But OCSP is the only thing that's widely supported as of now. You can't on one hand say "don't blame Chrome to not support something that doesn't exist", when at the same time it rejects something that's widely deployed and even is considered a requirement for CAs.
Being able to revoke your certificate, even if it has problems is better than not being able to.
OCSP is still the standard way of communicating certificate revocations and even with all the HTTP-Extensions you need a way for certificate revocation.
Unlike most alternatives OCSP is out of the box supported by IE, Firefox, Opera and Safari. Only Chrome has it disabled per default. Most people revoked their old certificates after Heartbleed. This is an example of where you need an alternative to just pinning a key.
So you are saying that an attacker has to make sure that the OCSP connection isn't working means OCSP is worse than having no possibility of certificate revocation at all?
Not saying that it's absolutely secure. Hopefully everyone knows that there are flaws in HTTPS/SSL. Zooko's triangle[1] even gives you a hint why.
Also I am curious. What better, more widely used way of Certificate Revocation do you know?
OSCP fails often enough that requiring a verified pass would break the internet. Thus, browsers which support OSCP treat a failure to fetch OSCP data as a soft fail (i.e. they ignore it).
The problem is that if you can MITM someone, you can deny them access to the OSCP service and cause a soft fail, which makes OSCP worthless.
Just because it doesn't stop a full MITM between the CA and the client doesn't make it worthless. It still protects the user from trusting a server that is no longer trustworthy.
If a certificate is worth issuing when a server is trustworthy, it's worth revoking when the server loses that trust.
We are talking about adversaries who control both secrets and connectivity. Not because those are the adversaries we care most about, but because those are the adversaries that key revocation contemplates. The notion of "full MITM" versus "partial MITM" versus "passive-only" attacker does not apply.
Being able to revoke your certificate, even if it has problems is better than not being able to.
OCSP is still the standard way of communicating certificate revocations and even with all the HTTP-Extensions you need a way for certificate revocation.
Unlike most alternatives OCSP is out of the box supported by IE, Firefox, Opera and Safari. Only Chrome has it disabled per default. Most people revoked their old certificates after Heartbleed. This is an example of where you need an alternative to just pinning a key.
So you are saying that an attacker has to make sure that the OCSP connection isn't working means OCSP is worse than having no possibility of certificate revocation at all?
Not saying that it's absolutely secure. Hopefully everyone knows that there are flaws in HTTPS/SSL. Zooko's triangle[1] even gives you a hint why.
Also I am curious. What better, more widely used way of Certificate Revocation do you know?
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle