This misses the seminal result of Roughgarden & Tardos – the price of anarchy in the example is 4/3, but that is also the maximum price in any network where travel time scales linearly with traffic.[1]
Economically, this is a nice illustration of “externalities”. Each individual’s choice negatively effects the outcome of the others.
I wonder if the efficient outcome is restored again by allowing agents to pay each other to take a certain route. For example, agent 1 could get 0.009 from the other 99 agents for agreeing to take the detour. Thereby, the 99 agents save 0.01-0.009=0.001 each and the one agent gains 99*0.009-0.5=0.4 or so.
Just a scenario I’ve experienced—
You’re at the super market in one of those help your self lines. Unless the store is not busy, there is always some traffic.
Sometimes you have one or a few items, and someone in front will let you pass. (Will wait)
Other times someone in front of you has a lot and they apologize for holding up the line. You might think, no problem at all. (Is patient)
And yet others are so harried and stressed they will take every advantage offered. (Always go)
Seems there is enough variation just on personal experience. Supermarket lines could be a good simulation.
People may not act outwardly selfishly, but people may not realize that their individual action is selfish from a game theory perspective.
Everyone takes the highway because it is the fastest way to travel. However every additional car does slow it down. And this will continue until travel times on the highway either match non-highway travel times or the road literally can't handle more people. But no one thinks that driving the car to the grocery store across town to redeem a coupon is "selfish", because everyone thinks they're in traffic, not that they are traffic.
[1] https://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/routing.pdf