1. If the RNG that you use for generating the one static RSA key is broken, you aren't secure either.
2. RSA key transport also transports a(n ephemeral) session key that is used for symmetric encryption and authentication of the payload and that can be used to compromise the connection if it can be predicted.
3. In a way, encrypting the session data is also done by generating an ephemeral "key" for each byte/block using the symmetric cipher as a CSPRNG (moreso with stream ciphers/modes than with "real" block modes), but you most certainly would not want to use that as an argument for using ECB in TLS.
4. Such blunt decisions have been long overdue. Complexity is a huge risk, it's about time we get rid of some of the cruft that makes systems vulnerable.
2. RSA key transport also transports a(n ephemeral) session key that is used for symmetric encryption and authentication of the payload and that can be used to compromise the connection if it can be predicted.
3. In a way, encrypting the session data is also done by generating an ephemeral "key" for each byte/block using the symmetric cipher as a CSPRNG (moreso with stream ciphers/modes than with "real" block modes), but you most certainly would not want to use that as an argument for using ECB in TLS.
4. Such blunt decisions have been long overdue. Complexity is a huge risk, it's about time we get rid of some of the cruft that makes systems vulnerable.