> "No they're not the same person, all entities are individuals"
So which one owes the bank the next mortgage payment? If they're not the same legal person then one of them doesn't. Twins have different names, different birth records, different memories, different legal and social identities. If the twins are honest people then they won't pretend to be each other and will self-separate to clear this up. Both Nautilus's, if they are honest people, will be adamant that they are Nautilus and try to use their genetic and biometric and memory records to prove it, neither will want to be the discarded one who must change their name - and neither will have any priority. At t=t0 they are, from the outside, two separate bodies who are the same person.
> "if each copy has their own mind, how can they simultaneously have your mind?"
If they are hardware identical, memories identical, who else's mind could they possibly have (at t=t0)? You copy OpenOffice onto two computers, they both simultaneously have OpenOffice. One doesn't have a different software just because future changes on one will not magically happen on the other. If brain and hardware and memories is not "what it means to be Nautilus", the what does? What else is there? The copy's internal experience will not be the experience of being a copy, it will be the experience of being nautilus with the same continuity of life experience that you have right now.
> "They're either separate entities, or they're not. If they are, the copy is a different person, and the Mars nautilius self is different from Earth nautilius self, running on the identically copied hardware. This position resolves all possible contradictions."
If they are identical in all ways at (t=t0), what specific difference are you pointing to when you say "different person"? And before you say "location", if I move location I don't become a different person. If they are identical then it shouldn't matter if you switch that sentence around and say the Martian is the real one and the Earth one is the "different person". Since you earlier said "you die, someone else goes on living on Mars and you have no knowledge of it" I think you wouldn't be as happy with that phrasing. The weirdness is that the viewpoint "I stay on Earth, a stranger appears on Mars" and "I arrive on Mars, who cares what happens on Earth" are both valid, both people experience actually being nautilus as validly as each other and neither has any better claim to the one true continuity of experience.
So which one owes the bank the next mortgage payment? If they're not the same legal person then one of them doesn't. Twins have different names, different birth records, different memories, different legal and social identities. If the twins are honest people then they won't pretend to be each other and will self-separate to clear this up. Both Nautilus's, if they are honest people, will be adamant that they are Nautilus and try to use their genetic and biometric and memory records to prove it, neither will want to be the discarded one who must change their name - and neither will have any priority. At t=t0 they are, from the outside, two separate bodies who are the same person.
> "if each copy has their own mind, how can they simultaneously have your mind?"
If they are hardware identical, memories identical, who else's mind could they possibly have (at t=t0)? You copy OpenOffice onto two computers, they both simultaneously have OpenOffice. One doesn't have a different software just because future changes on one will not magically happen on the other. If brain and hardware and memories is not "what it means to be Nautilus", the what does? What else is there? The copy's internal experience will not be the experience of being a copy, it will be the experience of being nautilus with the same continuity of life experience that you have right now.
> "They're either separate entities, or they're not. If they are, the copy is a different person, and the Mars nautilius self is different from Earth nautilius self, running on the identically copied hardware. This position resolves all possible contradictions."
If they are identical in all ways at (t=t0), what specific difference are you pointing to when you say "different person"? And before you say "location", if I move location I don't become a different person. If they are identical then it shouldn't matter if you switch that sentence around and say the Martian is the real one and the Earth one is the "different person". Since you earlier said "you die, someone else goes on living on Mars and you have no knowledge of it" I think you wouldn't be as happy with that phrasing. The weirdness is that the viewpoint "I stay on Earth, a stranger appears on Mars" and "I arrive on Mars, who cares what happens on Earth" are both valid, both people experience actually being nautilus as validly as each other and neither has any better claim to the one true continuity of experience.