Also, one reason they’re as expensive to maintain as they are is that we don’t test detonate them any more. We have to do a bunch of indirect testing with expensive equipment and supercomputers.
That’s probably a good thing; certainly the people complaining here about costs would not suggest we go back to doing so.
We could probably drive the cost down a bit by specializing in a delivery system (say, submarines) but I’m not a strategist and maybe those that are think it’s too risky. Certainly if we were to keep only one thing about the military it would be nuclear missiles.
I think the diversity of platforms is a small factor in the cost: nearly all of the equipment and people involved in the various delivery modes would still exist if there were no nukes at all, and possibly in far greater quantity. Further, I don't believe the figure cited here is actually meaningful: the net cost of nuclear weapons isn't calculable thing. There are far too many indirections involved, and the depth of the thinking and planning and interrelationships can't actually be reflected in a ledger, never mind thinking about what the cost of not funding this arsenal might be.
But, to the extent that the bean counters can, somehow, draw a bunch of arbitrary lines in the sand and directly attribute some 11% of the US military budget to the nukes keeping the peace on behalf of the entire Western world, it doesn't appear excessive.
The goal of the US nuclear unbrella isn't just to defend the western world, it's to inhibit the rest of the western world from building nuclear weapons.
At some point there may be a phase change where the US abandons this goal. In that world, the rational strategy becomes one of strategic disengagement, so that if nuclear war breaks out (or a conventional war that risks going nuclear) the US is not drawn in. The lesson becomes that of WW1, not WW2.
So say you. This is a discussion about costs, as opposed "goals." Were I to stipulate the claim you make, then it's all be a terrible failure: at least three US allies have built and currently operate a nuclear arsenal.
The thinking has always been that we need a triad of nuclear delivery systems, partially for deterrence and partially as a hedge against future technology. Submarines are survivable today, but who knows what new detection system a brilliant Chinese scientist might invent tomorrow? And SLBMs can't really hold deeply buried bunkers at risk, like the ones heavily used in North Korea and Iran. Hitting those takes an air delivered "bunker buster" nuke.
Similarly, part of the reason the UK has repeatedly decided to retain its remaining nuclear weapons (Trident submarines) is that nukes were and are, pound for pound, very inexpensive compared to other weapons.
