The whole premise of client asset segregation is that failure of the broker should not put the assets of a client in jeopardy. This isn't a technical detail of "the regulations", it's the entire foundational premise.
The trade is not "done" until it settles. As discussed throughout, that's T+2. Prior to settlement, the trade can fail (e.g. your counterparty turns out not to have the money/stock to fund their side of the trade).
If you really want to read the detail, it's called Rule 15c3-3.
15c3-3 does not say that a broker can not use client funds to purchase securities for the client that the client is trying to buy.
It says the broker can’t use client funds to purchase securities for proprietary trading.
Everyone has totally misread the rule and then is stating a total falsehood as if it’s unequivocal truth. It’s maddening.
> The Commission adopted Rule 15c3-3 in 1972, in part, to ensure that a broker-dealer in possession of customers' funds either deployed those funds “in safe areas of the broker-dealer's business related to servicing its customers” or, if not deployed in such areas, deposited the funds in a reserve bank account to prevent commingling of customer and firm funds.[7] Rule 15c3-3 requires a broker-dealer to calculate what amount, if any, it must deposit on behalf of customers in the reserve bank account, entitled “Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers” (“Reserve Bank Account”), under the formula set forth in Rule 15c3-3a (“Reserve Formula”).[8] Generally, the Reserve Formula requires a broker-dealer to calculate any amounts it owes its customers and the amount of funds generated through the use of customer securities, called credits, and compare this amount to any amounts its customers owe it, called debits.[9] If credits exceed customer debits, the broker-dealer must deposit that net amount in the Reserve Bank Account.[10]
> Possession and Control Monitoring is related to SEC rule 15c3-3 - The Customer Protection Rule. The Customer Protection Rule prohibits a brokerage firm from commingling fully paid for customer securities with non-fully paid for customer securities and/or firm securities.
> When a client of the firm purchases securities through the firm and pays for those securities in full, the firm must "lock-up" or "segregate" those securities for the protection of the client. The segregation of fully paid for customer securities protects those client owned securities from the firm's creditors in the event that the firm can no longer continue as a going concern - that is, the firm goes belly up.
> SEC rule 15c3-3 also prevents the brokerage firm from using full paid for segregated shares to satisfy any delivery commitments that might result from the firm's trading activities. If, for whatever reason, the firm does use segregated customer shares to satisfy a firm delivery a 'SEG Violation' or Possession and Control violation occurs.
> The reserve formula calculation is performed weekly to identify customer related payables and receivables. If the calculation results in a net payable to customer, the broker-dealer is required to reserve this amount in a special reserve bank account. This special reserve bank account is for the exclusive benefit of customers and funds can only be withdrawn with the support of an updated reserve formula calculation. In theory, on the date the reserve formula is calculated, combining the securities held in possession or control plus the funds included in the reserve formula should equal the amount the broker- dealer owes to the customer.
Everything in the rule is about not using customer funds for proprietary purposes. Not co-mingling customer and brokerage funds. Meaning the brokerage can’t make their own trades with customer money.
There isn’t a single word against using customer funds to purchase customer shares.
It’s a rule against using customer funds for non-customer activities.
If anything the problem that Robinhood ran up against was net capital requirements under 15c3-1.
Yes. I don't really understand what is being argued here.
There are three stages; execution, clearing and settlement.
Execution is the formation of the legal-binding agreement, e.g. a contract to exchange money for stock. For these cases, this is happening via matching on an exchange between a buyer and a seller. If the time of the trade is T, then happens at T+0.
Clearing is the paperwork activity that takes place after execution that include the due diligence steps of making sure that trades match, as well as other stuff that can reduce the amount of settlement activity. This happens in the period from T+delta through T+2-delta.
Settlement is the actual exchange, and is the point at which legal ownership of the stock changes. This happens at T+2.
It is obviously true that the brokerage uses client money for settlement; otherwise how would the broker ever fund any trades by its clients?
Is also obviously true that prior to the moment of settlement the client money is ... the client money, and subject to segregation. In other words, from the broker perspective, it's always client money until it's off their books.
The time when the NSCC wants to see adequate collateral is exactly during the clearing period, when the actual counterparty risk exists. That collateral absolutely cannot be from client money due to the segregation rules because the whole purpose of the collateral is to reduce the risk of a broker failure causing clients to lose money.
RH's collateral requirements blew up because some substantial proportion of their clientele was attempting to go long GME during a period of vast price volatility, and the NSCC's procedure for determining those requirements takes into account primarily the size of the net long position and the volatility for each member.
Net result: RH has to go raise capital in a hurry; RH stops its clients from going any further long GME.
So I'd say the truth came out in an interview late Sunday evening between Elon Musk and Robinhood CEO Vlad Tenev. [1]
> Tenev explained that while he was sleeping, at 3:30 a.m. PT on Thursday, Robinhood's operations team received a file from the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) that as a clearing broker, Robinhood Securities needed to put up around $3 billion "an order of magnitude more than what it typically is."
> So, it was unprecedented activity. I don't have the full context about what was going on, what's going on in the NSCC to make these calculations," Tenev added — prompting Musk to joke if someone was “holding you hostage right now.”
> Tenev said that after putting their heads together and calling the higher-ups at the NSCC, they got that figure down to $1.4 billion, from the initial $3 billion. "We were making some progress, right, but still a higher number," he added.
> Next, Tenev said they had to explain how to "manage risk in these symbols" by restricting activity in the volatile stocks. After that, the NSCC said the charges on the deposit were $700 million, which Robinhood "paid promptly."
You don't even have to read between the lines here. Robinhood isn't the problem here. Massive long retail demand is crushing shorts, which is potentially opening the clearing houses to multi-billion dollar losses. The way to stem the losses is to stem buying pressure and get the stock to come down.
So call up Robinhood and demand $3 billion in collateral (an order of magnitude higher than the day before) unless they stop the buying pressure on the shares. When Robinhood agreed to limit buying, the NSCC was willing to drop the collateral requirement to $700 million.
This isn't about a share-for-share clearing / transaction cost for each buy order entered. Those buy orders are cash funded and zero risk for Robinhood and zero risk to NSCC / DTCC. This is about extorting Robinhood to stave off the bankruptcy and subsequent contagion of a 140% short interest on a stock that's gone up 70x in just a few months.
Look, I agree that Robinhood can't use customer funds to pay extortion demands from the clearing houses. My point is that Robinhood clearing fully cash-paid buy orders does not incur additional clearing costs to Robinhood. It's not a per-order transaction fee. It's a slush fund which is used to pad against defaults.
> "Now, why is that so high? Like this seems like, it sounds like an unprecedented increase in demand for capital. What formula did they use to calculate that?" Musk asked.
> To contextualize the number, the app's CEO noted that RobinHood had raised about $2 billion in total venture funding. He added that the formula was “not fully transparent” and “not publicly shared.”
I'm sorry, but you just conceded the whole discussion (turns out: it was definitely clearing collateral calls!) but then moved the goalposts to a conspiracy in which the clearinghouses were protecting the shorts.
Going by what you think is reasonable isn't going to answer the legal question.