> do folks in the business really simply steal a laptop and try to pull all data? or do they steal the laptop and wipe it and flip it... if they wanted your data wouldnt they steal you, the human, too ?
Governments definitely worry about it, and I’d be shocked if e.g. banks didn’t also put it into requirements. Access can be temporary, too: imagine if you get 15 minute alone in someone’s office or they have a kiosk in the lobby, etc. – not enough time to open the case up but plenty to toss a USB drive in and reboot. Repeat for lost devices or scenarios like the KnowBe4 attack disclosed yesterday where some dude might not be able to explain cracking the case open.
> the signing method only offers buying more time before the innevitable data is "breached" by a theat actor - its the same buying-time for any and all encryption.
You have to think about cost, too. It appears to be safe to buy a used Mac because Apple employs competent cryptographic engineers and very few targets are worth involving a lab with truly serious hardware. This could be the case on the PC side too, but it’s undercut by vendors skimping on execution and until Secure Boot is pervasive and robust, nobody can easily tell whether hardware they’ve lost control of can be trusted. People have been getting malware on used computers for years and a trusted boot process makes it easier both to tell if that’s happened and to be confident that you’ve fully wiped a system.
i only chose those questions as to pick on the concept of "stealing a laptop" - its more the hypothecial use case where majority of users, given the "my laptop got stolen" will never see their system again. folks in the business of stealing a laptop will resell it if they can - a laptop in a random car in SF.. sounds real profitiable to try to decrypt some aes 2tb data for a cat pic); secure boot has not guarnteed a password to access the bios in my experiences - and not all bios are created equal. just makes it harder for data on the drive to be accessed (and certainly prevents my neighbor from putting a rootkit in my bootloader)
of course govts worry about data loss - and implanted root-kits; yes we want to prevent those but my point is there are many steps along the path where the complexity can get out hand, and every added step to a system is another step of potential failure - and anything we invent will be vurnerable to human mistakes/errors/ect (like we've literally seen). the problem is the firmware is mutable, the os is mutable, ect ect. the signed stages are a bandaide (not that im smart enough to solve the problem) and it's a matter of time before something like a cert leak happens (again). its funny too because we worry about 1000's of folks computers having a rootkit (that needs physical access when things like my-pc-looks-tampered-with are not considered), and then we let location data be gathered by literally every company, hmmm
the scenario where 15 min alone in somebodys office, (this made me laugh actually - theres a countless amount of what-ifs): a company with any kind of compliance should never let an untrusted person be alone (especially with access to a computer); a smaller company, surly we'd assume would be less of a target, but not a guarntee - but thats also why all companies should not leave their vaults with raw cash open for any to access.
as far as used systems going; folks will always fall victim for that which they do not know. for a newly owned computer a user should be fresh installing the firmware and OS. but convience has folks trained to plug-and-play with 0 downtime, 0 setup, 0 knowledge of options. apple, of course, that cannot be done on the same level as my non-apple system is done. and from what i remember, apple folks need to have proof of reciept for a used-sale, and even then can still get trolled on a used-sale with the find-my-mac lockout - maybe its improved nowaday; i'll simply pass and rather buy new (not that im supporting apple)
Governments definitely worry about it, and I’d be shocked if e.g. banks didn’t also put it into requirements. Access can be temporary, too: imagine if you get 15 minute alone in someone’s office or they have a kiosk in the lobby, etc. – not enough time to open the case up but plenty to toss a USB drive in and reboot. Repeat for lost devices or scenarios like the KnowBe4 attack disclosed yesterday where some dude might not be able to explain cracking the case open.
> the signing method only offers buying more time before the innevitable data is "breached" by a theat actor - its the same buying-time for any and all encryption.
You have to think about cost, too. It appears to be safe to buy a used Mac because Apple employs competent cryptographic engineers and very few targets are worth involving a lab with truly serious hardware. This could be the case on the PC side too, but it’s undercut by vendors skimping on execution and until Secure Boot is pervasive and robust, nobody can easily tell whether hardware they’ve lost control of can be trusted. People have been getting malware on used computers for years and a trusted boot process makes it easier both to tell if that’s happened and to be confident that you’ve fully wiped a system.