> perverse incentives like allowing you to “sell” or hold hostage something you were going to do anyway
This is true, but it's a weird way to frame it. Yes, absolutely: carbon-sensitive regulation changes the market pricing such that less polluting activities and means of production are "worth more". So if you have some, you win. If you were planning on having some in the future ("were going to do anyway"), you likewise get a windfall.
And thats... good? It's not perfect. But it produces the result we want.
IMHO the much bigger problem with offset regulation is that it's likely to be nearly impossible to actually measure[1] and we'll be dealing with cheating and fraud for decades. But the incentives seem fine to me.
[1] Vs. a carbon tax which is pure simplicity: $xxx per ton of carbon (for extra credit: a floating price based on a dynamic bid-based sequestration market) pulled out of nonrenewable sources, paid by the extractor at the time of initial sale, and let the market sort out how to allocate the overhead.
Who gets to decide what the carbon footprint of every activity is? How is the surveillance of every activity performed? What is the performance metric to evaluate the success or failure of the system?
Imagine being a politician and proposing taxes on energy and fuels which will directly and indirectly increase the price of literally everything. Imagine all the hate currently being directed at Russia being redirected towards you personally.
You can just make the tax revenue neutral, and give each person an equal dividend. That way the average person would actually get money back from this tax scheme. It’s what Canada does. The goal isn’t to raise money, it’s to incentivize consuming lower carbon goods.
The third question has an obvious answer, so I'm not sure I get your point. The first two are just saying "regulation is hard", and I agree. But it's possible nonetheless, just like every other regulated industry.
Recognize that all your questions could have been asked about, say, sulphate emission regulation in the 1970's. (Or CFC's in the 90's). And that worked out OK.
This is true, but it's a weird way to frame it. Yes, absolutely: carbon-sensitive regulation changes the market pricing such that less polluting activities and means of production are "worth more". So if you have some, you win. If you were planning on having some in the future ("were going to do anyway"), you likewise get a windfall.
And thats... good? It's not perfect. But it produces the result we want.
IMHO the much bigger problem with offset regulation is that it's likely to be nearly impossible to actually measure[1] and we'll be dealing with cheating and fraud for decades. But the incentives seem fine to me.
[1] Vs. a carbon tax which is pure simplicity: $xxx per ton of carbon (for extra credit: a floating price based on a dynamic bid-based sequestration market) pulled out of nonrenewable sources, paid by the extractor at the time of initial sale, and let the market sort out how to allocate the overhead.