Cockpits are now locked by default, so there's no terrorist getting in there anymore, they can threaten anything, all it would do is divert to closest landing spot.
TK1476 in 2006. Flying from an EU country to Turkey on a major airline.
"Italian Interior Minister Giuliano Amato reported that the hijacker slipped into the cockpit with a package which could have been a bomb when flight attendants opened the cockpit door, and the pilots acted according to the international rules in the matter and did what the hijacker wanted."
There's procedure to leave a tray on corridor and have cabin crew protect it so people cant just jump in cabin.
Pilot also can check camera and deny the open.
So having a successful takeover depends on multiple failures at same time... chernobyl happened so its not impossible but much less likely then before.
At this point id be more worried about pilots or malware on flight computers.
Yes, and this is why crazy pilots suffering from depression can bury their planes in the ground and nobody can do anything about it.
200 people lost their life in the crash of Germanwings 9525 on March 24, 2015, but this is not classified as a terrorist attack so it doesn't really count for anything.
However, it is the direct consequence of the so-called security procedures implemented the world over; those 200 people are victims of "security".
This lead directly to the rule that nobody can be alone in the cockpit. If you're in the front of the plane when a pilot needs to use the toilet you'll see the dance; service cart blocks the aisle, flight attendant goes into the cockpit, then one pilot comes out.
To me this sounds like a risk for service cart/flight attendant/exiting pilot being overcome and entry gained to the cockpit. Even better a hijacker knows exactly when the opportunity arises as the service cart will be moved into place indicating the dance is about to start.
Furthermore, what's to stop suicide pilot murdering co-pilot behind a locked door?
That might be true, but there is a difference in causing the deaths of passengers somewhere behind the closed doors by crashing the plane — and dealing with flesh and bone co-pilot right here and now.
> Aviation authorities swiftly implemented new regulations that required two authorized personnel in the cockpit at all times, but by 2017, Germanwings and other German airlines had dropped the rule.
But a service cart and flight attendant seems like an entirely ineffective obstacle so what's the point? I think I don't know enough about how this "dance" works to comment, so maybe I'll just shut up :)
I don't remember the details, but remember reading that attack wouldn't have worked under US aviation rules, that it took advantage of some EU protocol oversight which was subsequently rectified. Don't quote me on it though.
EDIT post downvotes: what I mean is that even without a lock on the cockpit to prevent their copilot from entering, it seems difficult to prevent a determined pilot from crashing a plane.
It's a pretty well known event. The copilot locked the captain out and used the purposefully designed system to also disable the cockpit entry code. Of course the primary cause wasn't the security setup, but it did contribute to the event.
"The captain had a code to unlock the door, but the lock's code panel could be disabled from the cockpit controls...The captain then tried to break down the door, but like most cockpit doors made after the September 11 attacks, it had been reinforced to prevent intrusion."
> Robin said that when the captain left the cockpit, possibly to use the toilet, Lubitz locked the door, preventing anyone from entering. The captain had a code to unlock the door, but the lock's code panel could be disabled from the cockpit controls. The captain requested re-entry using the intercom; he knocked and then banged on the door, but received no response. The captain then tried to break down the door, but like most cockpit doors made after the September 11 attacks, it had been reinforced to prevent intrusion.
This seems like a pretty direct consequence to me. Similar to how an ultra isloated air-gapped environment with only one-way networking[0] would mean that the ops people couldn't easily stop e.g an ransomware attack in its tracks when detected. It's a cost/consequence of having the isolated network in the first place.
(If there was some magic code that always opened the cockpit door, then that could be coerced out of someone, yielding the system almost pointless)
I wonder if they should have separate external door for the cockpit and no door from the cabin to the cockpit. Absolutely no chance of hijacking whatsoever.
What about relief pilots on long trips or in the event of incapacity?
We could keep going I think: there are numerous downsides to maintaining an egress unreachable from the cabin and, given the ability to lock down existing doors, few superior benefits to justify it.
