> What cements the case as being meaningless in my mind is the fact that they were not ordered to strengthen their cups or to brew at a lower temperature.
And if such sanctions had been within the ambit of the jury empaneled, in a civil case, to consider the damages specifically due Stella Liebeck as remedy for her injuries, this statement might actually mean something.
You know, you've got this hilarious sort of completely unintentional doublethink going on that I just can't get enough of. I mean, on the one hand, you're tossing off all the slippery-slope-to-the-nanny-state clichés which are so depressingly common in arguments over this very case -- and on the other hand, you're blithely implying that the very same jury, which you hold in such thinly veiled contempt for having found differently from how you believe you would have in their position, should have had the power not merely to award monetary damages to Ms. Liebeck as they did, but should also have had nigh-untrammeled power to regulate the operations of a world-spanning corporation in whatever fashion they saw fit.
There's a certain essential irreconcilability in these opinions which I think you haven't yet noticed. Did the jury have too much power, or too little? Is the state too nanny, or not nanny enough? It can't be both. Make up your mind!
I didn't necessarily mean as a direct action of the participants in the case. Corporations are often compelled to change their behavior regulatorily after losing a lawsuit for only monetary damages due to the findings of the case.
Instead, we get an obvious warning on cups to join the other few hundred obvious warnings.
Obviously the CPSC/FDA or their local/state counterparts (I'm not sure who would exactly be responsible for such regulation in this case) didn't see the need to get involved.
I don't know where you're coming up with "nanny statism".
I generally do not hold juries in great respect; they often rule on emotion rather than hard fact. But that is a rant for another time.
Have you any other thinly veiled insults you'd like to throw my way as a result of my communicating unclearly? If not, I think we're done here.
And if such sanctions had been within the ambit of the jury empaneled, in a civil case, to consider the damages specifically due Stella Liebeck as remedy for her injuries, this statement might actually mean something.
You know, you've got this hilarious sort of completely unintentional doublethink going on that I just can't get enough of. I mean, on the one hand, you're tossing off all the slippery-slope-to-the-nanny-state clichés which are so depressingly common in arguments over this very case -- and on the other hand, you're blithely implying that the very same jury, which you hold in such thinly veiled contempt for having found differently from how you believe you would have in their position, should have had the power not merely to award monetary damages to Ms. Liebeck as they did, but should also have had nigh-untrammeled power to regulate the operations of a world-spanning corporation in whatever fashion they saw fit.
There's a certain essential irreconcilability in these opinions which I think you haven't yet noticed. Did the jury have too much power, or too little? Is the state too nanny, or not nanny enough? It can't be both. Make up your mind!