I was presenting Andreas Stokke's theory, insofar as I remember it from personal conversation. He is a professor at Uppsala University now and started out his approach with a publication in the Journal of Philosophy. I used to defend your view in private conversations (thanks to a misconception by Augustinus) but have been successfully converted by him and many others.
However, you seem to be awfully certain of your position and present it with apodeictic certainty. If you're really interested in the topic, I recommend Meibauer (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Lying as a reading. You'll see that your view is far less accepted than you think it is, but feel free to correct that by publishing papers about it. I've never followed up on it, but as always in philosophy the controversy never ends. As I've said, I disagree with Andreas a bit about the nature of such theories. In my view, they are in the end arbitrary, based on conflicting "intuitions." Still, I think that upon sincere reflection everybody should be able to convince him-/herself that his definition is better than yours.
Interesting rabbit hole. I don't think that's quite Stokke's theory, in particular he doesn't seem to think that the fact you are lying about must be true. That's the falsity condition, which doesn't come from Stokke although some others argue for it.
In fact the first parts of both definitions proposed by Stokke are just more formal versions of the definition I gave.
"You lie if and only if you say that p, you believe that p is false..."
It's a false statement about your own knowledge. That's essential. As Stokke says “you lie when you assert something you believe to be false”.
The greater rigor lies in violation of the violation of conversational norms and the purpose of the communication, which certainly seems correct to me. So while my definition and explanation were not complete, they seem to be consistent with Stokke.
The addition of the falsity condition seems to be contested. An attempted lie which is actually (unintentionally) relating the truth is apparently called a palter. I don't find that convincing, it's still a false statement about your knowledge so would meet Stokke's criteria at least as given in the article I found. I'd say it's a class of lie. Maybe he changed his mind later.
No, I doubt he changed his opinion. You're totally right, I misremembered a personal conversation with him where we discussed this principle. Quite embarrassing!
It appears that I would defend the traditional falsity condition, like others do, too, and that was probably even part of our disagreement. Regarding the "palter", I'm pretty sure he defended that this is not a lie. But after my misrepresentation of his position you definitely shouldn't take my word for it. This is not my line of work anyway, in my opinion you can define these concepts as needed relative to a more encompassing theory or purpose, and it doesn't make much sense insisting on one definition over the other. For instance, I believe in a legal context a lie could be defined very differently than for purposes of a moral theory. Regarding the everyday use, I find the version with the falsity condition I've presented above the most compelling.
However, you seem to be awfully certain of your position and present it with apodeictic certainty. If you're really interested in the topic, I recommend Meibauer (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Lying as a reading. You'll see that your view is far less accepted than you think it is, but feel free to correct that by publishing papers about it. I've never followed up on it, but as always in philosophy the controversy never ends. As I've said, I disagree with Andreas a bit about the nature of such theories. In my view, they are in the end arbitrary, based on conflicting "intuitions." Still, I think that upon sincere reflection everybody should be able to convince him-/herself that his definition is better than yours.