It's not perfect or anything, but it's usually a step up[1], and the funniest thing is that GPUs generally had less of ... "interesting" compute facilities to jump over from, just easier to access usually. My first 64 bit laptop, my first android smartphone, first few iPhones, had more MIPS32le cores with possible DMA access to memory than the main CPU cores, and that was just counting one component of many (the wifi chip).
Also, Hyperthreading wasn't itself faulty or "bugdoored". The tricks necessary to get high performance out of CPUs were, and then there was intel deciding to drop various good precautions in name of still higher single core performance.
Fortunately, after several years, IOMMU availability becomes more common (current laptop I'm writing this on has proper separate groups for every device it seems)
[1] There's always the OpenBSD of navel gazing about writing "secure" C code, becoming slowly obsolescent thanks to being behind in performance and features, and ultimately getting pwned because your C focus and not implementing "complex" features helping mitigate access results in pwnable SMTPd running as root.
All fine and well, but I always come back to "If I were a manufacturer/creator of some work/device/software, that does something in the plausible realm of 'telecommunication', how do make sure, that my product can always comply with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawful_interception requests? Allow for ingress/egress of data/commands at as low a level as possible!"
So as a chipset creator company director it would seem like a no-brainer to me to have to tell my engineers unfortunately to not fix some exploitable bug in the IOMMU/Chipset. Unless I want to never sell devices that could potentially be used to move citizens internet packets around in a large scale deployment.
And implement/not_fix something similar in other layers as well, e.g. ME.
If your product is supposed to comply with Lawful Interception, you're going to implement proper LI interfaces, not leave bullshit DMA bugs in.
The very point of Lawful Interception involves explicit, described interfaces, so that all parties involved can do the work.
The systems with LI interfaces also often end up in jurisdictions that simultaneously put high penalties on giving access to them without specific authorizations - I know, I had to sign some really interesting legalese once due to working in environment where we had to balance both Lawful Interception, post-facto access to data, and telecommunications privacy laws.
Leaving backdoors like that is for Unlawful Interception, and the danger of such approaches is greatly exposed in form of Chinese intelligence services exploiting NSA backdoor in Juniper routers (infamous DRBG_EC RNG)
Also, Hyperthreading wasn't itself faulty or "bugdoored". The tricks necessary to get high performance out of CPUs were, and then there was intel deciding to drop various good precautions in name of still higher single core performance.
Fortunately, after several years, IOMMU availability becomes more common (current laptop I'm writing this on has proper separate groups for every device it seems)
[1] There's always the OpenBSD of navel gazing about writing "secure" C code, becoming slowly obsolescent thanks to being behind in performance and features, and ultimately getting pwned because your C focus and not implementing "complex" features helping mitigate access results in pwnable SMTPd running as root.