One of the early arguments for a first strike was the ability to target military installations only.
Due to the limitations in early US targeting ability, a US counter strike likely meant having to go with a counter-value response instead of a counter-force one. Meaning bigger targets like cities over smaller military-only targets.
So if you worked under the presumption that war with the Soviets was inevitable, a first strike avoided mass casualties in the magnitude of 10s of millions in favor of decapitating military targets.
So yes, there is a logical argument that it would be the more ethical choice.
It wasn't until the 80's with advances in both surveying/geodesy (predicting precise ballistic trajectories taking into account local variances in gravity) and targeting/ delivery accuracy (B-1, B-2, peacekeeper ICBMs, and better SLBMs) that the game-theory changed.
That's just not realistic. The Soviet army relied on its productive capabilities to wage war. Without destroying cities, nuclear war with the USSR would simply be absurd.
Beyond that, American intelligence in the USSR was weak, and they wouldn't have been able to pin down high value military targets. They'd also have serious issues striking deep within the USSR.
Von Neumann also recommended that Kyoto, instead of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, be nuked, despite it having very little military significance and leading to many more deaths.
By the time he started proposing a strike of the USSR, the USSR had already started deploying early warning radar, jet interceptors and even guided missile systems designed specifically to stop B-29s carryig nuclear bombs. In testing they proved to be even more effective than needed to completely protect the installations they were defending against slow and heavy bombers. A strike in 1951 would have been a total disaster and would have not at all stopped their industry. The US didn't even know where they were making bombs.
His political views were that coexistence with the USSR was impossible. As it turns out, the USSR had no plans of invading the US, he was simply wrong.
Let's not try to whitewash history. Neumann knew that Soviet intelligence and counter intelligence was formidable. He knew that the strength of the Soviet military was in its cities . He had already recommended nuclear strikes on civilian population centers with low military value. He was noted by his fellow physicists to be unperturbed by his work. It's quite unlikely that he had any illusions about what as needed to actually stop the Soviet war machine.
He thought that the Soviet Union could coexist with the US. He was violent in his hatred of the Soviets and was militaristic. He thought that the US had to defeat the Soviets sooner than later. Surely we both realize that this means millions of dead.
That's what you're doing by discounting what was a fairly popular political opinion of the time.
>That's just not realistic. The Soviet army relied on its productive capabilities to wage war.
None of that matters if you get hit with a Soviet first strike.
The main goal wasn't to take out the conventional war machine, but the Soviet Nuclear capabilities. Counter force vs counter value.
And this was before "Spheres of Influence" was accepted as a realistic possibility on either side, when the admitted Soviet policy was that communism had to be spread worldwide, even if it came to instigating war. So a first strike wasn't just thought possible, but expected.
>That's what you're doing by discounting what was a fairly popular political opinion of the time.
Yes, the US in the 1950s had a fairly high amount of absolutely insane but fairly popular political opinions. For example numerous generals were advocating massive nuclear strikes on North Korea and the dissemination of radioactive material on the border with China. That doesn't even begin to excuse anyone.
>None of that matters if you get hit with a Soviet first strike.
>The main goal wasn't to take out the conventional war machine, but the Soviet Nuclear capabilities. Counter force vs counter value.
The USSR had no ability to deal a debilitating first strike to the US.
>And this was before "Spheres of Influence" was accepted as a realistic possibility on either side, when the admitted Soviet policy was that communism had to be spread worldwide, even if it came to instigating war. So a first strike wasn't just thought possible, but expected.
This is nothing less than complete historical revisionism. By the 1920's the dogma of "socialism in one country" was official Soviet policy under Stalin. Anyone that disagreed that socialism only had to be realized in the USSR was contradicting the party line and subject to be purged at any moment. To be sure, the USSR still supported communist parties around the world, but it explicitly eschewed the invasion of countries to install communism, instead it would only be done if it was necessary to protect Soviet socialism.
The idea that communism had to be instigated by war around the world was Trotsky and co doctrine of "permanent revolution". Notably, the first was exiled and assassinated. This doctrine while in the early days relatively popular in the Party never came close to being the official position of the party.
IIRC the quote I've seen on HN, it wasn't "nuke USSR as soon as possible", but more like "given that you already want to nuke Moscow tomorrow, why not do it today?".
That was not his reason, as I stated in another comment. You're free to educate yourself about his thoughts on the matter, which would be much more productive than a snarky comment.
I have already. I don't believe what he said publicly. I see no reason why I would have to. He was noted to be much more cruel and unconcerned with the destructive power of the nuclear bomb than his peers and recommended the nuking of civilian targets. He spoke of the necessity to destroy the USSR on ideological grounds. The idea that a preemptive strike would be limited against a nuclearly armed country is preposterous and ridiculous, and he had already suggested nuking for population destruction instead of military use.
Yes, but due to ethical considerations. One doesn't have to agree with the outcome of his reasoning, but it's well established that his reasons were ethical, not cynical or egoistic.
He was convinced that without an American preemptive strike, even more would die. He was wrong of course, as we now know, but it wasn't clear at that time.
There's an episode of Hardcore History on this topic, I think the title was "Destroyer of Worlds".
It was pretty clear at the time that the Soviets had no intention or capability to destroy the US in such a way that the US would not able to respond with a nuclear strike.
He was noted by his colleagues to be exceptionally unperturbed by his work. He recommended that the US strike Kyoto despite having no military significance to speak of.
He himself admitted that he was ideologically violently opposed to the existence of the USSR. It's clear that his motives were not about minimizing death and destruction.
