Quite. It is likely true that deep conceptual shifts within twentieth-century science have undermined what's commonly referred to as Cartesian-Newtonian metaphysics. Revisionist studies in the history and philosophy of science have cast further doubt on its credibility, and, most recently, feminist and poststructuralist critiques have demystified the substantive content of mainstream Western scientific practice, revealing the ideology of domination concealed behind the façade of "objectivity".
It has thus become increasingly apparent that physical "reality", no less than social "reality", is at bottom a social and linguistic construct; that scientific "knowledge", far from being objective, reflects and encodes the dominant ideologies and power relations of the culture that produced it; that the truth claims of science are inherently theory-laden and self-referential; and consequently, that the discourse of the scientific community, for all its undeniable value, cannot assert a privileged epistemological status with respect to counter-hegemonic narratives emanating from dissident or marginalized communities.
To be fair, if you want to go drown in the cosmic ocean of unbeing, I don't think anyone, hegemon or no, is stopping you but your own self-imposed linguistic and social structures.
It is ultimately an irony that the epistemological position--that Civilization is fundamentally about domination and cannot stand marginalized or dissident narratives--has only and could only flourish under civilizations in their least-connected-to-quotidian-life institutions. It requires being sheltered to recognize that ultimately everything is a social and linguistic construct. Everyone else doesn't have the luxury and are just trying to survive.
Even further, the idea that everything reduces to social and linguistic games isn't new. It is one of the oldest ideas in history found in both Buddhism (through depedent coarising) and in Graeco-Roman philosophy culminating in Christianity (the Logos). Both institutions developed monasticism for precisely the same reasons.
This world isn't real. You have to be out of this world to see the illusion behind it and to be free from it.
Everyone does not have to stop pretending it's real for you to stop pretending it's real.
I have to say, I am slightly disappointed that the opening of Sokal's "Transgressing the boundaries" paper isn't immediately recognizable by an HN audience ...
Studying, say, the food preferences of snails, is a very roundabout way to dominate society. A lot of the post-structuralist way of thinking comes down to a couple of obvious claims:
- "Scientists were part of a society that did Bad Things(tm) like genocide, slavery etc." Yes, indeed they were. Thanks for pointing out. This is not as profound a revelation as you might think.
- "Physical reality is just another discourse among many. There's no objective truth." This applies equally to just about any claim, including this second point denying privileged narratives. So why bother having a conversation? It's obviously a self-immolating belief system. There's in fact physical truth and reality. The phenomenon we describe as gravity will be around long after humans are no longer around to contemplate it. Also I'd argue that the post-modern argument is nihilistic. Just because you don't believe in my existence or choose not to articulate it in your "text" doesn't mean I don't exist. If we deny the power of language to represent and communicate reality, all we're left with is raw destructive brute force to decide what is real and who actually exists. Kind of like the USA we are slowly converging upon.
It has thus become increasingly apparent that physical "reality", no less than social "reality", is at bottom a social and linguistic construct; that scientific "knowledge", far from being objective, reflects and encodes the dominant ideologies and power relations of the culture that produced it; that the truth claims of science are inherently theory-laden and self-referential; and consequently, that the discourse of the scientific community, for all its undeniable value, cannot assert a privileged epistemological status with respect to counter-hegemonic narratives emanating from dissident or marginalized communities.