A tendency to nose up is not "instability". Recall that additional pilot training to anticipate and correct for it was the original solution to the characteristic. A pilot unaware of it may react incorrectly.
I have no disagreement with the shortcomings of the MCAS design, but the concept of it was sound.
As for pilot skill, recall there were 3 MCAS incidents. The first one porpoised a couple times, with the pilots recovering each time, and then another crew member in the jump seat turned off the stab trim.
In the second incident, the crew restored trim 25 times and never thought to turn off the trim system, over a period of 11 minutes. This is plenty of time to remember what the runaway trim cutoff switch is for. There's no excuse here.
In the third incident, the crew apparently did not read, understand and remember the Boeing Emergency Airworthiness directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, with a simple 2 step procedure to save the airplane. There's no excuse for that. I just find it baffling that a pilot would not be keenly interested in the only crash of the airplane type he is flying, to ensure he wouldn't crash.
The stab trim switch is a memory item, meaning it is supposed to be memorized by the crew. It's their job to remember it.
As for the two pilots I talked to, one contacted me as a result of these HN discussions. The other I buttonholed at the airport during layover. The latter was quite confident in his flying skills, the former related that he and his colleagues all agreed on the pilot error aspect.
There are pilots in my family, I have friends who are pilots, I worked at Boeing where my colleagues were pilots. None of them had any patience for pilots who could not follow emergency procedures properly. I don't either. A careless pilot has no business in a cockpit.
> In the second incident, the crew restored trim 25 times and never thought to turn off the trim system, over a period of 11 minutes. This is plenty of time to remember what the runaway trim cutoff switch is for. There's no excuse here.
> ...
> The stab trim switch is a memory item, meaning it is supposed to be memorized by the crew. It's their job to remember it.
The runaway trim memory item was written in a way that was inconsistent with how MCAS runaway behaved.
The steps were:
> Firmly hold control column. Disengage autopilot if engaged. Disengage autothrottle if engaged. Use the control column and thrust levers to control airplane pitch attitude and airspeed. Use main electric stabilizer trim to
reduce control column forces.
> If the runaway stops after autopilot is disengaged, do not re-engage autopilot
or autothrottle; end of procedure.
> If the runaway continues after autopilot is disengaged, place both STAB
TRIM cutout switches to CUTOUT.
> If the runaway continues, grasp and hold stabilizer trim wheel.
Historic runaway stab was generally consistant running, not a cycle like MCAS, so following the check list, you turn off the auto pilot, trim stops, you consider you completed the checklist. When it fires off again, it's not completely unreasonable to believe that it's not a runaway trim, as you completed the checklist as instructed.
As for the third incident, the Boeing Emergency Airworthiness directive specifically said that this issue only happened under manual control. The crew kept engaging the autopilot and when it continued to happen on the autopilot, it's not unreasonable for them to believe it wasn't the same issue per the Boeing Emergency Airworthiness directive.
Could they have done better? sure. Could they have saved the aircraft if they followed a different train of thought? yes. Was their train of thought unreasonable? According to the investigation, no, it was not. To many many other people who study this stuff, no one that I'm aware of places any blame on the crew and it feels wrong to continue to shit on their skills when from all indications, they did follow procedures as written and it wasn't enough.
A tendency to nose up is not "instability". Recall that additional pilot training to anticipate and correct for it was the original solution to the characteristic. A pilot unaware of it may react incorrectly.
I have no disagreement with the shortcomings of the MCAS design, but the concept of it was sound.
As for pilot skill, recall there were 3 MCAS incidents. The first one porpoised a couple times, with the pilots recovering each time, and then another crew member in the jump seat turned off the stab trim.
In the second incident, the crew restored trim 25 times and never thought to turn off the trim system, over a period of 11 minutes. This is plenty of time to remember what the runaway trim cutoff switch is for. There's no excuse here.
In the third incident, the crew apparently did not read, understand and remember the Boeing Emergency Airworthiness directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, with a simple 2 step procedure to save the airplane. There's no excuse for that. I just find it baffling that a pilot would not be keenly interested in the only crash of the airplane type he is flying, to ensure he wouldn't crash.
The stab trim switch is a memory item, meaning it is supposed to be memorized by the crew. It's their job to remember it.
As for the two pilots I talked to, one contacted me as a result of these HN discussions. The other I buttonholed at the airport during layover. The latter was quite confident in his flying skills, the former related that he and his colleagues all agreed on the pilot error aspect.
There are pilots in my family, I have friends who are pilots, I worked at Boeing where my colleagues were pilots. None of them had any patience for pilots who could not follow emergency procedures properly. I don't either. A careless pilot has no business in a cockpit.