That's because wireguard uses non FIPS 140 compliant algorithms. What would be really interesting is if the NSA told us their thoughts on the wireguard algos.

Would you trust the NSA’s thoughts on recommended algs given their chequered history?

I don't necessarily trust the NSA, things like DUAL EC DRBG are an excellent reason why.

However the govt standards for cryptography to use are known as FIPS 140. These standards are made by NIST, which has the NSA either heavily own or directly write the documents. This means that the NSA is defining the crypto standards for the rest of US Gov.

The conclusion is that if you want wireguard in govt networks, the NSA must bless their crypto primitives and algorithms. That's why I want to know their thoughts on it.

You need read between the lines and look at the full context of what they recommend.

Just saying “NSA bad” is a lazy argument.

> Just saying “NSA bad” is a lazy argument.

Yeah, so is that, and a stupid one given how much they, NIST, and the CIA rig things like elliptical curve standards

> Strange how this implies that the end-all-be-all of VPNs is IPsec

And no mention of poor configurations such as IKEv1, pre-shared keys and aggressive mode?

The NSA did like breaking IPSec VPN configurations according to documents exposed by Snowden