I think you missed the thrust of OP. The submersible had instruments in it to report on the hull condition. They all were reporting it had previously experienced severe strain before the last dive, and they were designed as tripwires. If they tripped, the hull should have been considered unsafe and not used again. They were ignored.
It is a shock that they actually worked and reported the hull was unsafe before it failed. Given everything else, it's not a surprise in the slightest that they were ignored.
They used an unproven custom-designed sensor + controller system to monitor the health of the hull.
The monitoring system detected the beginning of total hull failure in the exact way they intended. They then ignored that monitoring system because hull failure would have been inconvenient.
Really that's the whole story of Stockton here. Massively motivated reasoning. Anything inconvenient was written off as wrong. A lot of normalization of deviance too as some of the written-off concerns turned out to be wrong. But not all of them.
I recently got my PPL and that's a massive risk for pilots. You fly in weather you shouldn't and get away with it for a while. Then it becomes normal. You've "proven" you can handle it. Then a situation comes along that requires more margin than you have left and you die.
Once again... The instruments reported the hull was no longer safe for use before the start of the last dive. That was well before the implosion. You keep ignoring this part to focus on how there was no engineering that would suggest that those instruments would actually give early warning. I'm halfway there with you. It is actually a surprise that they reported it was unsafe before the dive. But they did, and that makes the subsequent human failures even more egregious.
It is a shock that they actually worked and reported the hull was unsafe before it failed. Given everything else, it's not a surprise in the slightest that they were ignored.