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>One alternative might be to have a security framework that offered the UAC prompt when a program actually attempted to do something that required elevation. I had thought that was the way UAC actually worked.

This is how it works in most cases, but it's different with access to directories inside "Program Files" folder: because it was a common behaviour in the past, there is a such feature as UAC virtualisation:

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb756960.aspx

>Prior to Windows Vista, many applications were typically run by administrators. As a result, applications could freely read and write system files and registry keys. If standard users ran these applications, they would fail due to insufficient access. Windows Vista improves application compatibility for standard users by redirecting writes (and subsequent file or registry operations) to a per-user location within the user’s profile. For example, if an application attempts to write to C:\Program Files\Contoso\Settings.ini, and the user does not have permissions to write to that directory, the write will get redirected to C:\Users\Username\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files\contoso\settings.ini. For the registry, if an application attempts to write to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Contoso\ it will automatically get redirected to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\VirtualStore\MACHINE\Software\Contoso or HKEY_USERS\UserSID_Classes\VirtualStore\Machine\Software\Contoso.




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