That isn't a summary, that's actually more accurate than the article.
The article suggests that you don't have to worry as long as you're paying your platform for use. Against which there's a huge counter-example called Microsoft in the 90's. The real distinction between platforms and Platforms is the word 'monopoly' that you use, and that is prominently absent from the article.
But even that doesn't quite feel like a complete theory, because there are monopoly Platforms that are real utilities, like the electrical grid. PG&E doesn't embrace, extend and extinguish. Why not? How can we arrange for more healthy seeking of monopolies and less rentierism? Are those even well-posed concepts? There might be something more valuable than the OP in this direction.
I'm not sure which specific time period you're referring to with respect to Microsoft, but I've worked for several companies who had paid for Microsoft support contracts, as of the mid-90s, and Microsoft support was always phenomenal, most especially SQL Server support.
Ah, such a simple word, but such complexity hidden under its hood. Regulation can create rentier institutions like the taxi medallion system[1] alongside PG&E. So another way to phrase my question is: how can we distinguish regulations that result in PG&E from those that result in taxis? When do the benefits of regulating an established player outweigh the costs in reduced incentives for others to attempt to create future monopolies?
One potential resolution to the question is that you can't, that PG&E's failure to grow is just a temporary failure of imagination. Rentierism is a weed that, uh, finds a way, to quote Jeff Goldblum from Jurassic Park (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkWeMvrNiOM). Under this worldview, a utility is merely a monopoly that nobody wants to compete with anymore -- for now. It has temporarily exhausted its growth/optimization curve, leading to predictable revenues. For a while the predictable revenues are divided between existing players (shareholders, govt, employees, etc.) in a stable equilibrium. But eventually, institutions that fail to grow (taxis) will run into hacks that do (Uber/Lyft).
An alternative solution would be that there is a distinction between good and bad regulations, perhaps that you have to weigh the size of the regulator against the size of the regulated industry. Taxi regulations were bad because they were suppressing a small industry. Regulation of large industries on the other hand, is more likely to do good than harm. Provided public attention can outlast private lobbying. That tension then becomes the new frontier for the eternal battle of public policy.
The article suggests that you don't have to worry as long as you're paying your platform for use. Against which there's a huge counter-example called Microsoft in the 90's. The real distinction between platforms and Platforms is the word 'monopoly' that you use, and that is prominently absent from the article.
But even that doesn't quite feel like a complete theory, because there are monopoly Platforms that are real utilities, like the electrical grid. PG&E doesn't embrace, extend and extinguish. Why not? How can we arrange for more healthy seeking of monopolies and less rentierism? Are those even well-posed concepts? There might be something more valuable than the OP in this direction.