Which is why CSAM is possibly a really interesting compromise/counter-argument. Supposedly, the only actual crime that the FBI has repeatedly sent warrants to Apple about have been child pornography/trafficking and it's an interesting stance for Apple to take here: "we'll address the actual and specific crime you seem most interested in, but will still not give you a generic backdoor".

Many of the arguments/fears about CSAM is that it can be widened to be a generic backdoor, but as you point out in the arguments Apple has already argued in court Apple doesn't seem to think a generic backdoor is a good idea and have strongly fought against it and CSAM seems to be entirely designed to not be capable as backdoor, and especially not a generic backdoor.

I absolutely understand the fears of false positives and whatever processes the FBI and other TLAs choose to do with the results from CSAM (though many of those concerns apply to everything the TLAs do regardless of what technical tools they have at their disposal), but I'm not sure that I understand all the fears that CSAM is a generic backdoor (in the making) given what Apple have revealed about how it is built and what Apple's quite explicit reasons seem to be to build it to entirely avoid building a generic backdoor and that everything about it seems a "thumb your nose at the FBI by doing what they ask explicitly for but not what they really want to build" by entirely building something that can't be used as a generic backdoor and is very specifically built to only a tiny explicit use case the FBI has asked for. At least from what I've seen so far.