I'm not generalizing; I'm restating the opinion in the FBI GPS case.
But your logic doesn't work anyways. If it did, we wouldn't need "stalking" laws. In stalking cases, defendants are guilty if the state (in this case, Connecticut) can prove (1) intent to to cause fear for their physical safety, (2) purposeful following not undertaken for lawful purposes, (3) willfulness, (4) repetition, and (5) that the victim actually ended up fearing for their safety. (That's paraphrased from CT model jury instructions).
Think about all the private following, observation, and even spying that this doesn't cover.
I think the specifics of the FBI GPS case result is wrong. I'm also uninterested in laws re stalking. I don't think your rebuttal has anything to do with my argument.
I'm talking about the philosophical matter of generalizing from specific cases of monitoring to mass surveillance, arguing that a justification for the former is not a justification for the latter, because the two are different in substance, not just quantity.
Case results follow from interpretation of laws; laws follow from philosophical principles. I'm arguing the philosophical principles. I don't accept counterarguments in the form of citations of specific laws, or interpretation of those laws, as valid.
Here's an interesting essay on precisely the kind of thing I'm talking about - and it explains why binary thinking on this matter is a bad way to go about it.
But your logic doesn't work anyways. If it did, we wouldn't need "stalking" laws. In stalking cases, defendants are guilty if the state (in this case, Connecticut) can prove (1) intent to to cause fear for their physical safety, (2) purposeful following not undertaken for lawful purposes, (3) willfulness, (4) repetition, and (5) that the victim actually ended up fearing for their safety. (That's paraphrased from CT model jury instructions).
Think about all the private following, observation, and even spying that this doesn't cover.