These results actually make sense. The 10 year period covered a tumultuous time in our economy. When the market drops 20%, no fees are paid, but no breaks on future fees are offered either. So let's say they start with $100 billion. The fund loses 20% one year, then rebounds exactly 20% the next. If charging 20% of profits, $4 billion in fees are paid on the $20 billion "gain," even though investors made nothing. They've actually had a net loss of $4 billion after paying fees on their "gains".
That is primarily why these numbers seems so ridiculous - the market had a few bad years, and then came back around. The people in charge of deploying this money should negotiate better terms, like paying fees only on net returns over longer periods of time (5 years instead of one year, for example). At the end of the day, it's their own fault for cutting lousy deals. $160 billion gives you a pretty big bargaining chip on fees.
> The people in charge of deploying this money should negotiate better terms
Indeed. Yet even those people are making good incomes for horrible decisions. As the author said, even his kid's 529 outperforms this nonsense. Making money when the market is up (over the period under discussion) should be a given. That it's not means everyone involved should be fired.
This is why I think people are too quick to dismiss market fluctuations as "noise". As long as there's money to be made from the instability, those ups and downs are signal, not noise.
Oh please. If you're in charge of $160 billion, you better be one of the most sophisticated investors on the planet, and wield your extraordinary power to achieve the greatest returns for your stakeholders. Those fee agreements are clear as day. They should know precisely what can happen if they choose to pay fees on yearly gains instead of on net gains from inception.
Stupid people aren't victims; they're just stupid. The bankers had a responsibility to their shareholders to ask for the highest fees possible, and the managers of the $160 billion had a responsibility to say no. Looks like the bankers did their job.
1) The pension managers WERE some of the most sophisticated investors on the planet.
So what the hell happened? You originally called them "irresponsible." Now you've edited to call them "stupid." What's your theory about what happened to these world-class investors? My point being, they can't simultaneously be in the "most sophisticated" class, and also in the "irresponsible" / "stupid" class.
Kickbacks? Got overly greedy and mis-fired? It could happen to literally anyone? Bad luck?
2) The pension managers WERE NOT some of the most sophisticated investors on the planet.
I agree with your assessment that they SHOULD HAVE BEEN. So what the hell happened? Did they lie when they were hired? Did they have a great track record (luck?), but flubbed this? Or did the person who hired them and put them in charge (the mayor?) trust someone they shouldn't have?
The real victims are the pensioners, and this story should be investigated. If not on their behalf, then as a lesson for other pensioners, pension managers, and the people who manage pension managers.
I edited it because "irresponsible" wasn't strong enough in this case. What they did was idiotic. I think they were on the stupid side...with this kind of money floating around, any hint of kickbacks or corruption would quickly float to the surface. I'm sure that the funds they invested in were run by world class investors, but the pension manager(s) simply didn't understand the implications of the fee agreement.
I don't think that the pension managers were sophisticated, but rather were idiots. They went to world class bankers to deal with the money, who did a world class job of creating an awesome fee structure for themselves.
Isn't the blame falling to the pension managers who picked the hedge fund, and the victims are the individual pensioners who each have negligible influence over decisions? Or am I misunderstanding something?
That is primarily why these numbers seems so ridiculous - the market had a few bad years, and then came back around. The people in charge of deploying this money should negotiate better terms, like paying fees only on net returns over longer periods of time (5 years instead of one year, for example). At the end of the day, it's their own fault for cutting lousy deals. $160 billion gives you a pretty big bargaining chip on fees.