Nope, not for me. If i were an aircraft engineer in Seattle, knowing very well i have little chance of employment outside of moving to Toulouse or Moscow, I'd maybe think twice before leaking the story anonymously. However, the current SRE me who doesn't have such limits, wouldn't even think twice. Those are human lives we're talking about here.
So every single engineer on this project is a total piece of shit? That is my only logical conclusion to your statement.
It's probably not as simple as you put it, then someone would've done something about it. (Assuming this system wasn't built by a very small engineering team, then they could statistically all be "bad" people).
Nope, but every single engineer who knew about this ( i doubt everyone was fully aware of this, it's very complex hardware and probably few engineers know everything about everything) and let it happen is a total piece of shit who deserves at least a couple of months in jail. How do these bastards sleep at night knowing they let a terribly poor aircraft design out of the door and that cost people their lives? And why, just so that someone higher level than them can get a higher bonus for delivering the plane faster?
Note: for me MCAS isn't a problem per se. It would have been better to have a new design from scratch, but that's a whole other issue. Lying about it(chances of failure, risk when it fails), hiding it, and to top it off using a single sensor that is known for occasional failure. And making it near impossible to override even when the pilots knew about it ( which they didn't, thanks to Boeing hiding it from them). That's criminal negligence by tens if not hundreds of people every step along the way. Every single one of them should be tried and have to explain why their manager's or their bonus matters more than human lives.
You're still sitting on the high-horse saying that you're somehow a lot better than the rest of these people.
It's an organizational/economical problem.
I would like to argue that because recertification requirements are as strict as they are, Boeing were forced to do this to get their product flying.
I don't condone Boeings behavior, but it's not hard to imagine why it happened, and it's definitely not the engineers fault. It's just capitalism in action.
I think we need to be careful about what "this" is. The common person is probably referring to the implementation details of the system, while most engineers I've met (or what tech calls an engineer) only look at their immediate slice of the pie. It's your older or more seasoned folks that tend to watch over and integrate those pieces and watch over process, but details can get lost in the shuffle.
It really comes down to failure to cooperate with the regulator. Perception management is often times easier than proactive compliance. I keep dreaming one day I'll end up somewhere where I can get more than platitudes when people say "we're here to do it right, even if it is hard".
