"LRNG" => (idiosyncratic) shorthand for "Linux's KRNG".
The LRNG never had the problem you're alluding to. It's not as if the literature eventually found "inexhaustible" designs. They were never exhaustible. There is no such danger. You can get to this axiomatically by looking at how a CSPRNG works (again: it's effectively a stream cipher construction), or empirically by reading about it. Either way: no, you're wrong here.
As a project rescue specialist whose had to diagnose and treat exactly this issue more than once, I feel like I'm being gaslit, although I know that's not your intent.
As recently as node 16 or 18 or so, which is still in real-world use despite its age, reaning on the real-word docker images that these projects use, it happens. And when it does, you can rightly guess that all the client's javascript developers were utterly perplexed specifically because they'd never heard of such a concern. But you point to the stack trace for when their call to uuid never resolves and provide all the documentation from familiar bloggers to help them wrap their heads around it, and voila -- the mysterious and catastrophic issue that's been plaguing them is suddenly remedied.
As I said, I appreciate that exhaustion doesn't need to happen in anything with an appropriate design. That's genuinely great. But even if it's just a certain and inappropriate way of using the linux RNG in a certain window of Linux versions (and I'm not strictly convinced its even so narrow a scenario), that's a actually a pretty common real thing that real developers will continue to encounter in the wild for longer than any us might want, and not some baseless myth or meme.
You're not being gaslit by me, but rather by older Linux kernels. There's no such thing as exhaustion. But there's a legacy kernel interface that pretends there is. The implication of using it is that your program will randomly stall, because the kernel is (was) galighting you. But that's not a cryptographic security issue.
Honestly it's kind of refreshing to see a thread like this. This was a live issue on HN like 10 years ago, when cryptographers started yelling at Ted T'so about how dumb "/dev/random" was, and generalist engineers on HN argued about it. But it has since become a settled matter --- here, I mean. Among cryptography engineers: never a doubt.
There are KRNG security issues! You can come up with cases, especially with embedded software or older hypervisors, where code runs with an unseeded RNG. That's very bad. But those issues aren't relevant to ordinary userland code; if your system can't run with the assumption that "/dev/urandom" is seeded, you're fucked for other reasons, so distributions (and hypervisors) go out of their way to ensure that can't happen.
At any rate: there is no case where "exhaustion" comes into play, and there never has been, but there was an archaic kernel interface in Linux that thought there could be such a thing, so there's a whole generation of Linux developers who believe it's a big deal. It is not.
"LRNG" => (idiosyncratic) shorthand for "Linux's KRNG".
The LRNG never had the problem you're alluding to. It's not as if the literature eventually found "inexhaustible" designs. They were never exhaustible. There is no such danger. You can get to this axiomatically by looking at how a CSPRNG works (again: it's effectively a stream cipher construction), or empirically by reading about it. Either way: no, you're wrong here.