That's true of any code execution vulnerability, though - it seems odd to call out the privilege elevation specifically. If that's all the GP meant, then sure, I fully grok.
I think it comes down to a jargon vs technical language thing. In formal settings arbitrary code execution is a different thing from privilege escalation. In casual jargony talk though, security guys tend to equate code execution with privilege escalation with box ownage.
Basically it goes "why would anyone not follow the execution -> escalation -> own path?" It's such an automatic assumption, combined with the basic premise of "there's no such thing as a secure computer", that the exact details are a hand-wave. This comes from the repeated demonstration that it's almost always true.
None of this seems crazy unlikely, but I'd still like to hear a confirmation that that's what was meant. Especially since korzun was talking specifically about Debian and Ubuntu where bash is only used as a login shell and so presumably those with access could already just run the app.
That recommends changing broken scripts to #!/bin/bash or changing to sh == bash as solutions. I would guess that there are going to be plenty of easily vulnerable debian/ubuntu systems.
More importantly though, it literally does not matter if this bug is "directly privilege escalating" or "1 step removed privilege escalating", the are fundamentally the same thing. It doesn't matter in any case where a script is executed with bash instead of dash.
'More importantly though, it literally does not matter if this bug is "directly privilege escalating" or "1 step removed privilege escalating", the are fundamentally the same thing. It doesn't matter in any case where a script is executed with bash instead of dash.'
It doesn't matter for security. It matters a lot for my understanding of what's going on.
Most code executions vulnerabilities aren't remotely accessible, which this is, which makes priv-escalation particularly nasty. (eg: incorrectly assuming that since www-data user doesn't have access to anything sensitive, this bug isn't a big deal)
Yes, potentially - if at any point during the execution of a program (or its descendents) a bash script gets called with an untrusted environment variable value from a remote source. The difference between a system with bash as /bin/sh and a system with dash as /bin/sh is that the bash system is implicitly executing bash all the time, whereas the dash system requires an explicitly-bash script to be executed. So the dash system has many fewer windows of opportunity for an exploit, but they could still be there.
Well, sure. It seems a slightly odd way to phrase it if that's the entirety of what korzun meant, though. Is there somewhere that happens in a typical out-of-the-box Debian or Ubuntu box?
Edited to add: Also no differences in capabilities when I cat /proc/self/status
None of which is to say there is clearly no such vulnerability - I'd just like to understand it if there is.