> We are not our brains. We are "conscious agents"... It's
> very good news that you are not your brain, because when
> your mind finds its true power, the result is healing,
> inspiration, insight, self-awareness, discovery,
> curiosity, and quantum leaps in personal growth. The
> brain is totally incapable of such things. After all, if
> it is a hard-wired machine, there is no room for sudden
> leaps and renewed inspiration...
Not to slight the blog response under discussion, but the quoted paragraph betrays such deep ignorance of basic neurobiology that any reaction seems like a waste of time. It's quite literally a (neuro-)philosophical equivalent of "Lots of spinach, ergo sum".
I find it highly fascinating that the Wikipedia article on "consciousness" says it's basically, well, crap. See for yourself:
"Consciousness - The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with self-consciousness—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it."
"The most compelling argument for the existence of consciousness is that the vast majority of mankind have an overwhelming intuition that there truly is such a thing.[20] Skeptics argue that this intuition, in spite of its compelling quality, is false, either because the concept of consciousness is intrinsically incoherent, or because our intuitions about it are based in illusions. Gilbert Ryle, for example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a Cartesian dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of individuals, or persons, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking of 'consciousness' we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings.[21] More generally, many philosophers and scientists have been unhappy about the difficulty of producing a definition that does not involve circularity or fuzziness.[17]"
Well put. Not like his other arguments aren t equally self defeating:
1. Brain activity isn't the same as thinking, feeling, or seeing.
2. No one has remotely shown how molecules acquire the qualities of the mind.*
3. It is impossible to construct a theory of the mind based on material objects that somehow became conscious.
4. When the brain lights up, its activity is like a radio lighting up when music is played. It is an obvious fallacy to say that the radio composed the music. What is being viewed is only a physical correlation, not a cause.
I think the biggest counterargument (if one were needed) is that if I start doing things to your brain, it affects your mind. If I cut a part of your brain out, your mind is impacted. This has been shown by injuries to the brain, lobotomies, etc. etc.
Beyond that, we could get into all sorts of philosophical arguments about the link between the mind and the brain, but it seems to me as a somewhat philosophically naive person that this fact is a clear and demonstrable link between the brain and the mind.
I think no one here assumes Chopra speaks with any authority as to the physiology of the brain. Yes, he's a doctor - of internal medicine with a specialism in endocrinology, but that hardly qualifies him to discuss the brain. That being said, I think the key to understanding the brain physically is to read this book:
An Anatomy of Thought: The Origin and Machinery of the Mind
by Ian Glynn
And to understand the inner workings of the brain and how it theoretically functions:
Society of Mind
by Marvin Lee Minsky
I believe the idea that the mind is just a "set of agents" is best explained in "Society of Mind".
One thing I've never heard a neuroscientist answer (although I have asked at least a dozen) is how to distinguish between the expression of consciousness and the generation of consciousness (i.e. the difference between a light bulb and an electrical generator). It's interesting to consider this question when we include the fact that the brain can't really operate without good blood flow into the brain. When blood flow is blocked the function of the brain (as well as the expression of consciousness) are blocked.
I genuinely have no clue what your question means and entails (as a neuroscientist with a reasonable undergraduate career in anglo-american philosophy). Can you elaborate?
If I were going to say something that sounded like that, it would be this:
We think of a lightbulb as a device which generates light, but it isn't that intrinsically; the filament glows only when electrified, and the bulb is only a small part of the light-generating system which includes an electrical generator (and, presumably, a burning fuel source). The bulb is the place where the light first becomes visible, but it makes less sense to say that it is the place the light comes from.
Similarly, we think of the brain as a thinking machine, but it isn't that intrinsically; it is only a small part of a much larger thinking system which includes functions of respiration, circulation, ingestion, et cetera. So we can say that the brain may be the place where thinking first becomes noticeable per se, but it makes less sense to say that it is where thought is created.
Which is all well and good. I'm not sure what part of it is supposed to be a hard question about neurology rather than a PHIL100 essay topic, though.
The light bulb is definitely a less-than-apt metaphor. I think the crux of what he's asking about is the line between a system's production of subjectivity and a subject's experience of it (which constitutes the subject as such). The separation between the two seems to be absolute, i.e. if "brains cause minds," as Searle puts it, no amount of introspection on the part of the mind allows it access to the brain. Consciousness is a one-way trip.
How to distinguish between the two might be an interesting question from, say, a Chinese Room[1] or p-zombie[2] standpoint, which might have some philosophical bearing on AI. But that's about all I can think of off the top of my head.
I think it is fair to say that we just don't know yet. Neuroscience has learned a great deal about the underlying machinery (neurons, synapses, and so forth), but we have no idea how you put that machinery together to generate something like consciousness. This is, for me, what makes the field interesting, because I think these questions are answerable.
As far as the original article, I think anyone who tries to argue that you are not your brain is ignoring over a hundred years of scientific evidence that suggests otherwise.
I would go so far as to say that we may one day be able to take away the legs, arms, organs, torso, head, everything that will eventually break down. Then upload our brains into a virtual, (dare I say) MMO world and not even notice the difference.
Of course, we'd have to get around the problem of parting with "self" when transitioning to the virtual immortal life. And therein lies the philosophical problem of the conscious.
Wouldn't this be similar to the concept behind The Matrix? You're virtually plugged in; you feel like yourself, but the steak you're eating has been graphically programmed inside this "MMO" world to trigger the appropriate stimulation in your brain to make the entire experience "real."
One thing remains inconsistent though. I understand that we remove our legs, arms, organs, torso, head, etc. in pursuit of becoming immortal via a virtual life, but... isn't the brain itself also within the same classification as the aforementioned body parts? It's biodegradable.
Say we find a way to preserve the brain eternally, wouldn't it then become irrelevant to live through a virtual life? For if we can preserve the brain, the same method can be applied to preserve the rest of the body that we earlier considered ridding ourselves from.
The mind is a metaphysical repository. The brain is not the cause of the mind; it is only a channel that allows us to associate with--and add to--it. If we were to say that the brain is the cause of the mind, then--by necessity--upon physical death, the mind would have to vaporize, vanish, cease to exist. Now.. our identity IS our mind. We generally don't identify who we are through our bodies. Our memories, habits, traits, tendencies, affinities, aversions, and reactions all emanate from our mind. And if we subscribe to the latter notion--that our minds continue to exist even after we end our mortal lives--then that postulates that there must exist another world, an accentuated world, devoid of time and space, that allows an endless progression of fulfillment and enlightenment and an infinite array of things to do, only without an aging body to drag us around as we attempt to do them.
