I think the point that the original poster was making is that corporations with lots of money behind them can keep trying to get similar laws passed, again and again, until they finally succeed.

Which is an extension of the broader problem with Congresspeople having often very-divided loyalties. On the one hand (usually the weak one) there are voters. On there other, there's the money. Backing this money up is the threat that favoring voters will mean someone else getting the money, which they will be expected to use attacking the person who had the temerity to refuse it.

It's an impossible situation - like depending on an employee whose salary and benefits are provided by your most direct competitors.

The logic of public election finance holds that all citizens, regardless of their political views, have a much greater interest in a legislative body responsive to voters alone than they do in possibly underwriting the campaign of a particular legislator who they oppose.

Put differently, would you rather (indirectly) fund the campaign of someone you don't want representing you, along with the campaign of someone you do, or would you rather have nobody you can trust to represent you on anything?