> Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels.
The military would disagree. The all-zeros combination code was chosen on purpose because it was felt that having a code at all was a reduction in security since the code revelation procedure became a single point of failure. These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians, and weren't exactly the best of ideas, so the military did what they needed to comply with the law but keep the nuclear arsenal secure and available.
>These aspects of the nuclear security system were designed by politicians,
This is false. I suggest reading Command and Control; it is illuminating and terrifying.
The setup you described evolved from a tug of war between competing bureaucratic interests combined with ineffective oversight. The various military organizations fought to keep control and funding of prestigious nuclear weapons; the political arm dealt with the paradox inherent in having a system that was ready to be deployed at a moment's notice, but impossible to detonate accidentally.
The compromise that emerged were these broken systems.
To quote from Command and Control:
>After the accident at Thule, the Pentagon had ordered SAC [Strategic Air Command] to impose some form of use control. Instead of relying on PALs, during the early 1970s the Air Force put a coded switch in the cockpit of every bomber that carried nuclear weapons. The switch permitted an arming signal to be sent to the bomb bay when the right code was entered. The lock had been placed on the bomber, not inside the bombs—and a stolen weapon could still be detonated with a simple DC signal. SAC was far more worried about its weapons being rendered inoperable during wartime than about someone stealing them or using them without proper authorization. During the late 1970s, a coded switch was finally placed in the control center of every SAC ballistic missile. It unlocked the missile, not the warhead. And as a final act of defiance, SAC demonstrated the importance of code management to the usefulness of any coded switch. The combination necessary to launch the missiles was the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.
Indeed, the military felt strongly that it was reasonable to increase the chance of causing Armageddon by accident, in order to hold sacrosanct their ability to cause Armageddon on purpose, and resented attempts to reverse that equation.
It's weird how you say that like it was wise instead of horrifically insane, though.
They generally had great trust in their people, and didn't think the risk of someone deliberately disobeying orders and using a nuclear weapon was high. Meanwhile, they believed that the Soviets were looking for an opportunity to strike, and that the best and only realistic way to prevent a Soviet strike was to present them with certain devastating retaliation. They never planned to cause Armageddon, only have the capability to respond to the other guy causing it in such a way that they'd never want to cause it.
The scary thing about the Cold War was that the participants generally had the best of intentions (aside from a few people like Curtis LeMay, and they never really got presented with the opportunity to express their evil side) but disaster could have easily happened anyway, purely by accident.
And I really shouldn't put this in the past tense. All of this stuff is still there. We all seem to have just decided to collectively pretend that MAD went away when the USSR dissolved, even though there are still thousands of missiles and nuclear warheads ready to wreck civilization at a moment's notice.
> And I really shouldn't put this in the past tense. All of this stuff is still there. We all seem to have just decided to collectively pretend that MAD went away when the USSR dissolved, even though there are still thousands of missiles and nuclear warheads ready to wreck civilization at a moment's notice.
Fully agreed. There seems to be this weird mode of thinking for most people 'I choose to ignore the bad stuff so that I am happier'. But the end result here might be exactly the opposite, the worst case.
For example, it is scary how lightheartedly people talk about 'war with Russia' in context of the current Ukraine crisis. Regardless on what political side one is, avoiding direct confrontation of nuclear powers should be the main concern.
Rather than all the talk and fuss and whatnot about more-or-less meaningful social justice causes, I would rather like to see a movement to put nuclear weapons into 'cold storage' and a verified international protocol to continuously check that they are there.
Seeing that it is unrealistic to have full disarmament, this would at least greatly reduce the risk.
> They never planned to cause Armageddon, only have the capability to respond to the other guy causing it in such a way that they'd never want to cause it.
In that case, they shouldn't have been fussed about an extremely small chance of failure. The Soviets would never dare bank on such a chance, therefore it wouldn't change the effectiveness of the deterrent.
The only reason to act as they did is that they were worried about not being able to get revenge if the Soviets launched first.
I vaguely recall a short story in which the Soviets launch their missiles, for whatever reason, and the U.S. President refuses to give the launch order. MAD has failed and America is doomed anyway; there is no value in adding hundreds of millions to the death toll simply to follow through on a threat.
> They never planned to cause Armageddon, only have the capability to respond to the other guy causing it in such a way that they'd never want to cause it.
This was one school of thought within the command and control structure, but was, from my understanding both a minority opinion and one held more by political oversight members than by the actual generals holding the keys.
Leslie Groves specifically felt that a nuclear exchange was inevitable, and that the US was in a position to win.
It always seemed to me that the military, specifically the Strategic Air Command appreciated that security and ease of use are trade offs, and consistently chose solutions very far to the "ease of use" end of that spectrum. SAC was considerably more worried that bomb security measures would inhibit swift retaliation than they were that poor security would allow for an unauthorized detonation.
More civilized individuals might call that insane as opposed to laughable.
This is all discussed in "Command and Control" by Eric Schlosser. I'm not sure if that specific story is available for free online somewhere, but it's hardly an isolated incident of terrible security within the nuclear arms community. The book bounces between two narratives, the first being an in depth look at a specific accident where a rocket exploded in it's silo, the second being a broader overview of the command and control structure around nuclear tech spanning from the plutonium spheres used by scientists in the manhattan project, all the way up to 80's era MAD policy and ICBMs on 24/7 alert.
Another one of my favorites from that book was the EOD tech that put a ready-to-rumble teller-ulam thermonuclear device into the bed of his pick-up truck, drove it off the base, dismantled it in order to show off to a girl, then reassembled and returned it. Although, I can't personally verify the source of that story.
Ever since reading Snowcrash, i've wanted my own personal nuclear umbrella. Not enough to actually do anything about it, of course. It just seems like the ultimate in "an armed society is a polite society."
I believe this was the combination to the locks on the launch bunker access doors, not the actual launch codes.
Either way-- laughable security for the military's crown jewels.