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>> If there is no way for the user to destroy something when they are actively hostile, you /know/ they can't destroy it by accident.

>Which also means they can't fix something in case of a catastrophic event. "Recover a file deleted from ext3? Fix a borked NTFS partition? Salvage a crashed MySQL table? Sorry boss, no can do - my admin powers have been neutered so that I don't break something 'by accident, wink wink nudge nudge'." This is, ultimately, an issue of trust, not of artificial technical limitations.

All of the problems you describe can be solved by spare hardware and read only access to the backups. I mean, your SysAdmin needs control over the production environment, right? to do his or her job. but a sysadmin can function just fine without being able to overwrite backups. (assuming there is someone else around to admin the backup server.)

fixing my spelling now.

Yes, it's about trust. but anyone who demands absolute trust is, well, at the very least an overconfident asshole. I mean, in a properly designed backup system (and I don't have anything at all like this at the moment) I would not have write-access to the backups, and I'm majority shareholder and lead sysadmin.

That's what I'm saying... backups are primarily there when someone screwed it up... in other words, when someone was trusted (or trusted themselves) too much.




Okay, now I think I understand you, and it seems we're actually in agreement - there is still absolute power, but it's not all concentrated in one user :)

(that rouge/rogue thing is my pet peeve)




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