That is to say, we're in the arms race because each country did have N each. But then one country had N+1, and so the others raced for N+2, and so on. If we hoped for 50 each, wouldn't it drop back to the same pattern, and someone would become 50+1?
Note that 4,000 of course doesn't solve the N+1 issue, but my point is if you're going to aim for 50 - I'm not sure what problems it solves. May as well shoot for 0, no? 0 seems equally impossible to me as 50, but at least it solves a single problem.. nukes, in general.
You can't just un-invent nukes. They're there, they provide nuclear deterrence. They will continue to exist no matter how many countries "agree" to stop using them. Regardless of whether you have them, there is always a chance that someone might still keep the nukes in secret despite what they agreed to. No one would want such a risk if they have an option to avoid it.
Oh I agree completely, but that's sort of my point.
The OP's solution seemed to be making everyone have 50 instead of 4,000. That seemed both impossible, and a weird goal. If you're going to try for the impossible, shouldn't we aim for 0?
Political leaders are far from the biggest worry compared to command and control of their vast nuclear arsenals. More eyes on less weapons mitigates that. After all, several nuclear weapons have gone missing by the US and several dozen are believed to have gone missing in the Soviet Union.
I don't really think that we believe either of those things; it seems a lot has been written on how MAD is a rather poor sentiment to rest our future upon.
But all that aside, 20 countries each having 50 warheads seems a lot likelier to end up with 20 countries each having thousands of warheads than 2 countries having thousands of warheads and everyone else none does, no?
Wouldn't you rather live in a world where all governments had zero nuclear weapons each?
A nuclear bomb serves no other purpose than killing huge numbers of civilians in a short period of time. Shouldn't we strive for a world where nobody has that capability? Not to mention that in the United States, one man has unilateral and final authority to launch a nuclear first strike.
The main purpose of nuclear bomb is to deter nuclear attack by ensuring MAD. We should strive for a world where nobody has a chance to use nuclear bomb. And, currently, a handful of countries having them is the best way to ensure that.
If all countries claim to destroy their nuclear bombs and never ever make a new one, would you trust all of them?
> The main purpose of nuclear bomb is to deter nuclear attack by ensuring MAD. We should strive for a world where nobody has a chance to use nuclear bomb. And, currently, a handful of countries having them is the best way to ensure that.
Why is a handful of countries having nuclear bombs the best way to ensure that? Why not two dozen countries having nuclear bombs? Neither Ukraine nor Iraq would have been invaded if they were nuclear-armed.
It's incredibly self-serving of nuclear powers to claim that they can have these weapons, because they will be responsible with them, but nobody else can. (And then they go ahead and start wars.)
Because superpowers are more likely to fight proxy wars or use indirect methods, while smaller countries are more likely to fight with real boots on real territory supported by real explosions.
The reality is that if a superpower wanted to launch a sneak nuclear attack on another superpower, it could be done to great effect without missiles or bombers, and without necessarily giving away the identity of the aggressor.
The fact that it hasn't been done either suggests lack of imagination or lack of willingness - or perhaps both.
As for small countries - it's debatable if nukes would have saved Iraq or the Ukraine, because any small country using nukes on a superpower is likely to do more damage to itself than the superpower.
But this is largely a sideshow in 2017. As we're currently discovering, infowar and weaponised social media are a much cheaper and more efficient way to wage proxy war than nukes or terrorism are.
Nukes are almost obsolete now that it's so ridiculously easy to persuade a country to destroy its own political stability and self-confidence with covert funding of fringe extremism, supported by weaponised social media.
And if that's not enough to do the job, direct hacking of infrastructure remains an option.
The West is well behind the curve on defending against both. As and when the next war starts - if it hasn't already - the reliance on nukes as a deterrent is going to become one of those "And this is what they were doing on until the new reality hit" chapters in future history books.
I don't see much difference between handful and a dozen or two. Or maybe my English as second language is failing me..
It'd be definitely interesting to see Ukraine and Iraq conflicts unfold while they had nuclear weapons. I'd be all for giving nuclear weapons to every single country if that'd stop wars in the future. But I'm afraid some asshats would start blackmailing others and those would bend over. And we'd be back at square 1.
Hicks said the metal of the screwdriver contacted the positive side of the fuse and also the fuse’s grounded metal holder, causing a short circuit that sent electricity flowing to unintended places.
Is there some company out there making non-conductive screwdrivers designed for electrical work? I can understand that maybe the materials science to make strong plastic screwdrivers didn't exist in the 1950s, but surely they exist today, right?
He was supposed to be using a fuse puller, but he didn't have one.
This is a fuse puller.[1] It's a pair of pliers made from nylon. Before good plastics, they were made of hardwood.[2] Standard electrician tool for a century.
Oh yeah they exist. There are ceramic ones and I have also seen plastic ones.
I've seen other fun specialized types of screwdrivers in my career:
Screwdrivers with conductive plastic in the handle, to deal with ESD requirements in the spacecraft industry. Alternatively, take a normal plastic screwdriver handle and wrap it in copper tape.
Beryllium screwdrivers (non-ferrous) for use around MRI machine bores thanks to the insane magnetic fields. You also have to wear ceramic hard-toed shoes.
Yes, beryllium is very nasty. You don't ever want to breathe its dust, so don't machine/cut/grind it ever. There are usually warning symbols on things containing it. But it has applications so it gets used.
For example, it is used in spacecraft to save weight over aluminum. When I worked with MRI machines, we used FETs with beryllium oxide ceramic (BeO) backing. BeO is an amazing thermal conductor, electrical insulator (only diamond is better).
It's mostly an inhalation risk. You definitely don't want to be around the manufacture of it without serious PPE, but touching a screwdriver should be fine. Just don't take it to a grinding wheel.
I'd guess anyone working on an MRI machine is wearing gloves anyway for other reasons.
At a company I used to work for we used to get a set of these every time we made a bulk order. But the company was just four people and we made those orders 3 or 4 times a year, so eventually we were basically drowning in very well insulated hand tools.
The proper tool is a fuse puller not a screwdriver. These days similar maintenance evolutions are heavily controlled operation performed under reader/worker controls.
This comes up on HN every few months (I've commented on it before)and that documentary is shocking and terrifying. The Arkansas one was crazy. We almost lost a rather sizeable area and the radiation zone is out to Memphis.
“I wasn’t there,” Smith said of the explosion, “but I know there were two technicians who ruined their underwear. 'Cause that ain’t supposed to happen.”
Best line of the story. I'm curious how close we've been to nuclear annihilation and we had no idea.
If you happen to visit Badlands National Park, or western South Dakota in general, make time to visit the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site mentioned in the article. I toured Delta-01 last summer, and it was fascinating. The tour guide did a fantastic job of conveying the gravity of the mission and just how scary the Cold War was.
When I visited, the guide was retired veteran from that missile site. He spent a lot of time discussing the living situation, and the maintenance schedule, and the phone setup. The guy had internalized that bureaucracy over his entire career, and wanted to explain in in painstaking detail.
The underground control center was amazing though.
I really wanted to visit this in 2009 while driving across the state. Unfortunately there were no signs on the highway to guide us (it was a relatively new historic site at the time) and me and my traveling companion missed it.
Incidents like this shows us that things will inevitably go wrong with increasing frequency and gravity.
Furthermore, I fear regional conflicts involving mass scale conventional face-off (ex. dmz) are converting to a low operating cost high risk situations in the form of mutually assured destruction.
East Asia is venturing into a potential double whammy of naval and nuclear arms race--smaller countries like South Korea are entering a phase of normalization for nuclear armament with pressure mounting from the public to have a deterrence and a back up plan yet cannot have land based missile silo's, instead relying on nuclear submarines that will host the IRBMs. The cost is much higher than the "previous generation", as smaller countries will most certainly be decimated, land based silos do not make sense.
the default there is airburst, but at Faro it would have detonated at the surface which reduces the radius a lot and casualties by a factor of 3, (prolly since less of densely-populated Goldsboro is affected)
There was a frightening number of close calls over the course of decades on the american side alone. One can just assume what must have happened on the sites of other nuclear powers that just doesn't get reported.
It's certainly time to reduce the number of warheads from a nuclear-winter-guaranteeing one to an at least nuclear-deterrence-still-works-but-an-accident-is-terrible-but-no-longer-civilization-ending one.
If the warhead had damaged the fuel tank there would have been an explosion, and the radioactive materials in the bomb would have been spread around the site. It would have looked like the Palomares explosion, and that was a mess: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Palomares_B-52_crash
There was an incident (this one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Damascus_Titan_missile_ex...) when a serviceman dropped a spanner while working on a missile. There was a fuel leak and an explosion, thankfully the warhead was thrown clear of the silo by the blast.
There have been many accidents, of a kind where even one is one too many. Given the potential damage, I certainly don't feel comfortable with your assessment that there wasn't any danger it would go off.
Likely these things happen more often than is publicly known, yet we've not (yet) seen a full-on swiss cheese kind of accident.
Yes, but there are two risks to that:
1) the conventional explosive detonates and it's similar enough to "normal" operating procedures to create critical mass and the nuke detonates
2) the radioactive material is spread out over a large area, contaminating
neither are as benign as an ordinary explosive of any yield, and I'd rather not risk any of that, at all.
It's hard to imagine your #1 could happen. The compression wave in a nuke has to be just right to achieve critical mass. It's not an easy thing to pull off deliberately under the best of circumstances
#2 is sort of half true. You wouldn't get nuclear material over a large area because it's so heavy. You could get a big plume from Chernobyl, but that was because there was a nuclear reaction going on, and it wasn't uranium that got boosted into the sky by the fire.
Still an expensive mess, but a pretty localized mess.
Well in a solid fuel missile, there was simply no way it was going to explode due to any kind of external damage (or at all, solid fuel does not explode). Good that nuclear safety of the warhead itself worked well, as none of the explosive lenses gone off.
This article didn't seem like that much of an incident. The warhead didn't fire, at least. SL-1 is more of what I would think would be a real .mil-sector nuclear accident.
We've been reckless and by all accounts it is a miracle we haven't had a serious accident (there have been a few, just not on our own soil). The number of close calls is just astounding.
Further the book, at one point, talks about America's position on Russia and the attempts to keep them from getting "the bomb". It is exactly what has played out and will continue to play out with North Korea and Iran. History is repeating itself and we sure haven't learned from it.
[0] https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00C5R7F8G/