If I stretch my imagination I can see the argument, but I don't buy it (IMHO).
I think the spirit of why the privacy of the content of my conversation is important equally applies to any information about that conversation. If my conversation is privileged, why shouldn't my meta-data be? What's the difference?
If AT&T provided a service that cataloged and tagged my conversation for retrieval based on analysis of the content (and I opted into this) would that meta-data also be available to the government?
But, I think there is a "huge material difference" between a parents right to know who their kids are talking to and a governments right to know who I am talking to.
To put it another way: is this a form of blocking the assembly of people? If I meet in private with a group of people does the government have a right to know all of the meta data about the conversation such as who was present, when they arrived and left, etc? In this hypothetical, I'm assuming we are convening on private property and not a public sidewalk. If we met in private does the government have the right to compel the doorman to reveal these details indiscriminately?
And to that I totally agree, I do not think that governments should automatically have the right to all call metadata and that the status quo is a gross overreach. I was just pointing out that there is a real (legal, common sense, whatever) distinction between knowing that a call was made and listening in to a call.
That's an exceptionally salient point if you think about how our nation was formed, and how much of what later proved to be the framework of our nation was the work of a bunch of guys secretly meeting in Philadelphia.
If the British had known the names, arrival times, etc. of those meetings, even without knowing the content, it is very likely that our nation would never have been born.
The key to the question was "indiscriminately." Does the government have the right to require to doorman to keep tabs on everyone without probable cause.
> But, I think there is a "huge material difference" between a parents right to know who their kids are talking to and a governments right to know who I am talking to.
No, there isn't. Children are not a parent's private property.
But, why is the conversation technically yours? What is materially different about the metadata (originated by the callers) and the voice data from the point of view of the phone company? It is all data flowing over their network, which is created by the private parties who use their service.
I honestly don't get this exception that's made for metadata where the phone company is concerned.
Because the metadata is information that the phone company has to know in order to provide you the service and to bill you for it, and therefore cannot be information in which the parties to the conversation have an expectation of privacy.
The content of the conversation, OTOH, is not information that the company needs to have to provide and bill for the service, and therefore can still be information in which the participants have a legal expectation of privacy.
Because the metadata is information that the phone company has to know in order to provide you the service and to bill you for it, and therefore cannot be information in which the parties to the conversation have an expectation of privacy.
This doesn't follow. If you are suing/being sued, your lawyer needs to know everything about your case to mount a proper offense/defense, but you still have an expectation of privacy. Similarly, your doctor needs to know everything about your medical history in order to treat you, yet you have an expectation of privacy there as well.
You are mistakenly inferring the wrong general principles from special cases that are well-known because they are exceptions to, rather than illustrations of, the generally-applicable rules.
> If you are suing/being sued, your lawyer needs to know everything about your case to mount a proper offense/defense, but you still have an expectation of privacy.
That expectation of privacy is created by the (well established at the time of the Constitution) common law lawyer/client privilege, it is not a generally applicable privilege that applies to commercial relationships and creates an expectation of privacy within those relationships. So, yes, there is an expectation of privacy here which has significance under the fourth amendment, but it is not one which extends to other business relationships like those between a telephone customer and their carrier.
> Similarly, your doctor needs to know everything about your medical history in order to treat you, yet you have an expectation of privacy there as well.
Again, doctor/patient privilege is a special case (which is why we talk about "doctor/patient confidentiality" and "lawyer/client confidentiality" and not a general privilege attached to commercial exchanges.)
You are mistakenly inferring the wrong general principles from special cases that are well-known because they are exceptions to, rather than illustrations of, the generally-applicable rules.
The existence of these special cases demonstrates that a loss of the expectation privacy does not inherently occur when one entrusts another entity with some detail of their lives.
That expectation of privacy is created by the (well established at the time of the Constitution) common law lawyer/client privilege, it is not a generally applicable privilege that applies to commercial relationships and creates an expectation of privacy within those relationships. So, yes, there is an expectation of privacy here which has significance under the fourth amendment, but it is not one which extends to other business relationships like those between a telephone customer and their carrier.
The extent to which commercial relationships pervade our lives is, in my opinion, just cause to expand the boundaries of a reasonable expectation of privacy. The lack of transparency in how companies handle customer data, what data is retained, etc., especially for non-technical users, is further reason to codify clear rights to privacy instead of relying upon impenetrable common law precedent.
And it is such a tenuous argument. So, if I have some unlimited flat-fee plan, wherein the number of calls, who I am calling, etc. (i.e. the metadata) doesn't matter, then this information wouldn't be necessary for billing. In that case do I suddenly have an expectation of privacy?
I would really like for someone to provide a good answer to this question.
> And it is such a tenuous argument. So, if I have some unlimited flat-fee plan, wherein the number of calls, who I am calling, etc. (i.e. the metadata) doesn't matter
It is provided to the phone company for the purpose of them acting on it to provide service, and with the knowledge that they will routinely track it, whether or not it is related to billing.
> I would really like for someone to provide a good answer to this question.
That is the actual basis of the legal distinction, whether or not you think it is a "good answer". See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
I think the spirit of why the privacy of the content of my conversation is important equally applies to any information about that conversation. If my conversation is privileged, why shouldn't my meta-data be? What's the difference?
If AT&T provided a service that cataloged and tagged my conversation for retrieval based on analysis of the content (and I opted into this) would that meta-data also be available to the government?