I think you are assuming the company charging for labor is paying for lodging, food, and other expenses, and that doesn't break even.
But that isn't how it is: the prisons charge companies or the government for labor and charge the taxpayers a day rate for the service of incarceration - additional prisoners mean additional profit.
Like most graft in the US, the issue is that private companies get to make a profit on public expenses. This is "more efficient" than having the government do it at cost (see also: medicine).
The practice in this case disincentivizes rehabilitation, means people lobby for things like 3 strikes, or trivial parole violations, mandatory minimums etc. The incentive structure creates systemic reinforcement. You go in to the system and it doesn't particularly want you to come out.
No, I think it is pretty clear from my comment that I do believe that companies are making money on prisons. It can be deduced for example from the part where I say:
> Now, to be sure, a lot of people make money on prisons, (...) but also some private businesses too.
In fact, it would be beyond strange to expect a private company to provide a useful service to the people indefinitely at a loss; that’s not how business works.
> Like most graft in the US, the issue is that private companies get to make a profit on public expenses. This is "more efficient" than having the government do it at cost (see also: medicine).
The problem is that “at cost” is not some sort of objective, physical notion. Most things that government does are “at cost”, but this means little to the taxpayers who foot the bill, if they end up paying more for government services provided “at cost”, than for private services, the providers of which end up making good profits. The entire point of private prisons is that they are cheaper to taxpayers than the government ran ones. In all, I see no problem whatsoever with private companies get to make a profit on public expense, if taxpayers benefit compared to the alternative.
> The practice in this case disincentivizes rehabilitation, means people lobby for things like 3 strikes, or trivial parole violations, mandatory minimums etc. The incentive structure creates systemic reinforcement. You go in to the system and it doesn't particularly want you to come out.
3 strikes, mandatory minimums etc are not a product of private prison lobbyists sneakily instituting them, while the public is kept in the dark. The actual history of those policies is that they were instituted with wide public support, during a time of large increase in crime compared to previous periods, when many of the offenders were found to have offended many times before, and got away with slap on the wrist. For example, first state to introduce 3 strikes law was Washington state, not exactly known for private prisons, or population hell bent on punishment. It was introduced by public ballot measure, which passed 75% to 25%. The voter pamphlet argued that under current law, a violent robber, who has two earlier violent felony convictions, is recommended only 5 years in prison, not even considering early release for good behavior. Not exactly what you would call a trick pulled on the public by sinister private prison lobby,
But that isn't how it is: the prisons charge companies or the government for labor and charge the taxpayers a day rate for the service of incarceration - additional prisoners mean additional profit.
Like most graft in the US, the issue is that private companies get to make a profit on public expenses. This is "more efficient" than having the government do it at cost (see also: medicine).
The practice in this case disincentivizes rehabilitation, means people lobby for things like 3 strikes, or trivial parole violations, mandatory minimums etc. The incentive structure creates systemic reinforcement. You go in to the system and it doesn't particularly want you to come out.