Isn't that giving in? It's smart - it anticipates the lie, and so prepares you for the inevitable betrayal. But wouldn't it be better if we at least pretended that people mean what they say, rather than preemptively give them a pass on their hypocrisy? The trouble with world-weary cynicism is that undermines basic human values like integrity. It sets the bar lower the more powerful an entity is. And that's the reverse of how the world should be. The bar should be higher the more powerful the entity. The degree to which we hold an entity accountable should be proportional to its power.
So, my friend, I understand where you're coming from, but I would encourage you to set aside your cynicism. You'll notice that I used the word "should" in the previous paragraph. I think you're right about how it is but let's not give up on how things should be.
I'm assuming you can't hold someone accountable to a statement they didn't mean. And yet, you make me rethink that. Perhaps you can, and perhaps that's closer to how it should be.
And it also helps me refine my earlier point. Too often I hear cynics (who are, after all, just disappointed idealists) effectively argue that we should give up, the game is rigged, and they'll get away with it no matter what we do. As emotionally safe as this position is, it's also self-fulfilling, and ultimately gives the powerful ever less accountability.
That said, I think "meaning what you say" should be an element of accountability, too, but you're right in that it's not strictly necessary.
> I'm assuming you can't hold someone accountable to a statement they didn't mean. And yet, you make me rethink that. Perhaps you can, and perhaps that's closer to how it should be.
I would say doing so is fundamental to consequentialist [1] and especially utilitarian [2] ethics. I'm not saying those are the best, but they are somewhat common.
It's hard to measure what someone means, which is why I like the idea of removing it!
As for the more philosophical stuff, I think I'm talking about (retributive) justice, and even more specifically, about how public attitudes about justice have a self-fulfilling effect on justice. My hypothesis is that cynical views on justice tend to be self-reinforcing, and idealistic views of justice are also self-reinforcing.
The primary utility of the cynical view seems to be personal/emotional, but comes at the expense of taking pressure off of the world to be better. I suppose my goal here is to encourage disappointed idealists to take up the idealistic mantel, and learn to get disappointed in people again. It's painful to care, but the pain is worth it to produce a better world.
So, my friend, I understand where you're coming from, but I would encourage you to set aside your cynicism. You'll notice that I used the word "should" in the previous paragraph. I think you're right about how it is but let's not give up on how things should be.