The article mentions the come-from-nowhere stories of people like Hong Xiuquan and Adolf Hitler, but I see these figures as catalysts of larger forces that had been in play for decades.
I see two major mega-wars in the past 300 years within the western world, whose history I am most familiar with. Both were results of a rising power challenging the existing superpower for supremacy.
The first was the stretch bookended by the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars, which I think can causally be combined, especially when factoring in how French finances following the Seven Years War and American Revolution contributed to the French Revolution. These wars were a Thucydides trap as Britain was challenging France for European supremacy. Britain succeeded in displacing France at the top.
The next megawar was the German challenge to Anglo-American supremacy, which took place in WWI and WWII. Germany failed to displace the Anglo countries.
Both war were Thucydides traps with different outcomes, and the severity of the conflict and long shadow cast by the wars is due to the stakes involved.
WWI and WWII can be seen as one war, which was the attempt by Germany to displace the UK and wider Anglo world as the dominant western power. I think it makes sense to group the wars together.
Not very widespread. You may not have a very long view on history. Take a look at my username (I'm "English" by the way). Just in case I need to spell it out: Gerdes ~= German.
Those two wars had very different reasons despite Germany being a participant in both of them. Russia (famous for not being Anglo) was a major player in those wars as well and we should not overlook Japan etc as well.
WW I is the more important because it destroys the power of the royal families that ruled the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey and China. By the end of WW II most royal families were reduced to figurehead status, except for the British and the ones that Britain tried to re-establish in the Middle East.
Yes, I really like the Thucydides trap framework, but this perspective must be seen from the PoV of the current hegemon. None of the Axis powers wanted to fight the US or even Britain, but the Atlanticist hegemon saw the development of Eurasian powers as unacceptable and must be put down.
Britain was not challenging France. The height of French power in terms of relative polarity was the early 18th century, not Napoleon (by that point, Europe was multipolar). Spain imploded, the Netherlands were imploding (connected to the split and decline of Habsburg), England was still emerging...but the key point about Europe, geopolitically, is that it has been multipolar since the fall of the Roman Empire (in terms of relative power, Britain came closest to domination but never sought preeminence in Europe, the foreign policy of Palmerston was pretty important in this).
I don't think Germany was challenging Anglo-American supremacy in WW2. For one, Hitler assumed (correctly, for the most part) that America wasn't terribly bothered about Europe. For two, Hitler also believed that Britain was the natural ally of Germany...until war occurred. WW2 was far more about Hitler's bizarre theories about race and what was happening to the East (Napoleon was France's Hitler...right man, right place but trying to do something that was basically impossible in Europe).
WW1 is probably more unclear because Germany did things, like building up their navy, that are difficult to interpret as anything other than challenging the status quo. But I think there were a number of strategic miscalculations on both sides that make it somewhat difficult to divine intention from actions (i.e. did Germany believe they would trigger a huge war...well after 1870 and the relative peace of the 19th century, probably not). I think the mistake you are making (not one btw that is contained with realist theory) is assuming that agency is necessary...Germany did not need to "challenge", conflict was inevitable through changes in relative power...I wouldn't necessarily agree with that still but it is a fairly nuanced point.
The stuff about the Thucydides Trap is also pretty questionable. Classical realist thought, of which Thucydides is part of, says that war between great powers is inevitable but this isn't really said explicitly in Thucydides (the first seed of these theories really come with Hobbes...I am guessing Hobbes' trap didn't pass muster with the editor). Allison cites statistics to justify the specific statement but these are pretty hopeless (similar to the issues with democratic peace theory...you can define things whatever way based on what conclusion you need). It is a great catchphrase and sounds very impressive but has always seemed rather devoid of content (Allison's views generally are). I am definitely sympathetic to realism but the whole "conflict is inevitable" stuff isn't really credible anymore.
I'm not necessarily ascribing agency to the actors. The verbiage I used was for brevity.
I too see these events as mostly the confluence of bottom-up trends outside anyone's control, with occasional pressure points at which "great men" can exert unique influence.
I see two major mega-wars in the past 300 years within the western world, whose history I am most familiar with. Both were results of a rising power challenging the existing superpower for supremacy.
The first was the stretch bookended by the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars, which I think can causally be combined, especially when factoring in how French finances following the Seven Years War and American Revolution contributed to the French Revolution. These wars were a Thucydides trap as Britain was challenging France for European supremacy. Britain succeeded in displacing France at the top.
The next megawar was the German challenge to Anglo-American supremacy, which took place in WWI and WWII. Germany failed to displace the Anglo countries.
Both war were Thucydides traps with different outcomes, and the severity of the conflict and long shadow cast by the wars is due to the stakes involved.