How can we "live" in these worlds? Are you talking about disembodying the feeling of self so it can be migrated to a simulation, or even to another material copy of the body?
Let's assume it's true that I can make a logically equivalent copy of myself somehow, and put it in a world where it won't suffer. How does that help the original instance of me, in this world?
Just knowing that it feels is not enough. I believe that this guy that stuffs himself with drugs and does Kate Moss feels (and probably feels quite good, much of the time). But when I suffer, thinking that other people are having fun is only of marginal consolation.
Finally, you can't say a simulation is real without emptying the word 'virtual' of meaning- and by extension, the word 'real' itself. By the same token, our imagination consists of systems in the electrochemical and topological mess that are our brains, so everything we imagine is 'real' too. If we allow this, how is the concept 'real' different from that of 'everything'?
Cf. The Matrix. Except with enough processing power, instead of sharing a simulation, you have it all to yourself -- so you can always be the #1 Most Important Person in the world, if you wish. Everything will work out the way you want it to, whatever your particular ethos; you'll set things to rights. AIs will be programmed to seem like fully convincing humans, but secretly they'll be on virtual happy pills so they'll never suffer.
In that case you can't run the simulation until the sun goes red dwarf, unless you are ready to extend physical human life that far.
It would be easier, as the article suggests, to just stimulate the spots in the brain responsible for pleasure. If the point is artificial happiness, why all this simulation stuff at all?
I wouldn't be surprised if we could do it in 40 years.
If you only want to stimulate pleasure centers, no need for expensive equipment -- just use poppies. If addiction is a problem, then presumably there is more to life and hence a reason to simulate after all.
Let's assume it's true that I can make a logically equivalent copy of myself somehow, and put it in a world where it won't suffer. How does that help the original instance of me, in this world?
Just knowing that it feels is not enough. I believe that this guy that stuffs himself with drugs and does Kate Moss feels (and probably feels quite good, much of the time). But when I suffer, thinking that other people are having fun is only of marginal consolation.
Finally, you can't say a simulation is real without emptying the word 'virtual' of meaning- and by extension, the word 'real' itself. By the same token, our imagination consists of systems in the electrochemical and topological mess that are our brains, so everything we imagine is 'real' too. If we allow this, how is the concept 'real' different from that of 'everything'?