This is an evergreen story. Regulations sold as weapons for davids to defend against goliaths are instead used by goliaths to fend off davids. It turns out that Goliath can learn to use a sling too, and can hurl bigger stones with it. This is why goliaths like regulations so much, and why patents may be more disease than cure.
It's like mandating a certain minimum stone mass, arguing that small stones are ineffective projectiles, and that we need to help stop people from getting scammed by unscrupulous stone vendors. But in reality all it does is make it so that only giants can use slingshots effectively.
The real problem is when one's intent and focus is to create certain consequences (at a macro level)...inevitably it doesn't work (it may still work at a micro level), as evidenced by the analysis of actual consequences you are pointing at. Better to act according to a set of principles, consequences be damned--or blessed as the case may be.
Cf. Taleb's ideas on inductive reasoning/enduring conservative philosophy over deductive reasoning, etc
I understand and agree with the overall stirrings of your comment, but it's not necessarily relevant in this case. Taleb is about making choices in uncertainty where it's a reiteration of Biblical, Aquinas, Augustine of Hippo, Berkeley, Kant, Ricoeur, Geertz, and Eliade philosophy. It's no question that given an uncertain circumstance, one should stick to a framework that works independent of circumstance, a categorical imperative framework.
In this case I am sure that the concern is almost always on the intent of individuals rather than the consequences. I'm sure you can find your own examples of this, it would be more difficult for me to guess which examples you would agree have had negative consequences but good intent. Regardless, consequences can be deduced with good analysis: for instance physics has done such a tremendous analysis from deductive reasoning on the universe that I am able to communicate to you right now.
In regards to Taleb using only inductive reasoning over deductive reasoning: I hope not. Inductive reasoning is even controversial among logicians to be a reasoning at all, it's a weak logical intuition. Deduction is much more powerful, even Taleb argues for his non-novel idea of a categorical imperative, in the same way religions (and all the philosophers I listed) have, given that no circumstantial framework always works because circumstances change, we are forced to find a framework that is irrelevant to dynamic environment. The reasoning to choose a categorical framework at all is deductive.
Taleb shouldn't be seen as a tool to justify cowering from rational analysis but instead the justification for favoring morality and epistemology over utilitarianism.
I really only mentioned Taleb in passing it's not the main of my argument, and you seemed to latch onto it.
For me to elaborate on my point, I'd rather go on about a priori vs a posteriori reasoning, and anti empiricism, and the modern religion of "science" and all that.
I also hope you aren't suggesting that anything besides deduction is not "rational analysis."
I've been wondering, for a while, if regulatory capture is a natural outcome of two-party systems.
The central genius, IMHO, of the US Constitution is the built-in trilemma (separation of powers, court vs legislature vs executive), which has proven more durable. (Present circumstances notwithstanding, ahem.)
What would a trilemma for regulations look like? Give "the market", in the form of consumer advocates, a seat at the table?
I still have no idea.
I've asked everyone I can think of. Famed muckraker Greg Palast's, who has direct experience trying to thwart regulatory capture, answer was "more transparency, more participation".
Which I find very unsatisfactory. Having done the whole agitator, whistleblower routine, it really isn't sustainable for outsiders to serve as the counterbalance. It occurs to me each of the three parties needs some kind of veto power.
1) Regulations by default should be capped at organization size or industry. Minimum wage is a great example of this, great for 25% of companies/industries, terrible for the rest - its hard to measure jobs that are never created as a result.
2) A powerful, well financed agency whose mandate is to audit all regulations, monitor and capture data regarding it's function, and review their ultimate utility to society as a whole. The vast majority of harmful regulations were designed in a different era and for a different evolved market. Markets also adapt to regulations as well naturally reducing utility.
This agency would have the power to temporarily end regulations until congress reviews it and either updates it or ends it officially.
3) Time limits on regulations forcing them to be renewed every x years, requiring data to show it's helping, not harming society
RE: your point #1, nope that won't work. By capping based on revenue, bigger companies will simply spin off certain employee segments into separate contractor companies. Create a possible loophole, and it will be exploited.
I feel that minimum wage pushes companies to invest in technology and automation. Which is always good. Set the minimum wage at $50 and eventually no human will need to work for so less money.
I'd have to chew on this one. I'm not willing to forfeit environmental, consumer, safety umbrellas without an compelling upside (upgrade).
2) Ah. An regulation ombudsman? Like the Congressional Budget Office, but for rules and regs?
3) Emphatic agreement. I've adopted an almost religious devotion applying TTL (time to live) to everything. DHCP lease expiration and renewal, auth security tokens, cache invalidation are such effective architectural patterns, they feel like magic to me.
I would say that regulatory capture is the natural outcome of a Republic, due to the fact that the representatives can be persuaded to act against their constituents wills.
A Direct Democracy is now technologically viable, and having people regularly participate in voting on small topics keeps people accountable and also allows more nuanced views where somebody doesn't have to, eg. be anti single-payer-healthcare AND be anti illegal-immigrant at the same time. This reduces deadlocks and we don't get stupid compromise bills with pork spending being passed so that each team gets something they are happy about.
The average person can't sink the time to become knowledgeable on all matters that affect them. Worse yet, the average person is trivially manipulated through mass media. To game the entire system, you just have to gain control of the education sector and grow yourself a generation of placated consumers that do as they're told. And exactly this seems to be happening in many countries right now.
Getting a desired outcome on any given vote by polarising the topic along some axis sounds like something that could be achieved with current generation ML.
Actually, we had sort of a trilemma, during the cold-war- when there was a external force on the market to behave "well" or face socialization of capital by internal forces.
Thats why the front-states of the cold war where either war-zones or rich show-rooms.
My favourite irony about this phenomenon is how often people attack the anti-regulation libertarians for just want to help mega-corps become even bigger.
Regulations help big companies, but no regulation helps big companies even more. Just imagine the profits you could make if you could save on safety inspections or workers rights.
Have you ever worked in a large corporation? Many of us who have, are convinced that without massive state interference on their behalf they couldn't survive at all. A corporation might be set up so that one sort of regularly-needed thing might happen quickly and efficiently, but every other sort of thing requires massive coordination among non-cooperative parties. Shit takes forever. Large firms are quite concerned with getting just the regulations they want, not no regulations at all. Fortunately for them we have a society in which they are well-placed to designate exactly those regulations they desire.
There is a term, "economy of scale", that makes a certain sense when applied to some factory-based manufacture of commodities. Rather than be restricted to that particular field in which it is valid, this term is a shibboleth used by Economist writers and their dupes to hamper any critical examination of anything a corporation might do.
I have, in fact, worked in a large corporation and I agree that regulations are a big reason why they survive. I just don't think that no regulation at all is the better alternative. I wish I knew how to prevent big corporations writing their own regulations, but for many topics most people who know anything about it are on their payroll.
You think that long-after-the-fact punishments that require long-term planning would have an effect?
We have evidence that even the most severe punishment of all does not work as a deterrent (example link: https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/study-88-criminologists-do-not-...). Or smoking, where knowing how bad it is seems to have little to no effect (even doctors do it).
Even if people did act completely rationally, a dollar earned today is worth much more than dollars lost tomorrow even without inflation. And how many expensive and useless mergers have been performed even when the executives and even the top stock owners knew it was a bad strategy long-term? They just sold their stake and let somebody else deal with the fallout.
So even with complete rationality, detaching punishment from the "crime" (in time) gives people time to get in the harvest and move on before punishment occurs, making it useless as a deterrent (given that, as linked above, it does not even work when people cannot detach themselves from facing the ultimate punishment it's even worse).
If you want insurance to take the role of regulation you quickly end up with certification programs that are necessary to get any insurance. Those programs are just regulations in disguise that are divorced from any democratic process for changing them. If you want to rely on litigation you face the problem that big companies can afford armies of lawyers that can delay rulings until the injured party runs out of funds or fighting will.
