> The argument proposed by physicalists says that there must be some new state inherent to the apple that registers in our brain as “red apple”.
No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process.
> The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain.
And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.
Thanks for the clarification! I find this topic fascinating, but am definitely still learning it.
My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises. But if there is no expectation of similar patterns across individuals, I would imagine the usefulness in that sense is limited. So, perhaps this isn't an end goal of physicalism.
In which case, perhaps neither party expects there to be a solution to the origins of consciousness, maybe!
> My impression was that the underlying assumption (or at least, the end goal) of the physicalist interpretation is that this physical process can ultimately be used to predict how consciousness arises.
This is the hope of many physicalists, but it is not required for physicalism to be true.
No, it doesn't. Physicalism does not require that the exact same brain state must accompany a particular perception, either in different humans, or in the same human at different times. All it requires is that perception is a physical process.
> The non-physicalist argument is that the experience of seeing that apple is unique to each one of us, and emerges uniquely for every brain.
And the physicalist's response is that even if this is true, it does not refute physicalism. Perception can be a physical process and still satisfy these statements.