The real problem is when one's intent and focus is to create certain consequences (at a macro level)...inevitably it doesn't work (it may still work at a micro level), as evidenced by the analysis of actual consequences you are pointing at. Better to act according to a set of principles, consequences be damned--or blessed as the case may be.
Cf. Taleb's ideas on inductive reasoning/enduring conservative philosophy over deductive reasoning, etc
I understand and agree with the overall stirrings of your comment, but it's not necessarily relevant in this case. Taleb is about making choices in uncertainty where it's a reiteration of Biblical, Aquinas, Augustine of Hippo, Berkeley, Kant, Ricoeur, Geertz, and Eliade philosophy. It's no question that given an uncertain circumstance, one should stick to a framework that works independent of circumstance, a categorical imperative framework.
In this case I am sure that the concern is almost always on the intent of individuals rather than the consequences. I'm sure you can find your own examples of this, it would be more difficult for me to guess which examples you would agree have had negative consequences but good intent. Regardless, consequences can be deduced with good analysis: for instance physics has done such a tremendous analysis from deductive reasoning on the universe that I am able to communicate to you right now.
In regards to Taleb using only inductive reasoning over deductive reasoning: I hope not. Inductive reasoning is even controversial among logicians to be a reasoning at all, it's a weak logical intuition. Deduction is much more powerful, even Taleb argues for his non-novel idea of a categorical imperative, in the same way religions (and all the philosophers I listed) have, given that no circumstantial framework always works because circumstances change, we are forced to find a framework that is irrelevant to dynamic environment. The reasoning to choose a categorical framework at all is deductive.
Taleb shouldn't be seen as a tool to justify cowering from rational analysis but instead the justification for favoring morality and epistemology over utilitarianism.
I really only mentioned Taleb in passing it's not the main of my argument, and you seemed to latch onto it.
For me to elaborate on my point, I'd rather go on about a priori vs a posteriori reasoning, and anti empiricism, and the modern religion of "science" and all that.
I also hope you aren't suggesting that anything besides deduction is not "rational analysis."
