Secure Boot is only going to hinder legitimate users in the long term.
iphone boot exploits, wii boot exploits, PS3 boot exploits have all been published freely mostly because they are very hard to capitalize on (these machines all have secure boot implementations, albeit not the UEFI one)
If UEFI secure boot exploits really protect against malware, they will be traded like 0-day exploits and will be worth a lot (I suspect it will be harder to update the firmware against these 0-days than running WindowsUpdate).
It's a landgrab; slow and cunning on the x86/AMD64, quick and merciless on the ARM. But it has a lot more to do with grabbing land than with end user security.
edit: drivebyacct2 claims that none of these 3 had security comparable with UEFI SecureBoot. I don't know enough to argue about that - my assumption is that it will be implementation flaws that will be exploited, rather than theoretical flaws. But I might be wrong.
iphone boot exploits, wii boot exploits, PS3 boot exploits have all been published freely mostly because they are very hard to capitalize on (these machines all have secure boot implementations, albeit not the UEFI one)
If UEFI secure boot exploits really protect against malware, they will be traded like 0-day exploits and will be worth a lot (I suspect it will be harder to update the firmware against these 0-days than running WindowsUpdate).
It's a landgrab; slow and cunning on the x86/AMD64, quick and merciless on the ARM. But it has a lot more to do with grabbing land than with end user security.
edit: drivebyacct2 claims that none of these 3 had security comparable with UEFI SecureBoot. I don't know enough to argue about that - my assumption is that it will be implementation flaws that will be exploited, rather than theoretical flaws. But I might be wrong.