> The Battle of Kadesh, ca. 1285 BC, is the earliest military encounter that can be analyzed in detail. This conflict between the Egyptian forces of Ramses II and the Hittite army of Muwatalli
The real Trojan war was an uneventful raid on a coastal city, one of hundreds that happened in that region and era. Just one that happened to inspire a particularly gifted poet...
> WWII is the quintessential transformational war, not only because of the sweeping changes it brought to the global order but also because of the decades-long shadows it cast over the rest of the 20th century.
This is funny because my history professor used ww2 as the quintessential example of a non-transformational war. Nothing essential changed as a result of ww2. All those lives lost for essentially nothing. The power structure pre-ww2 ( US, Britain, Soviet Union ) was precisely the same post-ww2 ( US, Britain, Soviet Union ). The same people who ruled the world before ww2, ruled it after ww2 without any systematic change. There was no paradigm shift as a result of ww2. The international world order remained in place.
WW2 was the bloodiest war. It was the most destructive war. But it wasn't transformational because the side trying to cause a transformation ( reshape world ) lost and they lost badly.
WW 2 is the war that took the USA from an isolationist power to global policeman. Conversely it set the UK (and to a lesser extent, France) on the path of liberating their colonies. It also set the state for the UN to be created. And the groundwork for a new international norm against wars of conquest.
Yes, the same countries wound up staying in charge. But it transformed the world.
> WW 2 is the war that took the USA from an isolationist power to global policeman.
The US was never isolationist. It's one of those lies that we tell ourselves to pretend we aren't an empire. If we were isolationists, we would be a 13 state nation.
Our first vassal nation was japan and we got them in the 1850s. But of course, we'd never call them that since that's what empires do.
For an isolationist nation, we sure did get around.
> Conversely it set the UK (and to a lesser extent, France) on the path of liberating their colonies.
Path of "liberating"? The UK and France didn't liberate anything. The indians, vietnamese, etc all fought bloody wars to free themselves from their brutal colonial masters. Tens of millions of indians, vietnamese, algerians, sub-saharan africans, burmese, etc had to die to liberate themselves. India, vietnam, algeria, etc weren't given their freedom by the "gracious" brits, french, etc. The british, french, etc colonizers were never the good guys.
> And the groundwork for a new international norm against wars of conquest.
How convenient since the world had already been conquered by the winners huh? Not much left to conquer other than land dominated by the "winners". Also it wasn't anything new. The league of nations already laid the groundwork. Funnily enough, germany and japan weren't too fond of that since they had just begun their quest for conquest.
> Yes, the same countries wound up staying in charge. But it transformed the world.
The former negates the latter. If you could point out the fundamental ( paradigm shift ) that occurred because of ww2, I'm all ears. Instead of saying it transformed the world, point out the transformation.
In the 1800s the US was indeed expansionist. But their view was that of Manifest Destiny - it was the USA's manifest destiny to expand and control the Western hemisphere. To that end the USA launched wars (eg against Mexico), fought against colonial powers, and so on.
However it was also a defined sphere of influence. The USA was late to both WW 1 and 2 because what happened in Europe was widely felt to not be the USA's affair. Privately we armed one side, but we didn't fight. It was not until the Kaiser attempted to form an alliance with Mexico that the USA entered into WW 1. And not until Japan attacked did the USA enter WW 2. After WW 2, the USA proactively looked for opportunities to engage world wide.
On the colonies, all of the European powers had put down rebellions repeatedly. After WW 2 they moved towards transferring power to local authorities. And their desire to do this was codified in the UN charter. See https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xi/index.h... for verification.
Wow. Empty virtue signaling words. With such empty words, one wonders why so many colonized peoples had to die after ww2 to free themselves from their brutal colonizers?
Seems like there are a lot of people defending the brutal colonizers. I wonder why?
I am sure you will have a reply to all of the following (and I could probably come up with some arguments of my own, if I were so inclined), but here's a few more arguably transformational consequences:
1. The rise of the USSR as a global actor.
2. The rise of communist China.
3. The demilitarization of Japan, and the ending of its colonial ambitions.
4. The development and use of nuclear weapons, transforming what it means to be a global actor.
5. The foundation of Israel, transforming the politics of the Middle East and beyond.
6. The rise of the dollar.
7. The effective end of Western European military competition.
There is also something significant for not happening:
8. The USA exploiting its monopoly of nuclear weaponry beyond the defeat of Japan.
I agree with you that colonialism was on its way out regardless, but WW2 and its immediate consequences may have accelerated it, arguably leading to
9. A redefinition of what expansionism means.
As I don't think the 'mega wars' theory is any more the whole of history than the 'great men' theory, I do not want to exaggerate WW2's importance (and, furthermore, I consider WW2 in Europe to be a continuation of WW1), but it seems inarguable that things changed quite significantly (including of course, the fact that the tensions that precipitated the war were no longer in effect afterwards.)
> but here's a few more arguably transformational consequences:
You are confusing important happenings to transformational changes ( ie paradigm shifts ).
Nothing you listed are transformation changes to the world order. The soviet union existed before ww2 and they were a dominant force before ww2. Communist china rose within the ( american/anglo-american/western/international ) world order.
Probably the most important geopolitic event in the 20th century was the collapse of the soviet union. But it wasn't transformational. It didn't cause a paradigm shift. The world order remained.
> but it seems inarguable that things changed quite significantly
Change happened within a western world order. It wasn't transformational to the world order.
Lots of history happened after ww2. What didn't happen was a transformational change to the world order. Man landed on the moon. Didn't change the world order.
I don't believe I am confusing important happenings to transformational changes; rather, I think you are simply denying that there was a transformation.
For example, you write "The soviet union existed before ww2 and they were a dominant force before ww2." The second part of that statement is either irrelevant or factually incorrect, depending on whether you are referring to potentiality or actuality, but let me guess: when confronted with the evidence against it, you will fall back on the position that what actually happened did not amount to a transformational change.
Your argument so far has been a combination of non-sequiturs (such as mentioning the moon landing), downplaying the magnitude of transformation that did occur as a consequence of WW2, and your 'get out of jail' argument of simply denying that this or that was truly transformational. At this point, you owe us some examples of truly transformational changes.
> I don't believe I am confusing important happenings to transformational changes; rather, I think you are simply denying that there was a paradigm shift.
Paradigm shifts require a significant fundamental systematic change. It mostly started out with kuhn describing scientific paradigm shifts, but can be used elsewhere. Here's one clue, paradigm shifts don't happen often. The fact that you listed 9 should be a clue that most or all of what you listed are not paradigm shifts.
> For example, you write "The soviet union existed before ww2 and they were a dominant force before ww2." ... you will fall back on the position that what actually happened did not amount to a transformational change.
I was pointing out that soviet union existed before and after ww2 in pretty much the same position. Also, we are talking about the change of the global world order. You seem to be fixated on individual countries and are completing missing the point.
> Your argument so far has been a combination of non-sequiturs (such as mentioning the moon landing)
It's not a non-sequitur. I was just pointing out important events happened. But those important events don't change the international world order. Vietnam War, Iraq War, etc happened. Didn't change the international world order.
> At this point, you owe us some examples of truly transformational changes.
Once again, we are talking about transformation changes of the world order, not single nations. Since the "world order" is a fairly recent invention and hasn't changed, I'll give you localized historical examples.
The mongol conquest of china, middle east, russia, etc which shook up the geopolitical eurasian order.
The treaties of westphalia which created the sovereign nation-state.
You know significant events which actually changed something.
The world before ww2 was a "western" world order. The world after ww2 was a "western" world order. The same people running the world before and after.
I think the confusion here is that you seem to be talking about changes with individual nations while I'm talking about the world order.
The creation of israel, north/south korea, south sudan, etc are important to those nations, but didn't transform the world order. These nations all live within the established "western" world order. But if you feel different than you are entitled to it.
The opening of china was an important event, but didn't cause a paradigm shift since they decided to work within the "western" world order. If china ever challenges the current world order and decides to create their own international system and does so successfully, then a significant world transformation would have happened. A world led by china with "chinese values" instead of "western values" would amount to a paradigm shift in the international world order.
WW2 didn't cause a "transformation", it actually cemented and reinforced the pre-ww2 status quo. Once again in terms of the global world order, not individual nations.
Your case of the treaties of Westphalia is an excellent example of why trying to draw a sharp line between transformational and other changes is unhelpful, as the treaties were at most a ratification of a series of connected changes that had been building over long periods. The treaty serves as a marker for the conclusion of a phase of history (insofar as things ever do have a conclusion), but it certainly was not the event that caused the transformation.
To summarize the effect of WW2 as "The world before ww2 was a "western" world order. The world after ww2 was a "western" world order" is to avoid the issue, as it ignores the transformation of how the world was ordered within that broad characterization. The pre-war powers that you list (USA, Britain and Russia) were either incapable of or unwilling to exercise their alleged dominance over the Axis powers; afterwards, the Axis was gone, Russia was, for the first time, globally influential, the British empire existed in name only, the USA was exercising its influence to a degree never seen before, and the era of the nuclear standoff had begun. That was not a cementing of the status quo ante, and it is not obvious that these changes were less transformational than the fall of Constantinople.
By the way, some of your posts in this thread have been downvoted, and I just want to make it clear that it is not me. While I do not agree with your position, I support your right to make it.
> Your case of the treaties of Westphalia is an excellent example of why trying to draw a sharp line between transformational and other changes is unhelpful, as the treaties were at most a ratification of a series of connected changes that had been building over long periods.
That's the point of a paradigm shift. It isn't a singular event. Momentum builds, a little here and a little there and then we have a systematic change. There is a world before westphalia and there is a systematically different world after. Lots of little changes and momentum before and during westphalia treaties.
> The pre-war powers that you list (USA, Britain and Russia) were either incapable of or unwilling to exercise their alleged dominance over the Axis powers;
What? Russia controlled germany via resources. Also, britain forced germany to pay a lot of reparations.
The idea that the pre-ww2 powers didn't enforce their dominance is factually incorrect.
> Russia was, for the first time, globally influential
Once again, you are fixated on a single nation. The international world order still remained the same. Whether a nation grows influence within it doesn't matter. Japan rose to become the #2 economy in the world and became "influential". So what? The world order remained. China is or will be the #1 economy in the world. The international world order still remains. China seems to be starting to create institutions to maybe one day challenge the international world order and if they do and they are successful, then a paradigm shift will have occurred. If they choose to get wealthy within the western world order like japan, taiwan, korea, etc, then no matter how rich china gets, no transformational change happens. It's significant change for china, but not for the world order. I don't know how better to explain it so I'll leave it at that.
> By the way, some of your posts in this thread have been downvoted, and I just want to make it clear that it is not me.
I don't care about downvotes. Especially on a forum. But thanks anyways.
There are a couple of points that can be made about this paragraph alone.
Firstly, let me remind you that it was you who presented the treaties of Westphalia as a paradigmatical paradigm shift, yet now you are backtracking, but not so far as to reach the logical conclusion, which is that this allegedly paradigmatical event was not causal at all; rather, it was caused by the changes that had already occurred.
Ironically, you are beginning to acknowledge that it is usually an over-simplification to look for paradigm changes in single events in isolation. This would be a reasonable counter to the thesis of the original article, but it is not the argument you are making here.
To consider some other specific claims:
> What? Russia controlled germany via resources.
That is an unconventional use of the word 'controlled', given what happened in June of 1941.
> Also, britain forced germany to pay a lot of reparations.
... to the point where, in 1938, Chamberlain could claim he had secured "Peace in our time".
> France took over german territory.
And yet did not respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, an event that Hitler himself regarded as a great gamble, but it really was not, given the state of France.
> The US controlled Japan via resources.
To such effect that Japan expelled the US from the Philipines and was bombing Darwin, Australia, by 1942 - not to mention Pearl Harbor.
> Not only that when Japan beat Russia, [the US] forced Japan to return territory to Russia.
Of what relevance to WW2 is that? There were some significant events between 1905 and 1941. The non-response to the fate of the USS Panay and the destruction of Nanking is more emblematic of the situation pre- WW2.
> [The western powers] told Japan how many warships they could build.
Which they ignored, as did the rest of the Axis.
> The idea that the pre-ww2 powers didn't enforce their dominance is factually incorrect.
See the above.
>Once again, you are fixated on a single nation.
Of course, if you quote me out of context, you can make it look like I am fixated on one thing, but if you consider it in its proper context it is just one of a number of changes that amount to a truly global transformation -- and, furthermore, to a global situation in which the USSR was not just one more of many nations.
>So what?
The specifcs of the immediate post-WW2 situation were unimagined in 1939. The world of 1950 was even less so.
The rest of that paragraph essentially just asserts that nothing that followed from WW2 could meet your idiosyncratic standards for being a paradigm change, which brings us back to one of the first points I made in this thread.
Having said all that, I think there is an overlap in our positions, in that I don't think we can take any single event, even one as large as WW2, independently of the events that led up to them. I agree that the (re)development of the nation-state was a paradigmatical historical change, but I do not attribute it to a single event. I suspect that significant changes occurred in the first half of the 20th century, and those of and around WW2 were as significant as many of your paradigm changes (I notice that you are silent on the issue of the emergence of the nuclear standoff), but only time will tell for sure.
> Ironically, you are beginning to acknowledge that it is usually an over-simplification to look for paradigm changes in single events in isolation.
What? Listen, a paradigm shift didn't occur after ww2. If it had, it would be germany and japan ruling the world. The same world order existed before and after ww2. I don't know how else to explain the same thing to you.
> That is an unconventional use of the word 'controlled', given what happened in June of 1941.
It isn't. An abusive husband controls his wife until she fights back and he doesn't. Germany's top goal in ww2 was to free itself from its dependence of soviet resources for its economy, resources, etc. Not only that, it's still a problem today. Some nations are worried that germany's growing dependence on russia today is a geopolitical security risk.
> ... to the point where, in 1938, Chamberlain could claim he had secured "Peace in our time".
Yes, I saw that documentary too. What's your point?
> And yet did not respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, an event that Hitler himself regarded as a great gamble, but it really was not, given the state of France.
And? I saw that documentary too. What's your point?
> To such effect that Japan expelled the US from the Philipines and was bombing Darwin, Australia, by 1942 - not to mention Pearl Harbor.
Just because Japan wanted to free itself of US control doesn't mean the US didn't control it beforehand. Ever wonder why Japan attacked the US? Because Japan was sick and tired of being our bitch. This is basic historical fact. Not only is it a historical fact then. It's still a fact now. The US is the guarantor of Japan's access to resources. We hold the levers to japan's economy.
> Of what relevance to WW2 is that? There were some significant events between 1905 and 1941. The non-response to the fate of the USS Panay and the destruction of Nanking is more emblematic of the situation pre- WW2.
It's to show the US controlled Japan prior to ww2? Remember you didn't believe the US controlled japan? Imagine winning a war and being forced to return territory to the loser by your "master". Now that's control.
This is getting ridiculous. I could tell it is going to go on forever. I'm not sure why you are so confused about the control and influence that the US had over Japan and USSR had over Germany as ww2 was mainly about japan and germany overthrowing their "masters" and setting up a new world order where they are at the top. Still not sure why you are so adamant that ww2 caused a paradigm shift of the world order. I don't know what world you live in, but I live in a western world order. My grandparents born before ww2 also lived in a western world order. This is a fact. Doesn't mean change didn't happen. Just not a systematic and transformational one implying a paradigm shift. We are simply going to have to agree to disagree. Have a nice day.
> Listen, a paradigm shift didn't occur after ww2...
I am listening, but what I am hearing are demands that I must accept your teacher's dogma as the absolute truth, some highly tendentious claims misrepresenting the pre-war state, and an inconsistent application of the concept of a paradigm shift.
> ...If it had, it would be germany and japan ruling the world.
That would, indeed, have been one outcome that could be called transformational, but the actual outcome was transformational in its own right. Notably, you have been silent on the arguments I have presented for that point of view.
> I don't know how else to explain the same thing to you.
You could try to offer some fact-based arguments for the cold-war nuclear standoff and a demilitarized Japan, now part of the Western alliance, being the status quo ante.
Furthermore, in your insistence that only a complete overthrow of the world order (as measured in a single-sentence summary) would count a a paradigm shift here, you are being inconsistent. The Treaty of Westphalia produced no immediate paradigm shift in Africa or Asia, and the fall of Constantinople was similarly a regional event.
> An abusive husband controls his wife until she fights back and he doesn't.
That analogy simply does not work for the pre-war relationship between Germany and the USSR. Your view of that relationship seems to align more with Mein Kampf than to reliable sources.
> Some nations are worried that germany's growing dependence on russia today is a geopolitical security risk.
Maybe so, but it is a situation Germany chose to put itself in after the cold war, and is of no relevance here: Germany's current dependence does not establish the existence of a dependency, let alone control by the USSR, prior to WW2.
> Just because Japan wanted to free itself of US control doesn't mean the US didn't control it beforehand.
And just because you have said that, it does not mean that the US was exercising control over Japan in the run-up to WW2. In your previous post, you reached back to the Treaty of Portsmouth in search of evidence that could be bent in support of your claim, completely ignoring how things had changed by the thirties. One could indeed argue that the war in the Pacific was started by the US imposing sanctions on Japan -- after well over a decade of non-intervention -- and the immediate consequences of that action showed clearly just how little control the US had over Japan at that point.
> What?
...
>Yes, I saw that documentary too. What's your point?
...
>And? I saw that documentary too. What's your point?
The point is that they all refute the line of argument you presented in your previous post, and you have offered nothing here to alter that. My point is that your arguments for the US, UK and USSR controlling the Axis prior to WW2 do not hold up to basic scrutiny.
And, just for the record, my knowledge of the relevant history does not come from a single documentary. Your attempt to imply otherwise, together with your faux-rhetorical-question style of responses here, just underscores how poorly you are doing in coming up with factual arguments.
> The same people who ruled the world before ww2, ruled it after ww2 without any systematic change.
I find that claim difficult to reconcile with the fact that WW2, or more specifically, the collapse of the empires participating in it, broke the back of jackboot-and-bayonet colonialism.
Not to mention that it completely reshaped the fate of Central and Eastern Europe for the next seventy years.
The only people for whom little changed after the war were Americans, Scandinavians, and the Swiss. (I'd list the Russians, but while nothing changed domestically, they did find themselves in the middle of a new empire.)
> The power structure pre-ww2 ( US, Britain, Soviet Union ) was precisely the same post-ww2 ( US, Britain, Soviet Union ).
Actually, it's even worse than that, because the main reason for the US and Britain to fight Hitler was supposed to be to save Eastern Europe from a totalitarian dictatorship (WW2 started because Britain and France decided they had to honor their treaty commitments to Poland when Germany invaded), yet at the end of the war Eastern Europe was in the hands of a worse totalitarian dictatorship, the USSR. So while the main great powers were basically the same (but see below), the territorial situation was worse.
> the side trying to cause a transformation ( reshape world ) lost
I'm not so sure the Allies weren't also trying to cause a transformation. There was a key difference in the power structure after WW2 as compared to before: the United Nations. The previous attempt at a single world organization, the League of Nations, failed miserably. The UN did not. Whatever you think of the UN's actual policies (I'm often not a fan of them), the fact remains that for 75 years now the world has accepted the existence of a single world organization that has at least some governmental or quasi-governmental powers. That is not an accident.
> yet at the end of the war Eastern Europe was in the hands of a worse totalitarian dictatorship, the USSR.
I was born in Hungary and I lived under the USSR occupation of Hungary. I am also the grandson of an Auschwitz survivor so I strenuously object to you painting the USSR as worse as Nazi Germany.
> I strenuously object to you painting the USSR as worse as Nazi Germany.
"Worse" based on the total number of their own people killed. I don't think there's any dispute that that number is much higher for the USSR than for Nazi Germany.
Since you mention Auschwitz, you might also consider the fact that the USSR had plenty of concentration camps in which people suffered just as badly. I have no doubt your grandparent's experience at Auschwitz was horrible, far, far worse than your experience in Hungary, but your experience in Hungary was also far, far better than what the USSR showed itself to be capable of. Alexander Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago described one of the USSR's camps as a "polar Auschwitz".
No. At least I don't think so. I remember he was a francophone who believed that the french revolution was the most important event in the last 500 years. I remember a few of us arguing that the american revolution was more important since it came first and inspired the french revolution. Not to mention the fact that we eventually became the dominant world power and not the french. Easily one of the best professors I've had.
The author completely forgot to include the thirty year war, it was instrumental in completely breaking Habsburg hegemony "almost" overnight on the historical scale, and opened way for historical shift of power to Western Europe from Central, and Eastern Europe.
The Thirty Years War also confirmed that the primary legitimate basis for power would be noble birth instead of ordination by God - a shift begun by the Reformation.
The French Revolution/Napoleonic Wars began the shift away from noble birth and WW I&II confirmed that the primary legitimate basis for power would be ownership and property.
No. (See: Chinese Mandate of Heaven; the multiple examples of people claiming to be ordained by gods and similar higher powers historically despite no or little connection to nobility, so on.)
The system it backs up is heritable monarchy, it didn't precede it.
Assuming this is true (which seems highly dubious), what are you contesting? Their claim is that God ordained their rulership, not that 'local religious authorities' did. Regardless of existence of the entity in question, "the primary legitimate basis for power would be noble birth instead of ordination by God" is the right thing to say.
Seems trivially true, to me. The european feudal system developed out of the late roman imperial system, that would have vicars and dukes, with the dukes representing secular military authority.
Also, off the top of my head, I think somebody like Charlemagne (as the first guy I know who merged military rule with the support of the pope) would have been wholy interested in christian support for secular reasons (and vice versa). Being the roman emperor, appointed by the pope, would presumably help with his legitimacy in Italy and Gaul.
> And in 1918 the victorious powers, dictating a new European peace at Versailles, would not have credited that Adolf Hitler, a destitute, neurotic would-be artist and gassed veteran of the trench warfare, would within two decades undo their new order and plunge the world into its greatest war.
According to a book review discussed recently here, Hoover did. Said book review totally transformed my understanding of him. And OK, not Hitler personally, but conceptually.
> dictating a new European peace at Versailles, would not have credited that Adolf Hitler, a destitute, neurotic would-be artist and gassed veteran of the trench warfare, would within two decades undo their new order and plunge the wo
Well, when you're too timid to occupy defeated enemies, you get another war.
That's why Russia insisted on occupying Berlin in WW2.
A little-known fact is that the USA proposed enslaving Germany, which leaked out and is why there was no chance of peace talks. The USA wanted to decimate the population, deindustrialize Germany and make them peasant farmers. Russia subsequently succeeded in doing that.
In a way it's a backhanded compliment to how much the Allies feared them.
> Well, when you're too timid to occupy defeated enemies, you get another war.
The US occupied Germany for decades. At first, very clearly, killing substantial numbers of resistance fighters. And then more subtly and covertly. Its occupying force was ostensibly to ward off the Soviet Union, but there was a domestic role as well. And its policies in Japan were similar.
That's the thing about the US. While there are numerous well-known examples of ham-handedness, US interventions have generally been so subtle and covert that their mention is readily discounted as conspiracy theory.
This article is excerpted from “Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years," first published in 2008. If some portions seem outdated, it's not just you.
1. Undid the Ottoman Empire. If the Ottomans had limped around for 20 more years, they would have found themselves in a century drunk on oil, while in charge of the majority of the world's oil reserves. The Ottomans would have been the global superpower of the latter half of the 20th century.
2. Rise of Communism. Lenin was an outcast living in Switzerland when the Tsar was overthrown. He arrived in Russia -- delivered there by Germany and with significant German funding -- two months after the interim government had taken over. It was a liberal democracy, not unlike the government of the US or France, that had the most power when Lenin arrived. Even if the Russian Empire had still fallen, the century probably wouldn't have fallen under the shadow of communism.
3. The center of world banking moved from London to New York City. After the end of 1916 or so, Britain was pretty much broke, and the war effort was to a significant extent funded by NYC bankers. London indebted themselves greatly to the US, and wherever you were in the world, if you wanted something to do with money, you went to New York City to get it, because England didn't have any. Of course, for these loans to mean anything, Britain would have to win the war (and reparations) which leads us to...
4. USA as world police. The US wanted nothing to do with European, Asian, or African politics. Even Teddy Roosevelt's "imperialist" attitudes were limited to North and South America. If Wilson wanted all the NYC banks to not go bankrupt, he'd have to enter the war- which he did. And thus began America's role as world police rather than a regional power.
5. The Belfast declaration and the catastrophic carving of the Arab world on arbitrary lines. Israel's foundation was laid down in 1917 by England declarating their intention to create a Jewish state in Palestine. And the borders drawn up on meaningless lines in the desert rather than along ethnic boundaries plunged the Arab world into a century of sectarian violence and chaos.
6. The Ottoman Empire would have gladly sold oil to Japan during their wars with China. (which likely still would have happened) Japan never would have had the quarrel with the United States that lead to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
While I'm not trying to minimize the human life cost of WWI, I actually don't think the death toll of the war was really all that significant. China's had a dozen or so civil wars with higher death tolls. More people died of the flu in 1918 and 1919 than all combat deaths from 1914 to 1918 combined. But WWI had an outsized effect on world history. I think it's probably the most transformational event in human history since... I dunno, Columbus introducing the Americas to Europe.
I don't know what the world would look like if WWI didn't play out the way it did. But it wouldn't look like this.
The article mentions the come-from-nowhere stories of people like Hong Xiuquan and Adolf Hitler, but I see these figures as catalysts of larger forces that had been in play for decades.
I see two major mega-wars in the past 300 years within the western world, whose history I am most familiar with. Both were results of a rising power challenging the existing superpower for supremacy.
The first was the stretch bookended by the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars, which I think can causally be combined, especially when factoring in how French finances following the Seven Years War and American Revolution contributed to the French Revolution. These wars were a Thucydides trap as Britain was challenging France for European supremacy. Britain succeeded in displacing France at the top.
The next megawar was the German challenge to Anglo-American supremacy, which took place in WWI and WWII. Germany failed to displace the Anglo countries.
Both war were Thucydides traps with different outcomes, and the severity of the conflict and long shadow cast by the wars is due to the stakes involved.
WWI and WWII can be seen as one war, which was the attempt by Germany to displace the UK and wider Anglo world as the dominant western power. I think it makes sense to group the wars together.
Not very widespread. You may not have a very long view on history. Take a look at my username (I'm "English" by the way). Just in case I need to spell it out: Gerdes ~= German.
Those two wars had very different reasons despite Germany being a participant in both of them. Russia (famous for not being Anglo) was a major player in those wars as well and we should not overlook Japan etc as well.
WW I is the more important because it destroys the power of the royal families that ruled the empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey and China. By the end of WW II most royal families were reduced to figurehead status, except for the British and the ones that Britain tried to re-establish in the Middle East.
Yes, I really like the Thucydides trap framework, but this perspective must be seen from the PoV of the current hegemon. None of the Axis powers wanted to fight the US or even Britain, but the Atlanticist hegemon saw the development of Eurasian powers as unacceptable and must be put down.
Britain was not challenging France. The height of French power in terms of relative polarity was the early 18th century, not Napoleon (by that point, Europe was multipolar). Spain imploded, the Netherlands were imploding (connected to the split and decline of Habsburg), England was still emerging...but the key point about Europe, geopolitically, is that it has been multipolar since the fall of the Roman Empire (in terms of relative power, Britain came closest to domination but never sought preeminence in Europe, the foreign policy of Palmerston was pretty important in this).
I don't think Germany was challenging Anglo-American supremacy in WW2. For one, Hitler assumed (correctly, for the most part) that America wasn't terribly bothered about Europe. For two, Hitler also believed that Britain was the natural ally of Germany...until war occurred. WW2 was far more about Hitler's bizarre theories about race and what was happening to the East (Napoleon was France's Hitler...right man, right place but trying to do something that was basically impossible in Europe).
WW1 is probably more unclear because Germany did things, like building up their navy, that are difficult to interpret as anything other than challenging the status quo. But I think there were a number of strategic miscalculations on both sides that make it somewhat difficult to divine intention from actions (i.e. did Germany believe they would trigger a huge war...well after 1870 and the relative peace of the 19th century, probably not). I think the mistake you are making (not one btw that is contained with realist theory) is assuming that agency is necessary...Germany did not need to "challenge", conflict was inevitable through changes in relative power...I wouldn't necessarily agree with that still but it is a fairly nuanced point.
The stuff about the Thucydides Trap is also pretty questionable. Classical realist thought, of which Thucydides is part of, says that war between great powers is inevitable but this isn't really said explicitly in Thucydides (the first seed of these theories really come with Hobbes...I am guessing Hobbes' trap didn't pass muster with the editor). Allison cites statistics to justify the specific statement but these are pretty hopeless (similar to the issues with democratic peace theory...you can define things whatever way based on what conclusion you need). It is a great catchphrase and sounds very impressive but has always seemed rather devoid of content (Allison's views generally are). I am definitely sympathetic to realism but the whole "conflict is inevitable" stuff isn't really credible anymore.
I'm not necessarily ascribing agency to the actors. The verbiage I used was for brevity.
I too see these events as mostly the confluence of bottom-up trends outside anyone's control, with occasional pressure points at which "great men" can exert unique influence.
The British conquest of India, which spanned the late-18th and early-19th centuries, killing millions of people, and affecting the fate of hundreds of millions seems to be strangely absent.
They also seem to have forgotten those bloody Romans rocking up and duffing up us Britons in 55 and 54BC then in 43AD getting the job done. Then those blasted Saxons, Jutes and Angles wandering on in and doing the same to us Romano-Britons in about 400AD. Oh and vikings and that. Picts, Irish, Celts and stuff.
(lol) You'll never guess what. 1066. Fucking great bunch of neo-froggies, err Norsemen or something waft on in and duff up us Romano-British, Saxons, Angels, Welsh, Scots, Cornish, Old uncle Tom Cobbley and all (and all.)
I'm not sure which Britain actually invaded which variety of India because I don't think you can use such trite terms. The India of C18/19 is not the India of today and neither is Britain.
Today I personally identify as a Briton first and English second. Some of my forebears were German(ish) in C17. My surname is Gerdes: does that make me a German? How does that work out for my great uncle leaping out of a Dakota aircraft over war torn Arnhem. He's a Briton (Englishman) (a Saxon?), trying to liberate a part of the Netherlands - Dutch (Saxons?) from a bunch of Germans (Saxons?). Notice how close the English word Dutch is to Deutsche. I lived in West Germany as a British forces dependent for about 10 years. Those are years that I cherish.
I'm talking about history on a scale of about 30-70 years (we were in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970-80s) with direct personal attachment and you are alluding to something that happened ~300 years ago in a world that you may not have even been a part of.
History is history mate. You don't have to like it.
Yep, Britain in India is hopelessly complex. For most of the time they were there, the Brits (or, more precisely, the East India Company...power over which was nominally British but was actually responsible to no-one) were the balancing act in all the regional conflicts between the Marthas, Mughals, Bengals, the Portuguese, the French, etc.
It was only after the 1850s that power really consolidated, and that wasn't through war. Definitely, you had famines...but where do you the draw line or attribute agency? It is very tricky to say: this famine wouldn't have occurred otherwise (the only circumstance I have ever come across where this was true was Mao).
My main thesis is that you can't dive in with C21 ideals about something that happened 300 years ago! Its not just hopelessly complex, it's a different world.
Britain is not now the same Britain it was then. Back then Britain included Ireland in total, along with a shed load of extra bits, way bigger than these islands. It was a full on Empire where the map of the world had a lot of pink on it. A lot of pink.
Maybe he thinks that this would be many separate conflicts because of the different powers that partook and over different decades? Does seem to be a big deal.
