> I really doubt the credibility of the author; as if engineers would overlook such a basic factor if it was that crucial.
The problem is that the F-35 had requirements that fundamentally conflict with each other.
It had to have a STOVL configuration, which probably dictated the nozzle design. But it also had to be 'stealthy', so the nozzle design and the wide fuselage needed for the STOVL requirement, negatively affected the stealth requirement. So much so that the stealth rating of the F-35 was downgraded.
It was also supposed to be more maneuverable than the F-16, but the other requirements resulted in aerodynamic performance that was less than what was originally planned. So much so that it lost a mock dogfight against a F-16. Granted that test is not the end of the story but it's not a good sign.
Then there's the fact that the military and Congress inexplicably decided that they'd throw the normal testing and validation phase out the window in favor of 'concurrency' where they're putting the aircraft into production before testing is done. This has the dual downsides of ensuring expensive retrofits when problems are identified but it commits the government even more deeply to a weapons system that may ultimately never perform as billed.
The problem is that the F-35 had requirements that fundamentally conflict with each other.
It had to have a STOVL configuration, which probably dictated the nozzle design. But it also had to be 'stealthy', so the nozzle design and the wide fuselage needed for the STOVL requirement, negatively affected the stealth requirement. So much so that the stealth rating of the F-35 was downgraded.
It was also supposed to be more maneuverable than the F-16, but the other requirements resulted in aerodynamic performance that was less than what was originally planned. So much so that it lost a mock dogfight against a F-16. Granted that test is not the end of the story but it's not a good sign.
Then there's the fact that the military and Congress inexplicably decided that they'd throw the normal testing and validation phase out the window in favor of 'concurrency' where they're putting the aircraft into production before testing is done. This has the dual downsides of ensuring expensive retrofits when problems are identified but it commits the government even more deeply to a weapons system that may ultimately never perform as billed.