No, that's not correct and what you're stating about my views or what I have said is not correct.
> Daniel Micay himself said that iphones are one of the best choices from a security perspective, GrapheneOS closing the gap.
I haven't said this about current era GrapheneOS. You're referring to outdated comments from 4 years ago. Pixels, AOSP and GrapheneOS have all massively improved since then. Pixels with the stock OS have competitive security with iOS. GrapheneOS is not closing a gap with iOS on security. It is closing a gap on privacy and also surpassing it with features like Contact Scopes.
> The reason is the close working together of hardware and software, which is very seldom done in case of Android devices - pixels being the sole exception that care about it, that’s why they are the only supported device.
AOSP is developed largely with and for Pixels, but that is not why they're the only supported devices for GrapheneOS. They're the only supported devices because they're the only devices meeting the security requirements listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. If you ignore the differences in APIs between iOS and Android while pretending that the iPhone supported alternate operating systems, it does not meet that full requirements list either. The lack of MTE is a simple example.
It's presented as being for the ultra paranoid but what it does is mainly reducing huge amounts of attack surface created by default enabled Apple services. They're basic security measures rather than something super advanced and niche. It's all grouped together into one setting with some aspects impacting usability a lot without being able to get most of the features without that, which was their choice, and is what makes it into way more of a niche feature than it has to be.
These Apple services/features don't exist for GrapheneOS in the first place. People use Signal or the hardened Molly fork on GrapheneOS, not iMessage/Facetime, etc. Android already takes a more cautious approach to media handling in the stock OS. Lockdown mode mainly disables the permissive defaults of Apple services/features and provides attack surface reduction for Safari. GrapheneOS has Vanadium features that are similar such as JIT being disabled by default but beyond that those browser parts of it there isn't a lot that's applicable.
You're correct that it was my position at one point, but it was around 4 years ago and a lot has changed. We did used to say iPhones were more secure from 2014-2019 but it started shifting in 2020 and then especially in 2021-2022 as AOSP, Pixels and GrapheneOS got to the point where we were confident what we provide is better overall for security. It's the same for privacy now overall, but there are areas where iOS does better on privacy and we're prioritizing fixing that by doing better than iOS in those areas such as clipboard privacy where Android is still weaker.
> Daniel Micay himself said that iphones are one of the best choices from a security perspective, GrapheneOS closing the gap.
I haven't said this about current era GrapheneOS. You're referring to outdated comments from 4 years ago. Pixels, AOSP and GrapheneOS have all massively improved since then. Pixels with the stock OS have competitive security with iOS. GrapheneOS is not closing a gap with iOS on security. It is closing a gap on privacy and also surpassing it with features like Contact Scopes.
> The reason is the close working together of hardware and software, which is very seldom done in case of Android devices - pixels being the sole exception that care about it, that’s why they are the only supported device.
AOSP is developed largely with and for Pixels, but that is not why they're the only supported devices for GrapheneOS. They're the only supported devices because they're the only devices meeting the security requirements listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. If you ignore the differences in APIs between iOS and Android while pretending that the iPhone supported alternate operating systems, it does not meet that full requirements list either. The lack of MTE is a simple example.
It's presented as being for the ultra paranoid but what it does is mainly reducing huge amounts of attack surface created by default enabled Apple services. They're basic security measures rather than something super advanced and niche. It's all grouped together into one setting with some aspects impacting usability a lot without being able to get most of the features without that, which was their choice, and is what makes it into way more of a niche feature than it has to be.
These Apple services/features don't exist for GrapheneOS in the first place. People use Signal or the hardened Molly fork on GrapheneOS, not iMessage/Facetime, etc. Android already takes a more cautious approach to media handling in the stock OS. Lockdown mode mainly disables the permissive defaults of Apple services/features and provides attack surface reduction for Safari. GrapheneOS has Vanadium features that are similar such as JIT being disabled by default but beyond that those browser parts of it there isn't a lot that's applicable.