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The firing scam worked about a decade ago. Audit logs would fix it, assuming the company knew about them.

Alternatively... They could just not route inbound messages to "sent".

What possible reason would enterprise customers have to demand that certain incoming messages get black holed into a folder that no normal user will ever look at?



You're asking this like "enterprise customers" as a group make sense or act logically.

My best guess is something like outlook or other client integration for "legitimate" impersonation.


It’s not necessarily moronic. If a tool can send email as you, it makes sense and is convenient for it to appear in your Sent label. And if you are using Gmail as your “system of record” it becomes a legal necessity.

Google itself uses gmail in both of the ways I mentioned.


That's just bizarre. It doesn't really contradict my point that they're not providing data integrity to end users.

Personally, I'd be pretty pissed if a tool injected into my sendbox instead of sending an (optional) copy of whatever it generated to my inbox.

On the other hand, I know how to set up filters.

Anyway, it has been a half-decade since I gave up on figuring out what fresh UI hell gmail has shipped each year. (I autoforward whatever must be sent to gmail elsewhere, and set up a logical contradiction email filter to nerf their broken and mandatory spam filter).

I guess if random systems are sent box injecting me, then I'll lose the emails. Oh well.


I'm done staring down the gmail rat hole for now, but the section on delegated access in this article is surprising:

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/askjack/2018/jun/28/c...

It sounds like there are third party G Suite tools that force you to enable delegated access (from the article, it is unclear if this is possible for personal accounts).

On top of that, some manage to enable it without prompting. Yet, somehow, Google let them keep their API keys.

Nice.




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