Thanks for your comment, very interesting.
About your last paragraph :
Do you know why NIST refuses hybridization, when European agencies imposes it ?
What is the political behind it ?
The charitable interpretation I would give the NIST - and a very real concern - is that they are not sure that one form of cryptography doesn't weaken the other, without proofs. Since these cryptosystems also tend to work in different number fields, it's very hard to prove anything about their interactions at all.
We all know the uncharitable interpretation, that the PQC algorithms may be backdoored.
NIST does not refuse hybridization, they will be publishing guidance on hybrid schemes in the draft of SP 800-227 at the same time as the final standards. They don't impose it though, because at a large scale it's more efficient to run just (fast) ML-KEM instead of (fast) ML-KEM + (slower) ECDH, which more than doubles your computation time for what they see as no benefit.
