This is difficult for me to understand. Are you suggesting that if nuclear power were completely unregulated, Tepco's behavior would've been more virtuous (as I read it, totally virtuous)?
Or is the claim that regulation made the problem somewhat worse, and this margin (between how bad the problem would've been without regulation and how bad it was with regulation) is the only part that would even be humanly possible to rectify?
Because if I owned the plant and I didn't have any regulators to deal with, I would think it in my interest to behave even worse: to lie more, to hide more, to be even less concerned about doing a thorough job of preventing the public's exposure to regulation.
You should look up "regulatory capture" it means something very different than how you are taking it.
Just so it's not a low-content post, a company can lobby the government to change, weaken or not enforce existing regulations, and often they compound this with bribery of the regulator. Many large companies in the United States go further and lobby to extend or re-word regulations specifically to give themselves a monopoly over the regulated market. All of these actions are forms of regulatory capture.
Other examples of it: the present state of the us patent and copyright system, especially if you include enforceable work-for-hire clauses and the language in various treaties referring to copyrights. Elon Musk's difficulties selling his electric cars online in Texas and other states are due to regulatory capture by car dealerships in that state. In general, most government-backed monopolies or "public-private partnerships" can safely be expected to involve a significant amount of regulatory capture.
Still though you should look it up because both the term and the actual process are really useful at figuring out the hows-and-whys of US government domestic actions.
Regulatory capture is when the people tasked with keeping an industry on its best behavior have too close ties to the industry, through personal connections or financial incentives, and are no longer able to do their jobs.
I would agree that we have a problem with inadequate or corrupt regulators in several industries.
Regulatory capture can take the form of outright corruption, but the more insidious form is cognitive capture. That's where the regulators simply don't have a sufficiently detached perspective from those they are regulating. They internalize the needs and thought patterns of the industry as there own.
A related phenomenon in foreign affairs circles is called "going native".
That's very interesting. It's easy to imagine how, as a regulator, going out to dinner with the regulated (or their representatives) on a regular basis would influence your thinking. It doesn't require a conspiracy theory, so it gives us a great jumping-off point for a rational discussion about how to limit the opportunity for this phenomenon to manifest. Thanks for the new viewpoint!
> This is difficult for me to understand. Are you suggesting that if nuclear power were completely unregulated, Tepco's behavior would've been more virtuous (as I read it, totally virtuous)?
If it were unregulated by government, then yes. It's a bit misleading to say there would be absolutely nothing regulating the industry if government wasn't.
This is difficult for me to understand. Are you suggesting that if nuclear power were completely unregulated, Tepco's behavior would've been more virtuous (as I read it, totally virtuous)?
Or is the claim that regulation made the problem somewhat worse, and this margin (between how bad the problem would've been without regulation and how bad it was with regulation) is the only part that would even be humanly possible to rectify?
Because if I owned the plant and I didn't have any regulators to deal with, I would think it in my interest to behave even worse: to lie more, to hide more, to be even less concerned about doing a thorough job of preventing the public's exposure to regulation.