> There also isn't any free will, because there isn't actually any agent who could have it.
The compilation of each possible Play in an Extensive Normal Form Game into a cellular automata can constitute a refutation by counterexample of your claim. It satisfies the agent condition through congruence with the technical language defining the concept of agent in artificial intelligence literature as it relates to agents in multi-agent multi-step decision theory problems. The condition of non-deterministic policies is found and shown to be optimal by Nash's justification for an mixed strategy equilibrium. The underlying mathematics that leads there is proven via Russel and there exists various proofs of the desiderata of probability from others which can begin atop that. Furthermore by compiling the formal system to get a physical system we create the ability for a logical analogy between the formal system and the physical system through Aristotle's analogical congruence concepts. We can count the cell configurations and we can count the transitional structure, but this is mostly a formality since we know through the definition of the compilation that they must agree. As far as I can tell at every single step in the laddering up there are proofs from the basics of logic to the mathematics to the use of probability to the justification through utility theory and even to the computational universality necessary to create the physical embedding of the agent in our reality.
The prior conception of guess appears laughable posterior to computation and comparison with evidence, but is just science prior and seeing it is wrong is hindsight bias posterior. It might sound laughable, but it is actually the case that it is not a laughing matter [1]. In like manner, but slightly different and perilously close to being anti-scientific is that you don't know until the observation whether guesses would go one way or another.
I'm saying your self-concept is only a useful abstraction. It's an evolutionally beneficial illusion that there is any entity called "me" that chooses which action comes next.
The mathematics of intelligence in multi-agent decision problems implication gives us informed guesses about what we should expect to see if an agent has free will versus if they don't. You are arguing with words like illusion, so I don't think you realize this, but what you actually need to provide to have your actual position be the consequence of experimental evidence is evidence of extreme compression being possible. Illusion? It is the evidence for agents, not evidence against agents, according to the theory informed guesses.
There is this story about a village of blind men and elephants. You are like a blind man from that village, saying that the elephant must be abstract because you felt a footprint of the elephant. Try playing with an elephant carving. It predicts footprints when you press it it into the ground. You can totally guess before you touch the elephant on the basis of the carving. The decision to focus on the untestable is a commitment to a hindsight fallacy which experimental investigation would likely refute.
I get what you are trying to say, but it isn't true. This is the long version that explains why and goes through the implications at each step showing the hypothesis, predictions they make, and why your views don't make sense. You should read this if you don't think my other post makes sense, but if it just clicks you don't need to read this.
H0: Free will predicts in advance of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you cannot always predict the result.
H1: A lack of free will predicts of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you can always have predicted the result in advance of the result, because there was only one possible resolution.
Complete Refutation of H1: The existence of halting problems. A self-reference in a decision problem refutes H1, because the self-reference
Additional strong evidence against H1: All the most successful epistemological frameworks suppose a superposition over positions which on attaining information about the next position resolves, not to a position, but to a new superposition. For example science does this. It believes we don't know for certain the theories, but we conjecture guesses and use observations to test them.
Implication of failure of H1 and the failure to refute H0: There exists a self-reference, a sort of self-concept, which prevents the resolution of a prediction prior to the resolution. Self-reference exists as a thing which must be computed.
Okay. So now we pick back up in the mathematics that deals with self-reference in game theory. In it we find equilibrium concepts which are defined with respect to self-reference and proven relative to self-reference considerations. These proofs show that the solution structure contingent on self-reference is non-deterministic.
Implication: Not only does self-reference exist, but the consequences of self-reference is the use of self-reference to refute self-referential prediction or to support self-referential prediction on the basis of utility of doing so or not doing so.
So now we know a self-reference must exist, we also know it predicts a refutation in some cases of the ability to predict it. We can also see that if the self-reference didn't exist, it would imply that there was no structure which wasn't computationally irreducible like self-reference structures are.
H3: We will see everything is predictable from the information contexts available, because agents don't exist. Example predictions: that all physics will be determinable like the position of a planet is determinable.
H4: We will that some things are not predictable, because of the existence of illusions that prevent resolution and which contain a self-reference consideration.
What we actually observe is H4. We observe H4 in at least one case, so we can't infer from H3 that we can reject H4, because H4 already rejects the safety of H3.
Let me give an example: Some deer in Africa don't see orange. Tigers, to us, are orange. To the deer they are green. The tiger color is decided by a self-reference consideration with the deer perceptual system. The deer is not going to be able to predict the future state of all tiger like we could predict the planets, because the deer is caught in a superposition with respect to a tiger's presence. When it observes a tiger, this looks the same as observing a bush. Therefore, even if it sees a bush, it can't predict that it can always model the consequence of a bush. Therefore, if we see a planet, it is incorrect to assume we can always predict the consequences of seeing a planet.
So now you can understand, if my other comment didn't click, why appeals to illusion are actually evidence for self-reference, not evidence against it. So feel free to read that comment again to see if it now clicks.
The compilation of each possible Play in an Extensive Normal Form Game into a cellular automata can constitute a refutation by counterexample of your claim. It satisfies the agent condition through congruence with the technical language defining the concept of agent in artificial intelligence literature as it relates to agents in multi-agent multi-step decision theory problems. The condition of non-deterministic policies is found and shown to be optimal by Nash's justification for an mixed strategy equilibrium. The underlying mathematics that leads there is proven via Russel and there exists various proofs of the desiderata of probability from others which can begin atop that. Furthermore by compiling the formal system to get a physical system we create the ability for a logical analogy between the formal system and the physical system through Aristotle's analogical congruence concepts. We can count the cell configurations and we can count the transitional structure, but this is mostly a formality since we know through the definition of the compilation that they must agree. As far as I can tell at every single step in the laddering up there are proofs from the basics of logic to the mathematics to the use of probability to the justification through utility theory and even to the computational universality necessary to create the physical embedding of the agent in our reality.
The prior conception of guess appears laughable posterior to computation and comparison with evidence, but is just science prior and seeing it is wrong is hindsight bias posterior. It might sound laughable, but it is actually the case that it is not a laughing matter [1]. In like manner, but slightly different and perilously close to being anti-scientific is that you don't know until the observation whether guesses would go one way or another.
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw