Are we talking about the D'Arcy Concession? I ask because none of what you are describing is found in the text of that agreement.
It's immediately obvious upon observation of modern Iran's highly developed petroleum industry that concessions sparked the development of infrastructure on a massive scale.
> Under that light, it's not really a case of buyer's remorse, where Iran signed a fair deal, and unjustly decided to renege on it.
I think it's precisely a case of buyer's remorse. In Iran prior to the development of infrastructure, 16% share in profits generated by AIOC with no initial capital commitment from the Qajars sounds like a great deal. In Iran after the wells are pumping, 16% share in profits sounds like a pittance. I reject your framing of the issue as an exploitation by British interests. That may be a palatable narrative for the times we live in today, but it's a distorted perception of the actual facts. Petroleum production was the single greatest driver of wealth and development in 20th century Iran. If not for foreign investment, the industry could not have boomed as it did.
D'Arcy took massive personal risk and even took the British government as an investor, but he failed several times in the process of exploring for oil before he was ultimately successful. Risk is the nature of the wildcatting business.
If you study the process of oil rights and nationalization in the Middle East, you will see that it is a topic marked by extremely brutish behavior from local parties as well as faraway beneficiaries like the US and the UK. Even OPEC is full of deception about production numbers as it sets production amongst member nations.
For that reason as well as others beyond the scope of the current conversation, there aren't many clean hands in the oil production business. Look at the massive corruption and cronyism taking place in Venezuela's PDVSA. Iran has the same kind of problem, where the country's dictators finance their corrupt practices using petroleum income.
See Section II (D) beginning on page 4, for violations of the original concession, and Section III (D) beginning on page 16 for violations of the 1933 agreement.
I'm not simply casting the British behavior as exploitative in some hand-waving appeal to the evils of imperialism. I'm talking about real, substantive, and specific violations of their own agreement.
That document highlights Iran's government's objections to AIOC, and we have to contextualize those objections within the backdrop that Iran had already nationalized AIOC a year prior, and needed to justify its actions internationally in order to keep selling oil abroad. World Bank member nations and other buyers also needed to know they would not invite grievances with the UK by continuing to buy from a nationalized company.
The author of the document you cite says that prior to the 1933 agreement, AIOC withheld royalties under guise of covering damages but really to squeeze Iran into accepting the new agreement; the problem with this logic is that damage to a pipeline also causes revenue loss, so you can't indemnify the company by simply paying them for the repair costs. The 1901 agreement says that Iran will protect the infrastructure, which it failed to do. In any case, those payments were addressed in Article 23 of the new agreement.
It does not appear to me that Section II (D) demonstrates that the contractual stipulations you mentioned (training/hiring of locals and establishment of medical facilities at AIOC sites) were violated. That part of the document also says nothing about infrastructure investment. Maybe I am missing something but I have read it three times now to make sure.
I don't see how Section II (D) could be any clearer. The agreement stipulates a reduction of foreign staff in Article 16 (III), and the document shows a substantial increase. The agreement stipulates the development of sanitation, health services, and housing meeting the most modern standards found throughout Iran in Article 17, and the document shows that workers live in unsanitary tent cities.
> Are we talking about the D'Arcy Concession? I ask because none of what you are describing is found in the text of that agreement.
The agreement was re-negotiated in 1933, according to terms that the grandparent pointed out. At this point I have to wonder if you are being disingenuous on purpose. The rest of your comment is a moral appeal making a case for why D'Arcy "deserved" the profits. You have to pick a lane, are you arguing on the basis of who "deserves" a countries natural resources, or from the point of view of adherence to contracts and agreements?
The financial risk of the initial investor is a reasonable justification for his profits. This applies to D'Arcy as well as AIOC. Their cut of the concession deal was reflective of their risk premium.
Iran didn't take the risk -- or the cost outlay -- of building rigs, importing engineers, etc. The idea that the British were somehow exploitative by resisting renegotiation is ignorant of this fact. Both the 1901 agreement and the 1933 agreement laid out responsibilities for the
Article 16 of the 1933 agreement covered the introduction of more Iranian nationals into the petroleum business, which AIOC did in fact carry out. Article 17 talks about sanitary and public health facilities for workmen, which sounds like bathrooms and medical tents/clinics to handle workmen's injuries and treat their families.
However, I see nothing in the 1901 agreement nor the 1933 agreement that says AIOC will invest in the general infrastructure of Iran. That is what the grandparent said ("generally contribute to the development of infrastructure in the country"). That idea is at best a false pretext for breaking the deal, and at worst just a blind restatement of something on Wikipedia. Actually, the text of the 1933 agreement says that AIOC would require Iran's consent to improve AIOC's infrastructure (including aviation and telephone).
Fortunately, the specific violations have been compiled by the world bank, as pointed out in a sibling comment.
I just have one part I found incredibly funny
> The idea that the British were somehow exploitative by resisting renegotiation is ignorant of this fact
If overthrowing a democratically elected government is not exploitative, I don't know what is. "Resisting renegotiation" is a very Orwellian way of phrasing such. I'm guessing something along the lines of "we will topple your government and hand over absolute power to a brutal dictator if the terms are violated" was also part of the the agreement?
What about all the other Iranians, the ones that had nothing to do with APOC or oil or the government. Did they also "deserve" their fate?
I would consider the construction of housing, sanitation and public health to be "general infrastructure", but if you prefer a different description, I won't argue. It strikes me as a bit of a moot point anyway, because the obligations to improve its workers' living conditions are clear and those obligations were not met. It doesn't matter whether you want to call them "infrastructure" or not.
It's immediately obvious upon observation of modern Iran's highly developed petroleum industry that concessions sparked the development of infrastructure on a massive scale.
> Under that light, it's not really a case of buyer's remorse, where Iran signed a fair deal, and unjustly decided to renege on it.
I think it's precisely a case of buyer's remorse. In Iran prior to the development of infrastructure, 16% share in profits generated by AIOC with no initial capital commitment from the Qajars sounds like a great deal. In Iran after the wells are pumping, 16% share in profits sounds like a pittance. I reject your framing of the issue as an exploitation by British interests. That may be a palatable narrative for the times we live in today, but it's a distorted perception of the actual facts. Petroleum production was the single greatest driver of wealth and development in 20th century Iran. If not for foreign investment, the industry could not have boomed as it did.
D'Arcy took massive personal risk and even took the British government as an investor, but he failed several times in the process of exploring for oil before he was ultimately successful. Risk is the nature of the wildcatting business.
If you study the process of oil rights and nationalization in the Middle East, you will see that it is a topic marked by extremely brutish behavior from local parties as well as faraway beneficiaries like the US and the UK. Even OPEC is full of deception about production numbers as it sets production amongst member nations.
For that reason as well as others beyond the scope of the current conversation, there aren't many clean hands in the oil production business. Look at the massive corruption and cronyism taking place in Venezuela's PDVSA. Iran has the same kind of problem, where the country's dictators finance their corrupt practices using petroleum income.