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I haven't managed to formulate the exact issue yet, but if I squint, I swear there's a path to track and/or deanonymize someone visiting your site. If you have any kind of previous information about the user, such as Meta, or Google or etc, you could easily try and see if the user holds any number of emails you think they might hold. From there on out we're practically back to third party cookie tracking.




The key mitigation is that the protocol - as envisioned - is mediated by the user agent; you as a website cannot silently fire off probes that tell you anything.

This section

https://github.com/WICG/email-verification-protocol/blob/mai...

could easily be done by malicious JS, an ad script, or the website itself, and then as the RP gets the output of 6.4) email and email_verified claims.

I'm guessing that this proposal requires new custom browser (user-agent) code just to handle this protocol?

Like a secure <input Email> element that makes sure there is some user input required to select a saved one, and that the value only goes to the actual server the user wants, that cannot be replaced by malicious JS.


> This section could easily be done by [...]

Less easily than you'd think.

You'd have to make an authenticated cross-origin request to the issuer, which would be equivalent to mounting a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack against the target email providers.

Even if you could send an authenticated request, the Same Origin Policy means your site won't be able to read the result unless the issuer explicitly returns appropriate CORS headers including `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <* or your domain>` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` in its response.

Browsers can exempt themselves from these constraints when making requests for their own purposes, but that's not an option available to web content.

> I'm guessing that this proposal requires new custom browser (user-agent) code just to handle this protocol?

Correct; which is going to be the main challenge for this to gain traction. We called it the "three-way cold start" in Persona: sites, issuers, and browsers are all stuck waiting for the other two to reach critical mass before it makes sense for them to adopt the protocol.

Google could probably sidestep that problem by abusing their market dominance in both the browser and issuer space, but I don't see the incentive nor do I see it being feasible for anyone else.




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