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Wow. To equate logic errors with being clueless? You do not need to be clueless to not sanitize input. You just need to forget about it, or incorrectly assume the input is safe, or, basically have a bad day. I make bad assumptions and stupid logic mistakes all the time. I guess everybody does because I see logic bugs everywhere.

Also you assert it is absurd to compare WordPress and openssh In the context of this argument why? They are both widely used software with very high stakes on their reliability and security. They show very well the contrast that even though one is memory managed and the other is not, that does not stop both having serious bugs. Actually it shows memory management is a don't care variable. On the other hand if chromium finds their project has much more memory management issues than other issues, then yes: memory management for the functionality of chromium seems to be a relevant facto upon which improvements can be done.




I think the previous poster was referring to SQL injection vulnerabilities from not sanitizing DB query parameters. And that's something you only f* up if you're clueless (like I was back when I used to do that).


>Wow. To equate logic errors with being clueless?

I meant that input sanitization is generally an easier problem to solve than writing safe C. If you can't do the former reliably, I'm certain you wouldn't be able to do the latter.

Input sanitization should generally be handled very close to the interface, once you went through this step you should expect to only deal with safe data. Memory safety covers the entire application, if some non-critical debugging function 10 level deep in the call stack messes up when it computes the size of a message buffer you can have a remote code execution vulnerability.

>Also you assert it is absurd to compare WordPress and openssh In the context of this argument why? They are both widely used software with very high stakes on their reliability and security.

Wordpress is a complicated ecosystem with multiple plugins that each can introduce security problems. Its attack surface is also incredibly large since it's generally public facing and anybody can interact with a lot of the features by default. That coupled with the fact that it's extremely popular make it a very good target for attackers. It's also a relatively fast moving target since the web changes fairly fast and new features have to be implemented regularly.

OpenSSH does mostly one thing and does it well. Its surface of attack is a lot smaller and it's vastly easier to audit and test. Its development is also overseen by the OpenBSD developers, who are famously uncompromising regarding safety. The feature set is very stable and changes very slowly.

>Actually it shows memory management is a don't care variable.

The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. How much development effort went into making sure that these issues didn't exist? How many thousands of hours auditing the code and making sure it did what people wanted? In a safer language this time could've been spent auditing other parts of the codebase or implementing other features.

I'd also like to point out that one of the biggest OpenSSH vulnerabilities ever found (in the Debian version of OpenSSH where the maintainer heavily reduced the generated key entropy by mistake) was indirectly caused by a memory issue since the reason for the patch was a false-positive returned by Valgrind regarding use of uninitialized memory.




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