> Windows NT permissions are not as granular as they could be.
For objects, Windows NT permissions are ridiculously granular; e.g. GENERIC_WRITE can be mapped to a half-dozen separately settable type-specific flags, depending on the object type (file, named pipe, etc.). It’s too granular for even an administrator to make sense of, arguably, and the documentation is somewhere between bad and nonexistent. (The UI varies from decent, like the ACL editor you can access from e.g. Explorer, to “you can’t make this shit up”, like SDDL[1].)
For subjects, the situation is not good, like on every other conventional OS. You could deal with that by introducing a “user” for each app, as on Android. But I’m not aware of any attempts to do that (that would expose this mechanism in a user-visible way).
(Then there’s the UWP sandbox, which as far as I tell is build with complete disregard of the fundamental concepts above. I don’t think it’s worth taking seriously at this time.)
I have no idea if there’s a granular object permission that could give access to the MBR of a disk. I’ve thankfully never had to dig that deep into Windows internals.
I’ve had to work with SDDL before to setup granular permissions for WMI monitoring on a whole lot of computers and my god, did it make me love the Cloud and Linux. I can’t emphasize enough how unintuitive setting these permissions is creates systemic over privileging.
For objects, Windows NT permissions are ridiculously granular; e.g. GENERIC_WRITE can be mapped to a half-dozen separately settable type-specific flags, depending on the object type (file, named pipe, etc.). It’s too granular for even an administrator to make sense of, arguably, and the documentation is somewhere between bad and nonexistent. (The UI varies from decent, like the ACL editor you can access from e.g. Explorer, to “you can’t make this shit up”, like SDDL[1].)
For subjects, the situation is not good, like on every other conventional OS. You could deal with that by introducing a “user” for each app, as on Android. But I’m not aware of any attempts to do that (that would expose this mechanism in a user-visible way).
(Then there’s the UWP sandbox, which as far as I tell is build with complete disregard of the fundamental concepts above. I don’t think it’s worth taking seriously at this time.)
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sec...